*PA*rtecipazione e *CO*nflitto
** The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies*
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version)
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version)
***PACO*, Issue 11(3) 2018: 646-691**
DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v11i3p646

Published in November 15, 2018

RESEARCH ARTICLE

THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY IN FRANCE

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ABSTRACT: Drawing on the case of France during the 2017 presidential election, which was marked by the victory of the centrist Emmanuel Macron and the surge of the populist radical right (Marine Le Pen) and left (Jean-Luc Mélenchon), this paper analyses the impact of social insecurity on voting, using a multidimensional indicator of "precariousness" that combines measures of economic hardship and social and cultural isolation. On the basis of the 2017 French Election Study, a series of logistic regressions estimate the impact of precariousness on individual vote choice (including abstention) in both rounds, controlling for socio-demographic and attitudinal variables. Precariousness mainly has a strong negative impact on turnout, silencing the most deprived. Among those who vote, it has a strong negative impact on support for Emmanuel Macron. It also has a positive impact on support for the populist radical right and, to a lesser extent, on support for the populist radical left when controlling for socio-demographic variables. But this effect practically disappears after controlling for attitudes. Social insecurity does not necessarily breed populism. Ideological divisions make the difference, especially attitudes towards the European Union, immigration, and the left-right divide.

KEYWORDS: Abstention, Vote Choice, Populism, Radical Right, Radical Left, Social Insecurity, Precariousness

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1. Introduction

The two oil shocks of the mid 1970s put an end to the "Thirty Glorious Years" of economic growth that followed World War Two, and marked what the French sociologist Robert Castel called "the return of social insecurity" (Castel 1995, 2003, 2005; Castel and Martin 2012). In sharp contrast with the wage-earning society, where workers had stable jobs, guaranteed wages, and good social protection, the aftermath of the oil shock brought social disaffection, mass unemployment, labour market dualization (Haüsermann and Schwander 2012), exploding income inequalities (OECD 2008, 2011 and 2017), and new forms of poverty. The "Great recession" of 2008 exacerbated these trends. A burgeoning literature sees a causal link between crisis-driven economic insecurity and the wave of populism that is sweeping through Europe, both on the right and, more recently, on the left (Bermeo and Bartels 2014; Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Algan, Guriev, Papaioannou and Passari 2017; Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez and Zucman. 2018; Piketty 2018).

France is an ideal case to test this hypothesis. Economic insecurity has increased since 2008 according to several indicators, less so than in Southern Europe, but more so than in most Northern countries. Unemployment rates, which had been slowly declining, increased in the wake of the Great Recession, from 8% in 2007 to 10.4% in 2015, and remained at 9.4 % in 2017. These rates were well below those of Greece and Spain (21.5% and 17.2%), but almost 2 points above the EU-28 average (7.6%) and 5 points above the German and UK rates (3.8% and 4.4%) (Eurostat 2018). Atypical forms of employment (such as part-time, temporary, and fixed-term contracts) grew from 12.5% in 2002 to 15.8% in 2018, bringing French rates close to the European average (Rhein and Walwei 2018). Poverty rates remained lower in France than in the EU, but they increased from 13.2% in 2008 to 14.6% in 2011, and were still at 14% in 2017[1]. Meanwhile, persistent poverty (over three years) increased from 5.1% in 2009 to 6.7% in 2015 according to the National Observatory of Poverty and Social Exclusion (ONPES 2018).

[1] Monetary poverty threshold set at 60 % of the national median disposable income after social transfers.

As for populism, the French Front National[2], co-founded by Jean-Marie le Pen in 1972, is the oldest and most successful among the radical right parties that arose in Europe in the mid-1980s. Since his youngest daughter, Marine Le Pen, took over in 2011 and started a campaign of "de-demonization" (*dédiabolisation*) (Dézé 2015), her electoral success has been spectacular. She came first, ahead of the Socialist left and the Sarkozyist right, in the European Parliament elections of 2014, while the 2017 French presidential election magnified the populist trends affecting other established democracies: the collapse of mainstream parties, the electoral dynamism of extremes, and the surprise victory of a newcomer – Emmanuel Macron, founder of the new movement *En marche*! The candidates of the centre-left Socialist party and the centre-right Les Républicains combined garnered barely more than a quarter of votes in the first round. The leader of *La France insoumise* (France unbowed), Jean-Luc Mélenchon, secured 19.6% of the votes, and the Front National candidate Marine Le Pen received 21.3%, qualifying her for the second round. Although Emmanuel Macron beat her, she obtained a record 34% vote share, representing 10.6 million voters.

This paper makes a threefold contribution to the debate. It proposes a new multidimensional indicator of precariousness, in line with the "capability approach" to wellbeing (Sen 1985; Nussbaum and Sen 1993), taking into account employment, job type, and monetary poverty, as well as health, housing, and access to social and cultural life. It revisits the sociology of political participation and citizenship, focusing on citizens at the bottom of the social ladder who are seldom studied *per se* in electoral surveys. It also questions the often-assumed link between social insecurity and support for populist radical right parties, showing that the most precarious are the less likely to vote. An introductory section presents the theoretical and methodological approaches, while the second explores the relationship between social insecurity and electoral turnout. The third examines the relationship between social insecurity and vote choice. A concluding section proposes further avenues for research.

[2] Renamed "Rassemblement National" (National Rally) in June 2018.

