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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Perspectives of the Antifa movement in Cyprus

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ABSTRACT: The article examines two different leftist, Antifa actors in Cyprus, a political party and a societal group (i.e., an organized football fan group), in relation to two issues. First, we scrutinize their action repertoire in order to identify the type of activities they embrace to tackle the fascist/far-right threat and activity. Second, we study their perceptions regarding the extent of the fascist threat and the use of violence in their treatment of far-right organizations and activists. The article seeks to understand how antifascists in Cyprus understand resistance against far-right organizations, and violence in particular as one manifestation of this resistance. The methodology relied on fieldwork that combines two different methods: analysis of social media posts over a span of 11 years (2010-2021) and selected interviews with activists and cadres from the two actors. We find that they share similar perceptions about the extent and the nature of the fascist threat in Cyprus. They also share similarities with regard to the overall toolkit they use to deal with the far-right. However, they deviate significantly in the way they perceive the use of violence against fascists.

KEYWORDS: AKEL, Gate 9, constraints, violence, street activism, digital activism, action repertoire

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1. Introduction

The Antifa movement is a complex and controversial phenomenon, with supporters and opponents offering sharply deviating views on its goals and methods. Antifa, short for 'antifascist', is a loosely-affiliated network of individuals and groups that oppose and actively resist the ideology and actions of fascism (Copsey and Merrill 2020, 125). The contemporary Antifa movement is characterized by an ad-hoc, non-hierarchical,

geographically dispersed social movement organization comprised of local activist groups (Copsey and Merrill 2020, 122) amongst others. Although primarily committed to fight neo-Nazism, fascism and racism, Antifa groups do not exhaust their activity in these themes alone. They are often engaged in other causes, such as movements for democratization, struggles against authoritarianism, improving social conditions of minorities and those in need, protecting the rights of immigrants, etc.

Antifascist studies were communist-dominated for many years (see for example Ceplair 1987; Payne 2003). However, anti-fascism was (and is) embedded in various national and local contexts leading to diverse trajectories, agencies and solidarities shaped by antifascist political activity. These are usually referred to as ‘anti-fascism from below’ (see also the introduction of this special issue) because they underline the importance of local contexts and experiences (Braskén, Copsey and Featherstone Copsey 2021, 6). This article taps into both traditions as it aspires to examine the Antifa movement in Cyprus in the context of both local conditions and communist heritage.

The use of violence is probably the most controversial and debated aspect of Antifa activity regarding the way they stand against far-right groups and organizations. This has led, in recent years, to recurrent calls and appeals by conservative right-wing politicians, particularly in the USA but also beyond, to designate Antifa as an extremist and sometimes terrorist organization, largely equating Antifa with organized violent extremists. However, “the evidence for such an equation has been mostly limited to a handful of instances that usually bear the hallmarks of political exaggeration or are alternatively attributable to individuals loosely associated with the Antifa movement” (Copsey and Merrill 2020, 131).

The present survey aims to analyze contemporary anti-fascism in Cyprus in a way that could stimulate similar analyses and comparisons in other countries but also among Antifa organizations transnationally. It relates to two issues: the forms of militant/street and digital activism they embrace against far-right groups and organizations on the one hand, and their perceptions of the extent of the fascist danger and the use of violence in their treatment of this threat on the other. This focus addresses a gap in the literature on the Antifa movement and organization in Cyprus, and also offers an opportunity to compare this movement with other similar cases; for instance, in south Europe. Cyprus went through a period of turbulent far-right activity before 1974 (see Sakellaropoulos 2017, 415-646), like other south European countries, which culminated in a military coup orchestrated by the extreme right, but has since developed a rather consensual political system. However, since the late 2000s the National Popular Front ELAM (Katsourides 2013) — a far-right party, with close ties to the Greek neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn — was established for the first time in the post-1974 era. ELAM’s presence, along with an increased political agenda focus on issues such as immigration, economic crisis and the ethnic composition of Cyprus’ population have resurfaced debates around far-right ideas, as well as the danger emanating from their activities.

The aim of this paper is two-pronged. First, we scrutinize the repertoire of action of two different leftist, Antifa actors in Cyprus: 1) the political party ‘The Progressive Party of the Working People’ (AKEL) and 2) a societal group, i.e., an organized football fan group, Gate 9. We will identify what type of activities they each embrace to tackle the fascist/far-right threat, and place their actions within the wider literature of contentious politics (Tilly 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Second, we analyze their perceptions regarding the use of violence against fascists. In this way, we seek to understand how antifascists in Cyprus understand resistance against far-right organizations, and particularly violence as one manifestation of this resistance. By comparing two different types of Antifa actors, we achieve leverage in explaining differences within the Antifa movement and we also address issues related to the constraints Antifa actors face because of the nature of their organization. The methodology relied on fieldwork combining two different methods: analysis of public announcements and social media posts (Facebook) over an 11-year period (2010-2021) and selected interviews with activists and cadres from the two actors. We find that they share similar perceptions about the extent and

the nature of the fascist threat in Cyprus. They also share many similarities with regard to the overall toolkit they use to deal with the far-right. However, they deviate significantly in how they perceive the use of violence against fascists.

1.1 The Antifa movement in perspective

The Antifa movement has a long history, with roots dating back to the 1920s and 1930s in Europe and particularly Germany. The archetype was a militant Communist Party-sponsored organization, *Antifaschistische Aktion*, active during 1932-33 (Testa 2015, 53-84). However, today's Antifa groups have no direct historical lineage to this communist-sponsored organization although some still see themselves as Marxist, e.g., in UK Antifa (Copsey 2018). In fact, there is no political party affiliation, no central organization, no central leadership, and no prescribed doctrine beyond a shared belief that 'fascism' must be defeated (Copsey and Merrill 2020, 125). Antifa in this sense is more reactive in nature against the fascist threat and might be best understood as 'essentially an ad-hoc sociopolitical movement designed to address a specific problem' (Knouff 2012, 65). However, it also has a proactive scope (Testa 2015, 5). This approach is based on the understanding that fascism is a violent and oppressive ideology that poses a threat to marginalized communities and to the principles of democracy and equality. However, with the dawn of the millennium, antifascists in a number of countries had to recalibrate their strategies as new far-right parties rose to prominence by distancing themselves from overtly fascist politics (Bray 2017, 74 f.). Furthermore, fascists have shifted from street politics to a professionalized presence on tv and in the media, for instance. Antifa activists have been forced to shift their strategies against these new populist figures, as well as finding new ways to justify militant action, which public opinion increasingly opposes.