2. State of the art, hypotheses and methodology

2.1 Socioeconomic position and politics

A first approach in this vein is the political economy of voting within a rational choice perspective inspired by Anthony Downs' 'median voter' theory (1957). The classical model of Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard (1981) implies that rising inequalities increase preference for redistribution. The lower the median voter's income falls below the mean income, the more likely s/he would benefit from tax transfers and thus support the more redistributive parties of the Left. It is a very simplified model. But recent studies that account for institutional context (tax system, type of welfare state, unionisation) and party competition come to the same conclusion (Cusack, Iversen and Rehm 2008; Pontusson and Rueda 2008). The same rational choice perspective leads other authors to emphasize the logic of economic voting, and more specifically retrospective voting. They argue that in hard times voters primarily tend to punish or reward incumbents according to their economic performance, whatever the ideology of the party in office (Healy and Malhotra 2013; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger 2013; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2014). Recent studies on the impact of the Great Recession come to the same conclusion (Bartels 2014; Kriesi 2014). Another strand of literature takes into account the observed or perceived risk of precariousness and its impact on welfare preferences. Philippe Rehm (2016; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger 2012) adopts what he calls a revisionist approach to the "power resource school", showing that two distinct groups tend to support the welfare state: the most disadvantaged (low-income) as well as the most economically insecure (high-risk), regardless of social class. The two indicators are correlated, but do not coincide completely. The "doubly deprived" (low-income, high-risk) are the most supportive of the welfare state, while the "doubly advantaged" (high-income, low-risk) are the least supportive. But the two other groups are cross-pressured. That is, high-risk but well off citizens can in certain circumstances find it to be in their interest to back welfare spending, while low-income, low-risk people might turn against it.

A second burgeoning field of research links the electoral dynamics of Populist Radical Right parties in Europe since the 1990s (Mudde 2007) to the realignment of the low-income and working-class voters that used to form the stronghold of the left

(Oesch 2008 and 2012; Arzheimer 2012). The transition from the industrial to the 'post-industrial' era has made societies more fluid and atomized, weakened old class solidarities and party loyalties, and favoured the 'politics of resentment' and 'anti-politics' which proved fertile ground for the emergence of these parties (Betz 1994, 36-37). The process is aptly described by the sociologist Didier Eribon in his autobiography *Retour à Reims* (2009) where he recounts how his parents and grandparents, once typical Communist party supporters, turned to the Front national. The second phase came with the acceleration of economic and financial globalization. The so-called "losers of globalization" turned to these Populist Radical Right parties – workers fearful of competition from immigrants and low-paid labour in developing countries (Betz 1994; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier and Frey 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Gougou and Roux 2013). Then the Great Recession of 2008 kindled their fears and reinforced their realignment (Betz 2015; Mayer 2014). However, some authors warn against a simplistic view of the process, arguing that it is more often the "cultural" losers rather than those worse-off in purely economic terms who turn to these parties, feeling their identity is threatened. Meanwhile, the most disadvantaged – the real "economic losers' – are more likely not to vote at all (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012, 26). More recent research has focused on populist radical lefts, such as Podemos and Syriza, and their appeal to working-class voters (Rooduijn, Burgoon, van Elsas and van de Werfhost 2017; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007; Visser, Lubbers, Kraaykamp and Jaspers 2014). The large-scale study conducted by Rooduijn and his colleagues, based on seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2014 in 23 countries, convincingly shows that there are similarities between the voters of the 26 radical right and 23 radical left parties studied (2017). Both are overrepresented among voters of lower socio-economic status and amongst working class voters. They also share anti-elite, anti-European and anti-neoliberalism and austerity positions. Yet they diverge radically on the issues of solidarity and immigration. Education is the main factor explaining this ideological contrast. The more educated turn to the radical left, and the less educated to the radical right.

A third line of research is political participation. From the pioneering work of Sidney Verba and Norman Nie (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995), to the most recent cross-national surveys (Gallego, 2008; Solt, 2008 and 2010; Schäfer 2013; Offe 2013), a host of studies show that participation skews in favour of higher status groups in society: those who have the necessary re-

sources, education, money, skills, network, and attendant participatory attitudes (interest, trust, and sense of efficacy). Conversely, the absence of such resources is conducive to abstention and political disaffection. Studies focusing on people in extreme situations such as the unemployed (Lazarsfeld, Jahoda and Zeisel 2002 [1933]; Pierru 2003), recipients of minimum welfare income (Bègue 2007), and inhabitants of disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Braconnier and Dormagen 2007) confirm the demobilizing impact of social insecurity, as do recent studies on job market segmentation and the growing divide between protected "insiders" and "outsiders" at risk (Haüsermann and Schwander 2012; Rovny and Rovny 2017). Only rarely, in specific political and economic contexts, can unemployment and economic hardship fuel discontent and remobilize (Burden and Wichowski 2014).

One can draw a series of hypotheses concerning the electoral impact of social insecurity in France in 2017 from this contrasting literature. It appears unlikely that precariousness will benefit the mainstream left. On the eve of the presidential election, the outgoing socialist president François Hollande was so deeply unpopular, even in his own constituency, that he could not even run in his party's primaries. The candidate who won the primaries, Benoit Hamon, was clearly further to the left than the rest of the Socialist party, especially on welfare issues, but was hardly known to the public. The mainstream right, Les Républicains, could have benefited from a negative vote against the incumbent party, but the candidate selected in the primaries, François Fillon, rapidly saw his image tarnished by a succession of embezzlement charges; his reputation as a hard-core conservative on social and economic issues did not help. General political distrust reached a climax. Four months before the election, only 11% of French voters said they trusted parties, 75% considered most politicians corrupt, and 89% had the feeling that "political leaders don't care what people like us think" [3] - and this share was even higher among voters with low levels of income and education. This was the backdrop to political exit and support for populist, anti-system candidates, especially among the most disadvantaged, already more distant from politics and less likely to participate. This leaves us with two main hypotheses:

[3] Baromètre de la confiance du Cevipof, wave 8, 16-30 December 2016. Retrieved January 3, 2019 (https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/BJ15515-CEVIPOF-Barometre_confiance_en_politique_vague8-1.pdf).

- HI Social insecurity is likely to decrease turnout
- H2 Social insecurity is likely to increase support for the Populist Radical Right and Left

2.2 Methodology

The data used to test these hypotheses come from a post-electoral survey of a large sample that is representative of registered voters living in metropolitan France. The survey was conducted immediately after the second round of the 2017 presidential election[4]. Operationalizing social insecurity required an indicator that went beyond material poverty to encompass social and cultural isolation, that is, an indicator of "précarité" – a word that is difficult to translate into English. It has several meanings in French, where it is used either as a synonym for social exclusion in general or as a limited reference to unstable forms of employment (for a history of the concept see Cingolani 2006). Here, the term is used in the perspective developed by the founder of ATD-Quart Monde (All Together in Dignity to Overcome Poverty – Fourth World) in his seminal report for the French Economic and Social Council (Wresinski 1987), and expanded by the sociologist Robert Castel (1995, 2003, 2005), as a lack of basic securities: being "at the mercy of any vicissitude of life, an illness, an accident, a lull in work, that interrupts the ordinary course of life and threatens to plunge us into social dependency and degradation" (Castel 2005,1). The EPICES index (Evaluation de la Précarité et des Inégalités de Santé pour les Centres d'Examen de Santé/Evaluation of Precariousness and Health Inequalities for Health Examination Centres) seemed the best fit. Originally developed for the French Social Security medical centres to detect health problems in socially vulnerable populations, the index is built using eleven simple yes/no questions covering financial difficulties, housing conditions, type of health insurance, support from family and friends, cultural activities, etc.[5] The questions had already been tested

[4] The 2017 French Election Study (FES 2017), coordinated by Nicolas Sauger at CEE, was conducted by Kantar TNS, face to face, between May 8 and May 23, on a quota based (gender, age, education, occupation of household and political regions) national sample of 1830 registered voters (for a detailed presentation see Gougou and Sauger 2017).

[5] The indicator stems from a large-scale survey conducted in 1998, with a host of socioeconomic indicators. A correspondence analysis showed all items loaded on a first factor of precariousness. The 11 items

in several electoral surveys (Braconnier and Mayer 2015; Mayer 2017). They take little time, are easily understood, and the non-response rate is negligible (below 1%). The answers provide a continuous measure that allows for the placement of respondents on a scale of precariousness ranging from 0 (not precarious at all) to 100 (extremely precarious)[6].

EPICES Score questions

1. Do you ever see a social worker?
2. Do you have additional health insurance?
3. Do you live with a partner?
4. Do you own your house?
5. Are there periods in the month when you have real financial difficulties meeting your needs (food, rent, electricity, etc.)?
6. Have you exercised or played sports over the last 12 months?
7. Did you go to the movies, theatre or any shows over the last 12 months?
8. Have you had a vacation over the last 12 months?
9. In the last 6 months, have you been in contact with family members other than your parents and children?
10. In the event of an emergency, are there people nearby on whom you could count to host you for a few days if necessary?
11. In the event of an emergency, are there people nearby on whom you could count to provide material assistance?

Comparing advantaged voters in the lower quintile of the indicator (with an average score of 4) to the most disadvantaged in the upper quintile (with an average score of 56) reveals an extreme contrast in socio-economic statuses in our sample of registered voters. In 2017, all the respondents in the first quintile lived in couples, owned their apartments, had been on holiday, exercised, and had attended shows or watched mov-

most correlated to the factor, explaining 91% of the variance, were selected for the EPICES score and weighted accordingly.

[6] In 2017 the mean was 26.4, the median 16.5, and the standard deviation 18.9.

ies in the past year, while none had experienced financial problems. At the other end, 55% of respondents lived alone, 60% had not recently exercised, 64% did not own their apartment, 70% had not taken a holiday, half had nobody to turn to for help in an emergency, and 76% could barely make ends meet every month. These gaps are all the more striking in that citizens who make the effort to register to vote are, on the whole, socially and culturally more advantaged than the unregistered[7].

Figure 1. EPICES scores by socioeconomic status



Source: French Election Study 2017

EPICES indicator scores are, as expected, correlated with other indicators of social and economic insecurity. They rise among respondents with low income, little education, blue-collar jobs, fixed-time or part-time contracts, or who are unemployed. They

[7]Unregistered voters, according to INSEE surveys (the Census office) based on an examination of electoral lists after each election using a large sample taken from a larger permanent sample representative of all people born in France (Echantillon Démographique Permanent/Permanent Demographic Sample) for whom INSEE has corresponding census data (Durier and Touré 2018).

are higher among young people, women, and foreign-born respondents. They reach their highest level among single mothers, whose score on the EPICES index is 17 points above the sample's average (Figure 1). A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the items in the EPICES index and the aforementioned indicators shows that they all load on a first factor of social insecurity or "precariousness"[8]. The advantage of the EPICES index is that it provides a synthetic measure combining these different dimensions. According to the conventional definition used by the social services, a score of 30 or above on the EPICES index indicates social vulnerability. 39% of the 2017 electoral sample falls into this category – a figure that is much higher than the share of people who are unemployed, below the poverty line, or in unprotected jobs - and 3 points above the share recorded at the 2012 presidential election (Braconnier and Mayer 2015, 23). While precariousness is, as expected, higher among voters in the lower income quartile (75%), manual workers (53%), and voters with primary school education only (53%), it also affects higher class, educated, and upper-income voters: 15% of the category of senior managers and professionals (*cadres supérieurs*), 20% of respondents in the middle-income quintile (2,501 – 4,000 euros monthly), and 22% of university graduates. The social insecurity that the EPICES index captures is a diffuse phenomenon that can cut through class and status lines (Rehm *et al.* 2012).