The way antifascists understand and define fascism is critically important, although in practice it has become quite flexible and inclusive. While many would agree that a core ideological tenet of fascism is ultra-nationalism, in practice, 'fascism' tends to be approached more in terms of everyday 'reactionary' social forces and tendencies, such as racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, the scapegoating and marginalizing of oppressed groups, and police brutality (Copsey and Merrill 2020, 127). This allows both antifascists and leftwing parties to address their criticisms to the broad space occupied by the far-right (Gilles 2019), which this article also applies in terms of the perception and practice of the Cypriot Antifa actors. However, such a broad definition also invites criticism that Antifa are 'notoriously generous in distributing the fascist label' (Johnstone 2019), since the label fascist is easily assigned to many different actors and actions not always justified by the definition of fascism. In other words, fascism is often applied in an inflationary way.

1.1.1 Antifa action repertoire

Antifa culture and organizing has also expanded within professional football team fan clubs. Sports, and particularly football, appeal more than any other social activity to the masses (Kyle 2019; Tuñón and Brey 2012;) and are inextricably related to politics (Power et al. 2020), and football especially offers an arena where politics unfold in numerous ways. Various regimes, political parties, individual politicians, and other actors have used football, and sports in general, to increase their appeal among the masses; to divert attention from pressing social and political developments (e.g., the world cup in Argentina in 1978); to make their way into politics (Berlusconi is a prime example here); to recruit members, etc. Organized football fan groups, mainly comprised by young people, are therefore the locus of both fascist and Antifa politics. At the same time, organized fan groups are also agents of both fascist and Antifa politics (Kennedy and Kennedy 2013; Testa

and Armstrong 2008). In Europe, some of the very fiercest antifascist conflicts have erupted in the context of football, for example in the late 1970s in Britain (Kuhn 2011: 143-147), or the Hamburg St. Pauli fan club, which established the Association of Antifascist Football Fans. Over the years, St. Pauli fans have formed bonds with antifascist fans of other European clubs as part of a more generalized Antifa culture (Kuhn 2011: 135-139).

Antifa actors ultimately seek to oppose and disrupt the activities of far-right groups, and thus utilize a variety of tactics representing and expressing the ideological approach each different actor embraces. Several kinds of antifascism can be identified: militant, legislative, and liberal (Testa 2015: 6). While some Antifa actors may be more militant or confrontational in their approach, others employ more peaceful tactics, such as boycotts and educational campaigns. Although shaped by locality, Antifa also typically deploy a mix of street protest and digital activism with the latter (rather than the former), accounting for the vast majority of everyday activity in contemporary times.

Digital activism refers to the use of social media and other online platforms to coordinate Antifa actions and to disseminate information about far-right events and activities and ways to oppose them, as well as to mobilize supporters and raise awareness about Antifa causes (Henke 2021; Copsey and Merrill 2020: 126). The maintenance of an antifascist media presence - be it via print media, music, or social networking sites online - is important for communicating arguments for militancy, to publicize activities and successes, to expose fascists, and to encourage others to join the struggle (Testa 2015: 5). In addition to these more traditional forms of digital activism, Antifa activists often use more aggressive tactics, such as ‘doxing’, which involves the public release of personal information about individuals believed to be associated with far-right groups (Bray 2017: 86). They may also use more traditional forms of communication, such as flyers and posters, to spread their message and mobilize supporters (Copsey and Merrill 2021: 15).

Militant antifascism (often referred to as *street* antifascism despite the differences between the two terms) refers to the branch of Antifa movement that opposes fascist ideologies and groups, often through direct action and physical resistance. It can take the form of protests, counter-demonstrations, and even violent confrontations with fascist individuals and groups in order to disrupt far-right rallies and marches. Militant antifascists believe that fascism poses a serious threat to human rights, democracy, and social justice, and that it is necessary to actively confront and resist fascist movements to prevent them from gaining power and spreading their hateful ideology. *Street Antifa activism* is less violent and confrontational in its methods. It refers to the use of public protests, direct action, and other forms of physical presence, including participating in protests and rallies and blocking access to far-right events. In addition to physical confrontations, Antifa activists also use a variety of other tactics, such as calling for boycotts of businesses or organizations that are seen as supportive of far-right ideologies.

Overall, the tactics and action repertoire employed by Antifa actors and activists vary and often depend on the specific context and goals of a given action or campaign, as well as the type of Antifa actor. While some tactics, such as physical confrontations, have been controversial, others, such as boycotts and educational campaigns, are more widely accepted as legitimate forms of protest.

2. Methodology and data

The present inquiry is a case study of the country of Cyprus, and the two main antifascist actors on the island: the left-wing party AKEL, which captures approximately 25% of the popular vote, and the largest organized group of football fans in Cyprus, the leftist Gate 9. These two Antifa actors in Cyprus each belong to the broader radical political left, but have different qualities and restraints. Examining these two groups

offers insight into how each group understands themselves and their practices. At the same time, we address antifascist struggle not only on the political level, but also in probably in its most raw societal manifestation, i.e., football. Moreover, by comparing two different type of actors we address issues related to the (different) constraints Antifa actors face because of the nature of their organization. This form of comparison offers leverage in explaining the variety existing within the Antifa movement and the differences in Antifa action repertoires.

The article makes use of a mixed-method approach to capture both militant/street and online activity, and therefore relies on fieldwork that combines two different methods. First, we review social media posts and public announcements, in terms of trying to identify both the form and context of their digital and militant activism, but also the way they frame their responses to issues pertaining to the rise and activity of far-right organizations. Our search for digital activism included public announcements and posts on social media (Facebook) over an 11-year time span (2010-2021), although not all activities were posted publicly in the first few years. The data presented concerns only their antifascist activities.

Second, we performed 8 selected, semi-structured interviews with cadres and activists, four from each of these two groups, which offers qualitative data to explain and elaborate their actions and perceptions. Interviews were carried out in February and March 2023 with Gate 9 activists. Anonymity of Gate 9 interviewees was critical, as activists explained they could not speak openly of what happens on the streets or with the police, as it could make them targets either of the police, with whom they all had problems in the past, or of far-right groups. While all names for Gate 9 activists have been changed, AKEL interviewees declared their names openly.