3. The effect of precariousness on voting turnout

Measuring turnout in opinion surveys is difficult, because abstention is still considered un-civic behaviour and systematically underreported. The options to answer the questions about turnout in the 2017 presidential election were worded in order to make it easier for respondents to answer honestly: "You did not go to the polls; you thought about going but ended up not going; you usually vote but this time you didn't; you voted". A combination of the first three answers yields a declared rate of abstention of 15% in the first round, and 19.2% in the second: 7 and 6 percentage points below the actual rates respectively. Considering those respondents who declared they

[8] See the results of the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) in Appendix A, Tables A2a-A2b.

voted but did not answer the next question on whom they voted as abstainers yields a result closer to the actual figures: 19% and 23%.

In confirmation of the first hypothesis (H1), social insecurity depresses turnout. If claimed abstention is used as the indicator, the share of non-voters in the first round ranges between 5% in the first quintile and 29% in the last, that is, the most precarious (Table 1). If respondents who did not declare their choice are added, the rates increase to 8% and 35%. Finally, if those who say they voted but cast a void or blank ballot are added – because although this reflects an effort to go to the polls[9], in the final instance it means not choosing between the competing candidates – then the share of respondents who fail to express any electoral preference rises to 13% in the lower quintile and 38% in the upper.

Table 1. Abstention and non-expressed votes by rising level of precariousness (%)

2017 Presidential election 1st round	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Total
Declared abstention	5	10	14	19	29	15
Abstention+No vote declared	8	12,5	19	22	35	19
Blank or void ballot	5	3	3,5	4	3	4
Total Non Expressed Votes	*13*	*16*	*22*	*26*	*38*	*23*
2017 Presidential election 2d round						
Declared abstention	10	14	17	22	36	20
Abstention+No vote declared	14	17	21	25	39.5	23
Blank or void ballot	12	16	12	17	12	14
Total Non Expressed Votes	*26*	*32*	*33*	*42*	*52*	*37*

Source: French Election Study 2017

The second-round figures are even more impressive. The 2017 presidential election was unusual, since it was dominated by the Macron phenomenon traditional political markers were blurred. With the mainstream candidates of both the right and left eliminated, the second round became a faceoff between a centrist and an extremist, both of whom rejected the left-right divide, albeit for different reasons. Turnout usually increases in the second, decisive, round. Yet this time, in a reflection of voters' perplexity, it decreased from 77.7% in the first round to 74.5% in the second, while the share of void or blank ballots exploded, reaching an unprecedented record of 8.5% of registered

[9] On the complex meaning of such ballots see Zulfikarpasic (2001) and more recently Moualek (2016).

voters and 11.5% of valid votes. This disarray appears in the survey. The share of declared abstainers rises from 10% to 36% as one moves from the first to the last level of precariousness; from 14% to almost 40% if respondents who do not declare their vote are included; adding blank and void ballot yields a total share of unexpressed preferences of a quarter among the least precarious voters and more than half among the most precarious (Table 1). Social insecurity does indeed have a demobilizing effect on electoral participation, and it silences the voices of the disadvantaged. One must also bear in mind that the actual political self-exclusion process is broader, considering that the citizens who did not even register to vote are not included in our survey sample[10].

Figure 2. Turnout in 2017 by rising level of precariousness



[10] INSEE estimates that the share of unregistered voters among French eligible citizens was around 12% on the eve of the 2017 presidential election, checking registration on the electoral lists on a panel of citizens (drawn from its Permanent Demographic Panel, supra). The shares rise among manual workers, the unemployed, and people without any education, of which only 60% are registered (Durier and Touré 2018).

Source: French Election Study 2017

A final way to outline this political exclusion process is to measure the share of respondents who did not participate in either round, that is, who are completely out of the game. The census office (INSEE) regularly measures this "consistent abstention" by reviewing actual registration lists – a far more reliable method than survey data. It estimates that 15% of registered voters did not go to the polls in either round of the presidential election (Buisson and Penant 2017). In our survey, the declared share is very close to this figure: 13 %. However, it varies between 2% and 26% as one moves along the scale of precariousness, while the share of consistent voters drops from 87% to 61% (Figure 2).

Other variables affecting turnout must also be considered. The "civic voluntarism model" (Verba *et al.* 1995) posits three main reasons for limited political participation amongst citizens. They can't participate: they lack the necessary resources (education, social status). They don't want to participate: they lack motivation (political interest, political trust, sense of efficacy). They were not asked to participate: they are not integrated in mobilizing networks. A series of binary logistic regressions test the specific impact of social insecurity controlled for all these factors. The dependent variable is consistent abstention (not voting in either round). The predictors, in addition to the EPICES index, are gender, age, education, monthly income by consumption unit, occupation (taking into account former occupation for unemployed or retired respondents), an indicator of religious integration mixing religious affiliation (Catholic or minority religion) and church attendance, and an indicator of immigrant background (having at least one non-French parent or grandparent)[11]. All variables have a significant impact on consistent abstention, in the expected direction. Being a man, young – especially between 25 and 34 years old – with little education, especially just a vocational degree, and being of foreign origin or belonging to a minority religion (essentially Muslim) – are all factors that increase the chances of systematically avoiding the polls. Conversely, belonging to the occupational group of "intermediate professions", which includes mid-level managers, executives, and "socio-cultural specialists" (Kriesi 1989), that is, healthcare professionals, teachers, social welfare workers, and media professionals, with high levels of education, sharply decreases the probability of abstaining as well as

[11] See the regressions with both models in Appendix B (table B1).

belonging to the penultimate income quintile. But precariousness has by far the largest impact. If the level of political interest is added – a key factor in electoral participation – it cancels the effect of age and religion, and considerably lowers the effect of education, but not the impact of precariousness. Once controlled for all variables, the predicted likelihood of abstaining in both rounds rises from 2% among the most secure voters in the first EPICES decile, to 22% among the most insecure in the last decile (Figure 3). The marginal effect of social insecurity is 0.05[12], meaning that each additional increase by one standard deviation on the EPICES index increases the probability of consistent abstention by 5 percentage points, all things being equal.

Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of constant abstention by precariousness



Source: French Election Study 2017. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence

[12] Statistically significant predicted probability ($p < 0.01$).

4. The effect of social insecurity on vote choice

4. 1 Respondents who express a vote choice and those who don't

Turning to consider the voters who expressed a choice, social insecurity seems, as expected (H2), to cause a turn away from the mainstream parties to favour the extremes, especially the radical right. As for turnout, we can start with simple bivariate tables and then run logistic regressions. In the first round, as one moves up the scale of precariousness, support for Mélenchon rises from 16% to 23% - 3 percentage points above his national score; support for Le Pen rises from 11% to 36% (almost 15 points above her national score). Meanwhile, support for the conservative candidate Fillon, the leader of Les Républicains, plummets from 28% to 9% (11.5 points below his national score), and for the centrist Macron, support drops from 30% to 18% (6 points below). On the whole, the leaders of En marche! and Les Républicains come out ahead among economically secure voters (quintiles 1-2), while the FN candidate is ahead among the less secure (quintiles 3-5). In the second round, the contrast is even sharper, with the FN leader's score rising from 19% among the least precarious to a record 53% among the most precarious (Table 2a).

Table 2. Declared votes in 2017 presidential election by rising levels of precariousness (%)

a) On the basis of expressed votes

1st round	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	*Total*
Mélenchon	16	20	19	23	23	*20*
Hamon	9	6	5	5	6	*6*
Macron	30	29	20	18	18	*24*
Fillon	28	25	21	12	9	*20*
M. Le Pen	11	13	24	31	36	*22*
Other candidates	6	8	11	11	9	*9*
2d round						
Macron	81	78	63.5	52.5	47	*66*
M. Le Pen	19	22	37.5	47.5	53	*34*

b) On the basis of all registered voters

1st round	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	*Total*
Mélenchon	14	17	15	17	14	*15*
Hamon	8	5	4	4	4	*5*
Macron	26	25	16	13	12	*18*
Fillon	25	21	17	9	5	*15*
M. Le Pen	9	11	19	23	22	*17*
Other candidates	6	7	9	8	5	*7*
Did not express a vote	14	16	21	26	38	*23*
2d round						
Macron	59	53	42	31	24	*42*
M. Le Pen	14	15	25	28	27	*22*
Did not express a vote	27	32	33	41	49	*36*

Source: French Election Study 2017, weighted by the 2017 election results for each round and socio-demographics (age, gender, education).

The picture changes if one adds the voters who did not express a preference, considering exit as an electoral option *per se* (Table 2b), to the mix. In this case the most striking impact of social insecurity is not so much that it boosts support for radical candidates, or depresses support for those on the right and in the centre, but that it keeps such large sections of the potential electorate from the polls entirely. In the first round, the "no vote" option is ahead of all other voting options for the three upper quintiles of precariousness. In the second round – the decisive one – it is ahead in the last two quintiles. In the most precarious quintile (5), practically half the voters express no preference. In this light, the most insecure voters' support for radical candidates is less obvious. Precariousness has no more impact on support for Mélenchon. While it still impacts support for Le Pen, her average scores in the two upper quintiles do not exceed 23% in the first round and 28% in the second (Table 2b).

Figure 4. Predicted voting probabilities by deciles of precariousness controlling for socio-demographic variables

a) 1st round of the 2017 presidential election



b) 2nd round of the 2017 presidential election



Source: French Election Study 2017. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Based on multinomial logistic regression (Tables B2-B3, Appendix B).

Validating these results requires some consideration of other factors likely to affect vote choice. A series of multinomial logistic regressions[13] tests the electoral impact of precariousness (measured by the EPICES index), controlling first for socio-demographic variables (age, gender, education, income by consumption units, occupation, and religion), and then political variables (presented in Appendix A): position on a 10-point left-right scale and attitudinal scales measuring opinions about central issues in the campaign, including the European Union (level of anti-EU sentiment), state intervention in the economy (level of economic conservatism)[14], immigration (level of ethnocentrism), and LGBT and gender issues (level of cultural conservatism). The dependent variables in the first round are votes for Mélenchon (La France Insoumise), Hamon (Socialist party), Macron (En marche!), Fillon (Les Républicains), Le Pen (Front National), one of the six smaller candidates considered as a unit, and no vote (abstention, void or blank ballot, no answer). In the second round, the dependent variable is a vote for Le Pen. The Macron vote is the reference category in both rounds. Each model was tested first only on those that voted for a candidate, and then on the whole sample. Because political exit is so frequent among precarious voters, the focus here is on the results for the full sample, i.e. that including voters who did not vote for any specific candidate[15]. The following figures show the predicted probabilities of voting for the main candidates by decile of precariousness, while the marginal effects sum up the size of each variable's effect in the theoretical model for all candidates, all things being equal.