The two group of interviewees differ in their demographic characteristics in terms of age: all Gate 9 members were below the age of 40, whereas the AKEL cadres ranged from ages 49 to 64. The difference in the age cohorts is reflective of the differences in their membership: the vast majority of Gate 9 members are below the age of 30 (Kimonas interview), whereas AKEL's average membership age is close to 60 (Stephanou interview). All interviewees were male, which was a choice made by each organization. We addressed each group with an official request for a small number of knowledgeable and experienced members of their leadership, and they selected and provided the interviewees. In the case of Gate 9 this reflects the predominantly male membership of this group (approximately 600 members, 15% of which are women), whereas for AKEL we do not know if it was random. However, AKEL's membership (approximately 10,000 members) is also male dominated with only approximately 25% women (Stephanou interview). All interviewees are members of the collective top leadership in their respective organization.

The questionnaire was structured in two parts. The initial questions sought to identify the nature and extent of the fascist risk in Cyprus. We asked the interviewees to identify the level, the expression, the form and the nature of the fascist threat; the timing of its appearance in contemporary times; the main far-right/fascist actors; whether fascists use violence in their activities and who their main targets are; what their action repertoire is; and how they understand the state authorities' stance against the far-right threat and violence. The second part focused on the Antifa actor itself, with questions including: their perception of how the fascist threat and violence should be dealt with; which actors they consider allies in the antifascist struggle; what their antifascist action repertoire is; what their take on the use of violence against far-right and fascists is, and whether the Antifa movement should make use of counter-demonstrations; and if they consider their antifascist action and stance to be satisfactory thus far.

3. Cyprus

The character of (historical and) contemporary fascism (or the far-right) in Cyprus is distinct from many other parts of Europe. Cyprus has no Nazi or neo-Nazi parties or marches to commemorate anything related to the past, and there is no white power rock scene, skinhead movement, or anything similar. However, there has always been a fascist and far-right threat related to the island's unresolved ethnic problem, i.e., the Cyprus problem. The latter refers to the longstanding political issue and conflict involving the two main communities on the island and the three guarantor powers: Turkey, Greece and the UK. The internal aspect of this conflict primarily stems from the ongoing disputes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots surrounding their political status and territorial control. The external aspect of the problem relates to the presence of foreign military forces. Although it took different shapes during the twentieth century, it had been predominantly shaped by the 1974 Greek junta military coup against the elected president of the RoC and the subsequent Turkish military invasion that divided the island thereafter (see Mallinson 2005; Ker-Lindsay 2011).

A crucial dimension of the Cyprus problem has been its association with Enosis, i.e., union with Greece, which developed during the British colonial era (Georghallides 1979). The idea gained traction among Greek Cypriots and became an all-embracing Greek Cypriot demand until Cyprus' independence in 1960. The most radical and extreme manifestations of Enosis were related to the more right-wing political actors and politicians on the island (Katsourides 2013). This became even more evident in the post-independence era, and the EOKA II paramilitary organization participated in the military coup against the President of the RoC (Loizides 2007). Despite internal diversity, Greek Cypriot extreme right organizations have always been associated with: (a) an intransigent line on the Cypriot problem that excluded the Turkish Cypriots and did not take into account the balance of power in the region (i.e., the role of Turkey); (b) anti-Turkishism; and (c) anti-communism. The last two forms assumed extreme dimensions on several occasions, extending to the murders of Turkish Cypriots and leftists.

The year 1974 was a turning point for the extreme right in Cyprus, which was forced to the political sidelines, finding shelter in the right-wing party, Democratic Rally (DISY), in Greek Cypriot student organizations in Greece (Ierodiakonou 2003, 304-313), and in the organized fans of right-wing football clubs. In 2008, the far-right landscape changed fundamentally with the establishment of ELAM (Katsourides 2013), a subsidiary party of the Greek neo-Nazi Golden Dawn (on GD see Ellinas 2015). Alongside ELAM, several other small, far-right groups appeared, albeit with a tiny membership. Some of these smaller groups are more extreme than ELAM. For instance, the leader of one such group, a lawyer from Limassol, was convicted to 10 months imprisonment for orchestrating an attack against the participants of an event organized by two extra-parliamentary left groups (Charalambous 2023). ELAM is the most powerful far-right organization in Cyprus with parliamentary representation (Ellinas and Katsourides 2022, 13). These new far-right groups retain some of the characteristics of the old Cypriot far-right, but they also incorporate new issues and methods of mobilization. ELAM, in particular, continues to maintain connections with past expressions of the extreme right (nationalism, anti-communism and anti-Turkishism). It also endorses the so-called 'Helleno-Christian ideals', a term that includes Christian identity within Greek nationalist ideology, along with a hardline position on the Cyprus problem.

However, ELAM no longer focuses exclusively on 'national issues', but rather has enriched its political arsenal with new issues that have been gaining salience in public discourse: the consequences of the economic crisis, the sharp rise of immigrants and asylum seekers, national identity, Turkish provocations and political corruption. All these issues are considered privileged for contemporary far-right parties (FRPs) and on many occasions FRPs have managed to establish authority and ownership over them, or at least dictate the frame in which they are discussed.

ELAM combines parliamentary and paramilitary activity and organization. For example, they organize target shootings, outfield exercises and excursions and they form assault battalions to attack immigrants. Past violent incidents have been recorded involving members of ELAM (e.g., attacks on Turkish Cypriot cars). However, violent incidents have significantly decreased in the last few years, indicative of a strategic shift in their political and communication strategy following the October 2020 indictment and eventually the conviction in Greece of Golden Dawn as a criminal organization (Ellinas 2021). ELAM's emphasis is now placed on anti-immigration rhetoric, anti-systemicism, family and protest politics. Any aggressive behaviour now takes place under the guise of organized supporters of specific right-wing football clubs or 'unaffiliated' citizens.

3.1 Antifa activity and actors in Cyprus

Antifascist activity in Cyprus also has a long history and corresponds to the type and level of fascist and/or far-right threats. What is distinct about Cyprus Antifa activity historically is that it was almost entirely molded within, and expressed by, the leftist Popular Movement; i.e., AKEL and its ancillary organizations (for AKEL and the leftist popular movement see Ellinas and Katsourides 2013). Historical antifascism underwent three distinct phases: first, the 1940s-1950s; second, from 1960-1974; and thirdly from 2008 onwards, following the reappearance of the far-right as an autonomous political actor.

The first traces of antifascist activity occurred in the 1930s with the voluntary participation of Cypriot communists in the Spanish Civil War (Strongos 2011). A few years later, in 1943, AKEL, called on its cadres and members to voluntarily enlist in the British army, in order to free Greece and the rest of the conquered peoples of Europe from the threat of Hitler's fascism (AKEL 1943). In the late 1940s AKEL formed self-defending militant groups to protect itself from the fascist 'X' organization led by Grivas.¹ It was during these years that the entire society and the political system of Cyprus was ideologized along the left-right divide, creating two rigid and opposing ideological camps that permeated all social activities, including sports. The nationalists and the communists created their own ideologically rigid social milieus that included cafes in every village, businesses, newspapers and football teams (Panayiotou 2006). Given the examination of an organized football fans association it is crucial to highlight that this all-embracing ideological division between the two camps is nowhere better portrayed than the division between the two biggest football teams on the island, OMONOIA (leftist) and APOEL (nationalist).² Gate 9 was established officially in 1992 as the more militant, organized OMONOIA fans association, with anti-fascism one of their guiding principles (Nicos interview). Gate 9 had very strong ties with AKEL until the late 2000s when their relationships deteriorated (see below). The vast majority of OMONOIA and Gate 9 fans voted for AKEL and many of AKEL's voters are also OMONOIA fans.

In the period of the nationalist EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) armed struggle against British colonialism (1955-59), AKEL and its affiliated trade union PEO (Pancyprian Federation of Labour) both embarked on political education campaigns. They also formed self-protection groups to defend themselves against the surge of nationalist violence against the party, which culminated in attacks and assassinations of leftists by EOKA militants, particularly in 1957-58 (Kızılyürek 2015; Katsourides 2021). Subsequently, in the tense period following Cyprus' independence in 1960 and until the Turkish invasion in

¹ Grivas was a notorious Greek Cypriot anticommunist and pro-royalist serviceman who founded the extreme right organization X in Greece during Nazi occupation cooperating with the German authorities against the leftist guerilla movement. He later led both the EOKA I and EOKA II. He was also responsible for ordering assassinations of leftists during the EOKA I armed struggle against the British. For Grivas and his activities see Katsourides 2021. For the 'X' organization see Panourgia 2009.

² For the establishment of OMONOIA in 1948 and the ideological division in Cyprus sports, see Ioakimidis 2013.

1974, AKEL and the government were forced to establish official and unofficial militant groups to deal with the terrorist far-right organization EOKA II. The latest antifascist period concerns the years from 2008 onwards, which addresses the threat posed by the appearance and establishment of the extreme right ELAM.

Contemporary anti-fascism in Cyprus is largely centered around two pillars that usually cooperate: the left political party AKEL and several small, societal groups with varied causes: Antifa, pro-immigrant, etc. The largest contemporary antifascist forces in Cyprus are AKEL as the parliamentary force of the left (Iliopoulou and Karathanasis 2014, 188), and Gate 9, now independent of any connection with AKEL, and probably the most militant expression of anti-fascism in Cyprus. AKEL and Gate 9 have demonstrated through their actions that antifascism is intrinsic to their activity and ideological composure (People's World 2011). As mentioned above, these two actors have historically shared an antifascist stance: OMONOIA and Gate 9 originate from the same matrix: AKEL. OMONOIA in particular is also rooted in the labour and antifascist struggles of the 1940s and 1950s. However, their relations have deteriorated since 2010 when Gate 9 became autonomous from AKEL tutelage and particularly in 2018 when OMONOIA was turned into a private company and sold to a Cypriot-American businessman. Gate 9 strongly disagreed with this decision, for which they blamed AKEL, and decided to form a new football team to restore the pride of OMONOIA fans and the connection with the ideas of 1948 (olaomonía 2021).

4. Empirical

4.1 Contemporary fascist threat in Cyprus

This section is primarily based on in-depth interviews conducted with activists and cadres of the two groups. The primary concern was identifying the extent of the fascist and/or far-right threat in Cyprus as perceived by the two actors. Interviewee responses from both groups are presented together, as they share many views, and are then situated in wider debates on the transformation of far-right politics.

All AKEL and Gate 9 interviewees report that the fascist threat is real, is increasing, and is simultaneously changing. They also all agree that the far-right, in Cyprus, is a diachronic phenomenon that persisted even after 1974 events in student organizations in Greece and in small groups within the right-wing party of DISY. They thus all point to the qualitative difference that occurred in 2008 with the reappearance of the far-right in the form of the extreme rightwing party ELAM. The conditions for this party's establishment were created by the financial crisis and the tumultuous economic environment, as well as guidance from Golden Dawn 'mother-party' in Greece (Christophides, Sylikiotis, Kimonas, Periklis, interviews). Beyond ELAM, which is considered to be most dangerous far-right actor, other important incubators of far-right attitudes and actions are found in the organized football fans of right-wing teams such as APOEL, Anorthosis and Apollon (which ELAM has long since infiltrated); in the student movement, both in Cyprus and in Greece; and also in the world of organized crime (Stephanou, Loukaides, Kimonas, Periklis interviews). The interviewees also agree that the Cypriot far-right ecosystem is far from united. However, they quickly point out that: 'although far-right groups have differences between them, and they often come into conflict, these groups are always united in every crucial moment particularly against the left and the immigrants' (Stephanou, Kimonas interviews).

The most intriguing point they raise, however, is the mutation of contemporary far-right, which makes it much more difficult to address. 'It was easy to discredit the hard-core fascists in the early post-1974 years since antifascists could rest assured that the majority of society would always side with you even if you had to become physical with them sometimes. They were easy times compared to now. In contemporary times fascism seems to be creeping and therefore much more difficult to deal with' (Christophides interview). Crucial to this process of far-right change and adaptation is the normalization of their presence and rhetoric offered by other

political parties and social actors, such as the media and the Cypriot Church (Sylikiotis, Kimonas interviews). In this regard, part of the media sometimes offers a false and twisted image of the far-right, hiding the real and serious threat it poses. ‘Despite this mutation however, ELAM continues to organize military drills and showcase their physical presence through military-style marches and other similar activities’ (Sylikiotis interview). For example, ‘members of ELAM go around in the streets in small groups and attack vulnerable people such as immigrants and homosexuals’ (Miltos interview).