For the radical right vote, after controlling for socio-demographic variables, youth and lack of education appear to be the main predictors. However, precariousness has a moderate but statistically significant impact, while income by consumption units has none. The predicted probabilities of voting for Le Pen vary between 11% and 17% in the first round, and 12% to 19% in the second, as one moves from the first to the last decile of precariousness (Figure 4a and 4b). The marginal increase of her score for an increase of one standard deviation on the EPICES scale, in both rounds, is around 2

[13] All the regressions are in Appendix B (Tables B2-B3).

[14] "Economic conservatism" actually refers here to what the French call "economic liberalism": being pro-market and against state intervention in the economy.

[15] The 4 logistic regressions on the basis of voters expressing a choice for a candidate, without considering exit as an option, are available on request.

percentage points (Tables B5a and B5b in Appendix B)[16]. But introducing attitudes into the model wipes out the impact of precariousness in both rounds completely (Figures 5a and 5b). What drove support for Le Pen in this election was fear of immigrants and of a European Union seen as opening the door to them. If one looks at the marginal effects, one standard-deviation increase on the ethnocentrism scale raises the probability of voting for Le Pen by 8 percentage points in both rounds; one standard-deviation increase to the right on the left-right scale adds 7.5 points in the first round and 5 points in the second, while anti–EU feelings contribute almost 6 points to Le Pen's score in the first round, and 7 points in the second. Economic and cultural conservatism have no significant impact (Tables B5a and B5b in Appendix B)[17].

For the radical left, the impact of precariousness on votes is not significant after controlling for socio-demographic variables, and the effect is even slightly negative when attitudes are introduced into the model (Figure 4a and 5a). The marginal effect of one standard-deviation increase of precariousness decreases the probability of a vote for Mélenchon by 2 percentage points (Table B5a in Appendix B)[18]. These voters are the polar opposites of those who voted for Le Pen. They are driven by a rejection of ethnocentrism, a rejection of economic liberalism, and above all ideological self-identification with the far left. The increase of one standard deviation to the left on the left-right scale increases the probability of voting this way by 12 percentage points. Education makes the difference: while the chances of voting for the radical right increase among the least educated, there is a significant positive relation between education and support for Mélenchon (Table B5a in Appendix B).

Lastly, the results confirm the major impact of social insecurity on political withdrawal. In the first round, each increase of one standard deviation on the precariousness index increases the probability of not expressing a candidate choice by almost 8 points after controlling for socio-demographic variables, by 9 points if attitudes are considered, and by 10 points in the second round regardless of control variables (Tables B5a and B5b in Appendix B). By contrast, Macron predominantly attracts the most secure voters. Each increase of one standard deviation on the EPICES index reduces the

[16] However, the effects are at the limit of statistical significance ($p < 0.10$).

[17] The marginal effects of attitudes on vote choices are all statistically significant ($p< 0.01$). The tables of marginal effects for all the main candidates are available in Appendix B, with the corresponding regressions (Tables B2-B5).

[18] However, the effect of precariousness is at the limit of statistical significance ($p < 0.10$).

probability of voting for Macron in the first round by 5 points after controlling for socio-demographic variables, by 4 when attitudes are considered in the first round, and by 12 and 9 in the second round. This aligns with the fact that the classification of individuals in the middle and upper middle-income groups (quintiles 3 and 4, compared to the richest voters in quintile 5) also increase his chances by 10 percentage points in the decisive round. The main attitude driving these voters is support for European integration. A one standard-deviation increase on the anti-EU scale decreases the chances of a vote for Macron by 13 percentage points in the first round, and almost 19 in the second (Table B5a and B5b in Appendix B) [19].

Figure 5. Predicted voting probabilities by deciles of precariousness controlling for socio-demographic and attitudinal variables

a) 1st round of the 2017 presidential election



[19] The marginal effects of precariousness and of anti-EU feelings on the Macron vote and on political withdrawal are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).

a) 2nd round of the 2017 presidential election



Source: French Election Study 2017. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. Based on multinomial logistic regression (Tables B2-B3, Appendix B)

5. Conclusion

The findings presented here primarily show that precariousness hinders participation in the electoral process. Social exclusion breeds political exclusion. For "When a person experiences economic adversity his scarce resources are spent on holding body and soul together – surviving – not on remote concerns like politics" (Rosenstone 1982, 26). In the second round of the 2017 presidential election, more than half of the voters in the upper quintile of the EPICES score either failed to vote or did not choose a specific candidate. This shrinks the constituency Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon claim to have among the underprivileged considerably. While there is a statistically significant positive association between scores on our indicator of precariousness and support for the two populist candidates after controlling for socio-demographic variables, this disappears when one takes into account political attitudes, and even becomes slightly negative for the radical left candidate. Social insecurity does not necessarily breed support for populism. The most insecure are difficult to mobilize. And if they vote, what counts first is how they feel about the European Union, immigration, government intervention, and their position on the left-right scale. By contrast, the in-

dicator of precariousness has a strong but negative impact, resisting all controls, on support for Macron, while income has a positive effect. Macron clearly is the president of the well-off and economically secure voters.

Figure 6. Location on left right scale by scores on precariousness index



Source: French Election Study 2017

Can one generalize from the French elections of 2017? The 2017 elections were unusual, marked by the breakdown of old parties, a populist dynamic, and the surprise victory of the leader of En marche! The 2012 presidential election took place in a different setting, with a classical opposition between the candidates of the left and right mainstream parties. The main trend was a massive rejection of the outgoing President, Nicolas Sarkozy. This boosted Marine Le Pen's score in the first round, but benefited the socialist Left and its leader, François Hollande, in the second. Precariousness, measured by the same EPICES index, amplified these trends for the main part. After controlling

for age, gender, occupation, religion, and education, it had no significant impact on support for Marine Le Pen, but a positive effect on support for Francois Hollande, especially in the second round. A qualitative study conducted before the first round of the election on the political impact of precariousness, based on interviews with people living on welfare and charity support, confirmed antipathy for Sarkozy. He was described as "the president of the rich" who made "the rich richer and the poor poorer", while Hollande was the candidate who defended "the poor", the "little ones", and the working class (Braconnier and Mayer 2015, 201-234). Social insecurity can produce contrasting political effects. Although this was not the case in 2017, it may one day tilt support towards the radical left, as suggested by the relation between respondents' positions on the left-right scale and their EPICES index scores (Figure 6). While the share of respondents who refuse to choose between the left and right rises with the level of precariousness (either refusing to answer or choosing a central position), so does the share of respondents who position themselves at either of the extremes, whether the far right (from 3% in the first quintile to 8% in the upper one) or the far left (from 3% to 10%). Potential support for the radical left exists among the most disadvantaged.

Our study focuses on the French case, and to date there is no EPICES score equivalent elsewhere. However, recent studies on the electoral impact of employment precariousness or "outsiderness" have yielded results similar to ours. Drawing from 5 waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) in 17 Western European countries and combining 4 different operationalisations of outsiderness (based on current labour market status or on occupational class groups), Jan and Allison Rovny (2017) show that outsiders are less likely than insiders to vote for major right-wing parties, and more likely to abstain from voting. The authors also outline the internal diversity of the outsiders. Those in occupational groups at risk of outsiderness are attracted to right-wing populist rhetoric, while individuals who actually face bad labour market conditions (unemployed, temporarily employed) are more inclined towards left-wing populist rhetoric. This very much aligns with the results of the principal component analysis (Table A2a-A2b in Appendix A). It shows two factors. While all the items load on a first factor of "social precariousness", on the second factor material deprivation indicators are positively correlated, but social isolation indicators are negatively correlated: this can be described as "connected precariousness". The high scorers on the first factor of "social precariousness" are elderly, uneducated, and socially isolated. Meanwhile, those who

score highly on the second factor of "connected precariousness" are younger, have attended college and sometimes university, are connected to the outside world, have networks, friends and family ties, but have no job security, filling low-pay, short-term temporary positions, and find it difficult to make ends meet. Politically, the former tend to abstain, and those who do vote are more likely to support the radical right. The latter go to the polls more often, and when they vote they lean more towards the radical left. Contrary to the assumption of Guy Standing (2011), there is no such thing, at least in France today, as a unified emerging "class" of the "precariat".

Acknowledgements

This article benefited from the support of the National Research Foundation of Korea (grant number NRF-2017S1A3A2066657). Special thanks go to Adrien Degeorges for his critical comments and shared statistical expertise, to Ruben Leria and Jan Rovny for their methodological support, to Carolyn Amon for her invaluable editing assistance and to the two anonymous reviewers whose remarks greatly improved this paper.

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APPENDIX A

1. Attitudinal scale items

Left-right scale

"In politics people talk about the right and the left. On a scale from 0 to 10 where would you place yourself, personally, 0 meaning you are more on the right and 10 more on the left? The scores in between allow you to qualify your opinion".

Cultural conservatism

"Homosexual couples have the right to adopt children/Women are primarily meant to have and raise children/It's normal that a woman has the choice to abort/Homosexuality is an acceptable way of leading one's sexual life: somewhat agree, strongly agree, some-what disagree, strongly disagree".

Anti-European sentiment

*"*All things considered, do you think that France has benefited or has not benefited from its membership in the European Union? Yes, it benefited, no it did not".

"Do you think that for France belonging to the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad".

"One should strengthen the powers of Europe even it if leads to reduce the independence of France: somewhat agree, strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree"
.
"The European integration hinders the good functioning of democracy in France: somewhat agree, strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree".

Ethnocentrism

"There are too many immigrants in France: somewhat agree, strongly agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree".

"All in all immigrants are a threat for the French culture: somewhat agree, strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree".

"Many immigrants come in France just to take advantage of the Social Security system*:* somewhat agree, strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree".

"Immigrants are responsible for the rise of crime rates: somewhat agree, strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree".

Economic conservatism

"The government should take measures to reduce income inequalities: somewhat agree, strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree".

"To establish social justice one should take from the rich to give to the poor: somewhat agree, strongly agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree".

-Do you think in the coming years one should give priority to the competitiveness of the French economy, or to the improvement of the workers' situation?"

"To face economic difficulties do you think the state should trust the companies and give them more leeway, or on the contrary it should control and regulate them more tightly?"

(All scales were standardized (Mean=0, SD=1) to allow for comparison).

2. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) on factors of precariousness

The analysis is run with 16 items, adding to the 11 that compose the EPICES score indicators of income, employment and marital status. The first five factors explain 50.7% of the total variance, of which the first 18.2% of the variance (eigenvalue: 2.916), the second 10.6% (eigenvalue: 1.694), the third 7.9% (eigenvalue :1.262), the fourth 7.6% (eigenvalue 1.223) and the fifth 6.3% (eigenvalue: 1.022).