‘The main forms in which the fascist and far-right threat is expressed are traditional hardcore nationalism and more recently racism’ (Loukaides interview). Both are facilitated by the worsening economic and social conditions of the Greek Cypriots and the increase of immigration to Cyprus, which provokes racism in society (Christophides, Miltos interviews). All AKEL cadre and Gate 9 interviewees agreed that the main recipients of far-right threats and occasional violence are the immigrants, the Turkish Cypriots and the leftists. More recently, other social minorities also became targets of their offensive behavior, particularly the LGBTQ community (Kimonas, Stephanou interviews). All interviewees pointed to instances of extreme right violence against each of the above groups, namely: an incident in Larnaca in November 2010 against the organizers and participants in a pro-immigrant festival; an attack against leftist students in December 2011; an attack against Mehmet Ali Talat, former leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, while he was the main speaker at a 2017 event in Limassol; attacks against Turkish Cypriots outside APOEL premises in Nicosia in May 2016; the beating of immigrants prior to 2013; and most recently, in December 2022, a demonstration held outside the parliament in favour of Grivas. However, interviewees fear that many violent incidents go unregistered, either because those assaulted are too afraid to report them (e.g., irregular immigrants) or because the police conceal them (Christophides, Nicos interview).

None of the interviewees were satisfied with the treatment of far-right offenses and offenders by state mechanisms and particularly by the police. Although they do not believe that the far-right has penetrated the security forces to the same extent as the Golden Dawn in Greece, they all believe that the right is somehow still being protected by the police. This perception was much more evident among the Gate 9 activists, who themselves regularly face ill-treatment from police officers. Both leftist actors justify this view based upon: 1) the poor record of indictments for this type of offense; 2) the fact that the police has been staffed for years by officers with personal biases or sympathies towards far-right ideologies or people. Given the small size of Cyprus society and the links between politicians and organized fans, this leads to mishandling of accusations against far-right-wingers.

Contextualizing this debate within the wider transformations of the European far-right helps explain how changes in the far-right pose increased difficulties for Antifa actors to respond to these new strategies, and to cope with the more demanding environment described by the Cyprus interviewees. The first important factor is the mainstreaming of far-right parties (FRPs) and ideologies (Mudde 2019; Mondon and Winter 2020; Brown, Mondon and Winter 2023). These parties have moderated their rhetoric, adopted more populist stances, and emphasized issues such as anti-immigration, Euroscepticism, and national identity to appeal to a broader base of voters. This strategy, which ELAM also applies, has allowed some FRPs to gain electoral success and establish themselves as influential political players (e.g., the National Front — now National Rally — in France).

A second important trend is that far-right movements in Europe have evolved their rhetoric and tactics to adapt to changing political landscapes. While traditional far-right ideologies centered on white supremacy and racial nationalism still exist, many contemporary far-right movements have shifted their focus to cultural nationalism and anti-Islamist sentiments. They often employ anti-globalization rhetoric, critique mainstream political establishments, and exploit fears and anxieties around immigration and national security. All these

resonate with the beliefs of large parts of local populations in many countries, thus making it very hard to marginalize the FRPs.

Third, FRPs have increasingly moved online and particularly utilize the power of social media (Caiani and Kröll 2015) to spread their messages and recruit supporters. Online platforms provide a space for far-right individuals and groups to organize, disseminate propaganda, and connect with like-minded individuals across borders. Social media platforms have also facilitated the amplification of far-right voices and allowed the spread of hate speech and extremist content (Smyrnaioi, Elafropoulos, Tsimpoukis, Mniestri and Tsimitakis 2023).

This broader European context of FRP activity is what left parties, civil society organizations, anti-racist groups, and other progressive movements now need to mobilize against. Protests, demonstrations, and grassroots initiatives have sought to challenge the far-right's narratives, defend democratic values, and promote inclusive societies. However, this resistance faces a much-changed landscape that decisively favors far-right activity and actors.

4.2 Antifascist repertoire

This section presents and analyzes the findings from our primary research on both actors' webpages and social media accounts on Facebook. It is important to note the differences between the two actors, which naturally affects the scope and type of their activities. A political party, by definition, has a much more expanded scope of action and this might result in fewer activities in a particular field, in this case antifascism.

As presented in the methodology section, we collected all the activities published by the two actors during an 11-year time period. The activities (digital and/or street) that relate to antifascist action are presented in a small number of subcategories for each actor, which we tried to keep the same for comparative reasons. In these sub-categories we did not include solely those activities that could be explicitly assigned as antifascist because this would not do them justice regarding the real number of antifascist events and activities both actors organize. We also took into consideration activities indirectly connected with the antifascist struggle. For example, antifascist activities in the Cypriot (and the Greek) context, such as street marches to honour the uprising of the Greek students in 1973 against the Greek military junta are also included. In the same manner we included all events celebrating the Greek resistance against the Nazis in Greece and the role of the communist-sponsored, partizan organization EAM-ELAS in this struggle,³ as well as the events honouring and celebrating the resistance against the 1974 military coup in Cyprus. The numbers presented below for both actors refer exclusively to the sum of their antifascist activities.

4.2.1 AKEL

AKEL's antifascist activity is divided into three main categories. One, the political actions that include mainly public meetings, debates, educational events and other activities demanding the physical presence of people (e.g., documentary screening, lectures, seminars, etc.). Second, all extra-parliamentary activity that could be considered street activism, including demonstrations, marches and public gatherings in protest of far-right activities and actions. Third, digital activism through public announcements and posts on social media (Table 1).

³ EAM stands for National Liberation Front and it was the political branch of the resistance movement. ELAS stands for Greek People's Liberation Army, and as the name suggests, ELAS was the armed branch of the resistance.

Table 1: AKEL antifascist activities

Type of action	Number of activities
Street activism	15
Political activities (public meetings and debates, educational events)	15
Digital activism (Facebook)	95

Source: authors own compilation of data

As expected, considering the media-focused environment of political actors, digital activism predominates actions of both the party and the antifascist activities. Digital activism outnumbers the amount of street activities sixfold. However, a point of caution is necessary here. AKEL’s affiliated organizations and particularly the youth branch, EDON (United Democratic Youth Organization), also organizes autonomous antifascist events and activities that were not included in our survey, as we focused on those events explicitly organized by AKEL. Therefore, the overall number of antifascist activities organized by the party milieu is definitely larger than the one presented here.

All 95 digital mentions are broadly divided in two thematic groups: 40 of them are announcements and/or Facebook posts referring directly to historical expressions of fascism and the continuous need for antifascist struggle. These posts mainly represent an act of remembrance of the antifascist past both in Cyprus and abroad. They refer, for example, to the symbolic day of 9th of May that Nazi Germany surrendered to the Soviet troops, the rise and fall of the Greek military junta in Greece (21 April and 23 July), etc. The vast majority of the remaining 55 announcements and posts were directly related with the Cypriot and Greek context, emphasizing actions and opposition to the Golden Dawn in Greece and ELAM in Cyprus and their relation to fascist ideology and practices. GD and ELAM often serve as proxies for condemning fascism. In the Cyprus-related posts there is also a widespread mention of the extreme right paramilitary organization EOKA II that participated in the 1974 coup and particularly its leader, Colonel Grivas. EOKA II and Grivas are the most important signifiers of fascism and extreme right activity in Cyprus. Some of these announcements also concerned the condemnation of extreme right violence in Europe and elsewhere, and expressed solidarity to immigrant and leftist victims of fascist attacks.

Street activities organized by the party included marches to honour local and international antifascists days such as the assassination of two AKEL members Kavazoglu and Mishiaoulis by a Turkish paramilitary, fascist organization in April 1965; the students uprising in November 1973 in Greece against the military regime; against far-right violence in Cyprus and Greece (e.g., P. Fyssas assassination by the GD in 2013); etc. Other politically related activities were mainly of educational nature and included documentary screenings, debates on the far-right in Cyprus and Greece, and other similar events.

Finally, AKEL cadres cited two primary restrictions the party faces in its antifascist activity. Firstly, the historical, social and electoral weight of the party necessitates a very responsible behaviour. ‘We have no right, in such a hostile international, local and media setting, to jeopardize the party, by behaving irresponsible’ (Christophides interview). Implied here is an admission that a parliamentary radical left party that also aims to govern cannot engage in any questionable and illegal activity, i.e., the use of violence. ‘This would allow our enemies to brand us as extremists, the other side of the extremis continuum’ (Loukaides interview). The second constraint the party faces is what Christophides called ‘a pseudo-democratic dilemma’. He refers to the other democratic parties’ refusal to join the antifascist campaign and isolate the far-right in every respect by invoking

two main arguments. One, that the far-right has the right to express their ideas freely since we live in a democracy. Second, the claim that the far-right has been accepted by the citizens since they were voted into parliament and that everyone has to respect this. ‘We obviously disagree with this approach but we haven’t managed to convince them otherwise’, he admitted.

4.2.2 Gate 9

Gate 9 antifascist activities are more diverse and include five sub-categories. The first, like AKEL, refers to the political actions including mainly public meetings, debates, educational events and other activities that demand the physical presence of people (e.g., lectures). Second, street activities including demonstrations, marches and public gatherings opposing far-right actions. Here we also included events in which Gate 9 participated not as the main organizer but with its own bloc. Third, activities organized in the football stadiums. Fourth, we account for Gate 9’s participation in the international Antifa ALERTA network⁴ events and other antifascist, antiracist events. Finally, digital activism through public announcements and posts on their Facebook page (Table 2).

Table 2: Gate-9 antifascist activities

Type of action	Number of activities
Street activism	13
Political activities (public meetings and debates, educational events)	40
In-stadium activities	15
Antiracist festivals and participation in the ALERTA network events	10
Digital activism (Facebook)	53

Source: authors own compilation of data

Gate’s 9 street activism includes actions of a nature similar to AKEL, but differing from the latter in that Gate 9 often participated in marches and demonstrations not necessarily against fascism or the far-right *per se*, but with the aim of preventing far-rightists from taking part in these events. One such example cited by Gate 9 activists was the anti-austerity demonstrations in 2013. Gate 9 took part with its own bloc, purposely, in order to use their physical presence to discourage any attempt by ELAM to infiltrate the demonstration (Nicos, Kimonas interviews). Activities in the football stadiums included, for example, hanging banners in the stadiums to express their solidarity to like-minded groups and fans in Cyprus and abroad, but often with direct reference to antifascist and antiracist slogans. Interviewees highlighted two examples illustrating this behaviour. The first incident took place in September 2015, on the two-year anniversary of the assassination of the Greek antifascist activist Pavlos Fyssas by Golden Dawn members. Gate 9 raised a big banner with the slogan: ‘Pavlos lives, crush the Nazis’. On another occasion, in February 2017, Gate 9 raised a banner with

⁴ The Antifa Alerta Network was founded in 2007 to fight against the racism frequently found on the terraces in football stadiums globally. The network is primarily formed of groups of anti-racist fans, who are committed to fighting racism both on the streets and in the stadium. The network aims to bring together such groups from across the world, to show international solidarity and to unite in the struggle for a better situation. For more information see, <https://republica.international/alerta>

the slogan 'Refugees Welcome'. This was a response to a banner raised a few days earlier by the far-right APOEL ultras with the slogan: 'Refugees go home'. On some occasions, Gate 9 also hosted groups of immigrants and refugees in their team's home games as an act of solidarity (Miltos, Nicos, Periklis interviews).

Gate 9 organizes an annual antifascist, antiracist football tournament in Limassol and partakes in ALERTA tournaments and discussions of a similar nature. They also organize a number of purely antifascist educational events for members and others: e.g., discussions and lectures about the coup in 1974, the Golden Dawn, etc. They also annually honour the sacrifice of G. Tsikkouris who died trying to set up a bomb against the military dictators in Greece in 1970. Their digital antifascist activities/posts, like AKEL, are divided between 23 references to occasions of historical fascism, and 30 to events and activities related to ELAM and the Golden Dawn (including references to Grivas and the EOKA II). In this sub-category, there are also references condemning expressions of fascism and anti-immigrant, racist behaviour from the far-right ultras of APOEL FC, their main rival.

Interviewee Kimonas lists four main obstacles to their antifascist activity. The first is police behaviour, which is usually far more aggressive against leftist fans than the far-right ultras. The second reason relates to Gate's 9 internal culture. 'Even if we are attacked by fascists, our values and culture, our code of conduct as an organized football fans association, does not allow us to cooperate with the police against anyone; even against fascists. We'll deal with them ourselves'. The third constraint relates to the group's internal composition, as the membership have different opinions. 'Although most members are highly militant, there are also some voices within Gate 9 that do not want us to react violently'. Finally, it has to be remembered, Kimonas says, 'that we are not a political party, nor an exclusively Antifa actor. We do much more than our fair share'.

5. Perceptions on violence and treatment of far-right and fascist groups and organizations

You fight them by writing letters and making phone calls so you don't have to fight them with fists. You fight them with fists so you don't have to fight them with knives. You fight them with knives so you don't have to fight them with guns. You fight them with guns so you don't have to fight them with tanks (cited in Bray 2017, 169)

The above quote comes from Murray, an activist in Baltimore, USA, and is indicative of the perception of many militant antifascists on how far-right and fascist action should be dealt with, meaning that Antifa actors must act proactively in order to avoid using force as much as possible. While some groups are restricted to 'writing letters and making phone calls', others, such as Gate 9, are willing to respond in kind to the actions of the far-right. This section will explain how the two Cypriot actors are divided on the use of violence against far-right groups.

5.1 AKEL

For AKEL the most effective way to combat fascism and the far-right is to have a diversity of tactics and to employ various means depending on the issue at hand (Stephanou and Christophides interviews). To deal effectively with the fascist threat the party believes a wide, antifascist alliance is needed. 'In this alliance, all antifascist forces have their place' (Loukaides interview). 'The goal must be to isolate the fascists so that their ideas are not normalized and accepted by society' (Sylikiotis interview). The answer for AKEL does not lie in

penalizing their ideas but fighting them effectively and via legal means (Loukaides interview). They invoke the old concept from the communist tradition: ‘We need to win the battle of ideas against fascism. However, when their ideology leads to acts of violence then the law should take over’ (ibid).

The party considers allies in the fight to oppose the far-right, the Greens in the parliament (Stephanou, Christophides, Loukaides interviews) and the various Antifa groups, pro-immigrant and LGBTQ organizations, as well as other extra-parliamentary left groups in society. ‘This alliance with pro-immigrant movements and organizations, as well as with LGBTQ organizations is crucial since most far-right attacks are directed against the more vulnerable groups of society’ (Stephanou interview). For a successful Antifa campaign, AKEL believes it is crucial to involve other institutions, such as the media, despite their belief that Cypriot media nurture the far-right via news coverage, rather than fighting them (Loukaides, Sylikiotis interviews).

When it comes to the issue of violence, AKEL cadres believe that ‘you can’t just have violence for the sake of it’ (interviews Loukaides, Christophides). The only excuse to use violence is when in self-defense (Stephanou, Christophides interviews). ‘By resorting to violence, it leads to the equation of the left with the fascists, the so-called theory of the two extremes. Violence is not the answer’ (Loukaides interview). However, the party always takes protective measures to guard its cadres and the events it organizes as a deterrent to any potential threat of violence. The best answer to the fascist threat for AKEL is to ‘try to create a culture that is not hospitable to them’ (interview Stephanou) and to ‘shape antifascist ideas among the public’ (Sylikiotis interview).

5.2 Gate 9

‘They told us not to not to answer them so that we don’t give them substance. What did they achieve in this way? Only to make them stronger’. The above quote from Gate 9 activist Kimonas sums up the group’s bitterness against AKEL’s official tactics against ELAM in the first crucial years after ELAM appeared. Miltos adds: ‘The first time ELAM marched in the streets, Gate 9 did a counter-march. They criticized us that it was the wrong way of dealing with them because we gave them substance’ (Miltos interview). Gate 9 has a different view on the issue of the overall treatment of fascism and the use of violence in particular against the far-right. In Gate 9’s view, the only way to deal with fascists is militant antifascism. ‘When you deal with a fascist it is better to throw a stone at his head than talk to him. It is the only language fascists understand’ (Kimonas interview). ‘The mainstream left was never militant against the fascist threat and this only made them [the fascists] more audacious’ (Periklis interview).

Activists interviewed explained that antifascist aggression is justified by the aggression of the fascists, and when this escalates to violence, the legitimacy of antifascist action ‘is drawn from the illegitimacy of its opponent, i.e., the fascists’ (Kimonas interview). ‘Fascists feel that they gain power through violence and through intimidation. The appearance of being strong and powerful is very important to them. So, it’s crucial that we destroy this image’ (Nicos Interview). ‘The job of the antifascists is to make fascists too afraid to act publicly’ (Miltos interview). ‘Antifascist violence has two main goals in our view: to protect people who are threatened by fascists and to show force and strength in an attempt to discourage the fascists from recruiting, organizing and spreading their ideas’ (Periklis interview). In this regard, an antifascist alliance is much needed. Gate 9 considers its main allies in the antifascist struggle to be the various small Antifa groups, other leftist football fans associations and sometimes AKEL.

Decisions regarding the use of violence are made via formal and informal discussions that take place periodically or when a specific occasion necessitates. ‘The very nature of an organized football fan club brings its members face to face with the possibility of using or responding to violence either against opposing ultras

groups or the police more often than other organizations' (Kimonas interview). In these discussions each member brings along their own individual perceptions and experiences. Many Gate 9 members had such experiences in Greece during their studies where they interacted with some leftist and anarchist groups that advise violent tactics on some occasions. 'Although we have collectively discussed and decided and set a general frame regarding violence, this is not always controlled. Often, members of our organization get involved in local, violent incidents in towns and villages either against other ultras or far-right groups' (Miltos interview). 'You have to understand that our members are young and for them sometimes is all about who dominates a particular territory' (Periklis interview).

When rationalizing their occasional recourse to violence, Gate 9 members view it as a pre-emptive measure to protect the marginalized and the oppressed from far-right violence. This counter-violence is understood primarily as a form of community self-defense, deploying physical force to counter or forestall the immediate threat of violence to marginalized communities: people of colour, immigrants, Muslims, LGBTQ, etc. Gate 9 occasionally organizes antifascist patrols in the towns of Nicosia, particularly in places where immigrants live (Miltos interview). Gate 9 has no faith in liberal illusions that the public sphere has a magic, intrinsic power to filter out fascist ideas, or in the institutions of government to prevent the spread of fascist politics. Self-defense is legitimate when the police are absent or sympathetic toward fascist assailants. 'Whenever the fascists behave violently, we need to do the same. Smash them in the streets' (Periklis interview). Gate 9 prefers the classic tactic 'go where they go', although they recognize that this is not always feasible, and therefore advocate that the best response is to increase the strength of Antifa organizations. 'In the capital town of Nicosia, the fascists are very cautious to attack immigrants or leftists because Gate 9 is really powerful' (Kimonas interview).

The Gate 9 activists we spoke with argued that there is a far greater degree of sympathy for Antifa among progressive citizens than the media and other actors admit. In their opinion, people may not acknowledge it publicly, but they can see its tangible benefits on the ground. One example is the 2016 Cyprus Cup final, which OMONOIA lost, and when leaving the stadium their fans were attacked by far-right Apollon supporters, posing an immediate threat to young children and families. 'What stood between the attackers and the crowd was Gate 9 members' (Periklis interview). 'Afterwards, there was a surge of public posts and messages of gratitude for our action by hundreds of OMONOIA fans, thanking us for saving their lives' (Nicos interview).

In sum, Gate 9's answer to tackling the fascist threat and violence lies in the combination of means. 'People tend to divide the concept of a mass/political from a militant response arguing that it's only possible to do one or the other' (Nicos interview). Gate 9 activists argue that both are needed: popular organizing, combined with antifascist confrontation when required. To this end, Gate 9 believes that antifascists need to maintain a strong presence on the streets: in demonstrations, in counter-demonstrations, and wherever else fascist groups attempt to organize.

The above debate relates to the question of the necessity of violence for social change; a complex and controversial topic with different perspectives and opinions particularly within the left and the Antifa movement. These different perspectives were reflected in the opinions of the two Cypriot actors examined here, which should not come as a surprise. The leftist, Antifa milieu entertains different approaches to the use of violence for social and political purposes.

Advocates of nonviolent approaches argue that social change can be effectively achieved through peaceful means. They believe that violence undermines a movement's moral authority, alienates potential allies, and can lead to further cycles of violence. This is partly the approach of AKEL, not unjustifiably given its status as a big, mainstream party that seeks to hold political power. Others argue that violence may be necessary in certain situations as a form of self-defense or defense against oppressive forces. This perspective maintains that marginalized groups facing severe repression and violence may have limited options for achieving justice

and protecting themselves. In these circumstances, the use of force may be seen as a legitimate response to systemic violence or threats to basic human rights. This perspective is closer to Gate 9's approach.

Both actors agree that violence is not sufficient to address the root causes of social problems. They emphasize the need for structural change, policy reforms, and addressing systemic violence through long-term strategies such as education, community organizing, and using legal and political channels to bring about sustainable change. Historical context is also important in this debate, as the effectiveness of violence as a catalyst for positive change is largely debatable in contemporary times.

Ethical and legal considerations, as well as a commitment to human rights, are other crucial aspects of any discussion on the use of violence by Antifa actors for social change. The decision to engage in or condone violence raises questions regarding the proportional use of force, potential harm to individuals, and the overall effectiveness of such tactics. Moreover, Antifa activists often find themselves faced with a tension between their commitment to opposing fascist ideologies and their support for freedom of speech. Balancing the need to challenge fascist narratives with the preservation of free expression often presents challenging ethical dilemmas in their ranks.

6. Concluding remarks

The ways and methods of dealing with the far-right threat relates to different considerations and approaches depending on the particular traditions of each country in question, the balance of forces between social classes, the power of antifascist forces, and the perceptions and tactics of left-wing movements, parties and social actors. The findings presented in this article suggest that the two actors under examination share common stances on a number of issues, particularly regarding the threat presented by fascism, as well as its consequences. This is suggestive that antifascist campaigns have the ability to at least momentarily unite leftists of all shades. As Bray (2017, xiv) notes, 'ideological differences are often subsumed in a more general, strategic agreement against the common enemy'. Both Antifa actors are also aware of the difficulties posed to their struggle by the mutation of contemporary fascism. ELAM's turn to parliamentary activity indicates the danger of other hitherto fringe extreme groups moving in to fill the void on the radical fringes (Christophides interview). "The challenge is to adopt antifascist strategy to face a more popular, mainstream foe" (Kimonas interview).

Both groups' action repertoires also share common themes and tools for addressing and educating society, as well as opposing the far-right. For both actors, antifascism is a cultural and political project that feeds into and nurtures their leftist ideology. Propaganda and political education are deemed crucial to successfully fight this cultural and political battle, and are the only long-term means to disintegrate the appeal of fascism and ultimately eradicate the need for physical confrontation. However, the two groups diverge in their stances regarding the use of violence. For AKEL, violence ought to be avoided and is only excused and justified when in self-defense. For Gate 9 being strong and sometimes aggressive towards the fascists is the only way to confront them, because violence is the only language fascists understand. Age differences in their membership is probably mirrored in these perceptions of violence, as younger activists are more inclined to accept and endorse more violent tactics than older generations (Legge 2008).

By studying two different actors with different perspectives on a limited number of aspects⁵ of the antifascist organization, e.g., the use of violence, this article captures the antithesis within the (Cyprus) Antifa movement

⁵ To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scholarly exploration of Antifa activity in Cyprus. Due to limitations of scope, we were unable to address many important aspects and facets of the Antifa movement. For example, the role of women, who

between a more defensive versus a more offensive, oppositional approach to fascism. This is justified not only by the variety of perceptions that the different Antifa groups entertain depending on the nature of each actor's organization and goals, but also the different constraints they face in their activity.

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face a variety of gendered challenges when they take an active part in the antifascist movement. For this reason, some German Antifa have created feminist groups called 'Fantifa' (Bray 2017, 193).

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Personal interviews

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2. Christos Christophides, District Secretary General of AKEL Nicosia and member of the Central Committee, MP, Nicosia, 20 March 2023, age: 49.
3. Giorgos Loukaides, Member of the AKEL’s General Secretariat and Political Bureau, Parliamentary Spokesperson, Nicosia, 17 March 2023, age: 54.
4. Neoklis Sylikiotis, Member of the AKEL’s Political Bureau (former Member of the European Parliament), 18 March 2023, age: 64.
5. Kimonas, Gate 9, Nicosia, 28 February 2023, age: 30.
6. Nicos, Gate 9, Nicosia, 11 February 2023, age: 40.
7. Miltos, Gate 9, Nicosia, 28 February 2023, age: 30.
8. Periklis, Gate 9, Nicosia, 18 February 2023, age: 29.

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