Table A2a. Matrix of components

	Components				
	1	2	3	4	5
Single mother	,321	,316	-,275	,342	-,280
Unwanted part time	,065	,310	,529	-,060	-,219
Fixed contract	,262	,374	,379	,000	,180
Unemployed	,339	,230	,385	-,043	,054
Lowest quartile income	,653	,272	-,235	-,040	,021
Sees a social worker	,334	,249	,026	,029	-,430
Additional Health Insurance	,232	,000	,107	,075	,778
Not in couple	,466	,337	-,550	,202	,120
Does not own house	,562	,331	,008	,009	,112
Financial difficulties	,497	,182	,308	-,118	-,086
No sport in last 12 months	,355	**-,368**	-,120	-,464	-,135
No movies or shows in last 12 months	,461	**-,286**	-,013	-,505	-,040
No holidays in last 12 months	,599	**-,231**	-,112	-,366	,057
No contact with family in last 6 months	,373	**-,311**	-,133	,231	,026
Nobody who could host you if problem	,485	**-,500**	,224	,446	-,063
Nobody who could give material assistance	,427	**-,543**	,233	,425	-,082

Source: French Election Study 2017

Table A2b. Regression factor scores by age, education and vote

	1st factor "Social precariousness"	2nd factor "Connected precariousness"
Age		
18-24	0.167	0.646
25-34	0.100	0.316
35-49	-0.714	0.257
50-64	-0.001	-0.123
65+	-0.059	-0.538
Education		
Primary	0.449	-0.329
Vocational	0.170	-0.036
Secondary	-0.080	0.158
Higher education	-0.437	0.170
Vote 1st round 2017		
No vote	0.370	-0.114
Vote Mélenchon	0.003	0.308
Vote Macron	-0.329	0.001
Vote Le Pen	0.302	-0.015

Source: French Election Study 2017

APPENDIX B

1. Logistic regressions on abstention/votes in the French 2017 presidential election

All scales including the precariousness scale (the EPICES index)[20] are standardized (mean= 0, sd= 1) to facilitate comparison. Model 1 tests the impact of precariousness controlling for socio demographic variables, model 2 adds political attitudes. For the 1st round, to save space, we only present the coefficients for the main candidates. The results for the socialist candidate Benoît Hamon (4.8 % of the votes) and the bloc of residual candidates (6.6 % of the votes all together: Nathalie Artaud, François Asselineau, Nicolas Dupont–Aignan, Jacques Cheminade, Jean Lassalle, Philippe Poutou) are available on demand.

Table B1. Binary logistic regression on constant abstention (in both rounds)

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2
GENDER		
Women	0.363**	0.426**
	(0.175)	(0.179)
Men (REF)		
AGE		
18-24	0.591*	0.505
	(0.317)	(0.323)
25-34	0.487*	0.489
	(0.277)	(0.284)
35-49	0.109	0.116
	(0.260)	(0.265)
50-64	-0.298	-0.254
	(0.252)	(0.255)
+65 (REF)		

[20] Figures 4a-4b, 5a-5b (predicted probabilities of votes by precariousness in 2 rounds) are based on the same regressions but use EPICES deciles rather than the standardized Score Epices, which makes the graphs easier to read.

EDUCATION		
Primary	0.315	0.136
	(0.296)	(0.305)
Vocational	0.566**	0.390
	(0.257)	(0.266)
Secondary	0.256	0.219
	(0.264)	(0.269)
College(REF)		
INCOME		
N/A	-0 .248	-0.429
	(0.379)	(0.388)
Q1	-0.237	-0.312
	(0.348)	(0.354)
Q2	-0.392	-0.449
	(0.336)	(0.340)
Q3	-0.268	-0.336
	(0.349)	(0.354)
Q4	-0.623*	-0.701*
	(0.366)	(0.370)
Q5 (REF)		
EMPLOYMENT		
Not working	0.123	0.038
	(0.356)	(0.362)
Self-Employed	-0.259	-0.311
	(0.407)	(0.410)
Intermediary	-0.777**	-0.831**
	(0.395)	(0.400)
Routine non-manual	0.066	-0.006
	(0.335)	(0.340)
Manual worker	0.160	0.044
	(0.348)	(0.355)
Manager(REF)		

RELIGION		
Practicing Catholic	-0.344	-0.324
	(0.460)	(0.462)
Occasional	0.212	0.146
	(0.298)	(0.303)
No Practice	0.261	0.203
	(0.190)	(0.193)
Other Faith	0.519*	0.519*
	(0.289)	(0.292)
No religion (REF)		
ORIGIN		
2 foreign parents	0.586**	0.579**
	(0.260)	(0.263)
1 of them	0.545**	0.510**
	(0.245)	(0.249)
None (REF)		
SCALE		
Precariousness	0.734***	0.708***
	(0.092)	(0.094)
POLITICAL INTEREST		
Not at all		1.249***
		(0.299)
A little		0.272
		(0.281)
Somewhat		0.094
		(0.289)
Very much (REF)		
Constant	-2.801***	-2,913***
	(0.371)	(0.413)
N	1830	1830
Log likelihood	1141.917	1109.118
X2 (df)	194,639 (25)	227.185(28)
Pseudo R2	0.195	0.225

B coefficient, standard errors in brackets Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table B2. Multinomial logistic regression on votes in 1st round

	JLM		Fillon		MLP		No Vote	
VARIABLES	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
GENDER								
Men	0.347**	0.485**	-0.585**	-0.158	0.107	0.167	0.461***	0.569***
	(0.176)	(0.196)	(0.264)	(0.229)	(0.190)	(0.224)	(0.173)	(0.184)
Women (REF)								
AGE								
18-24	1.264***	1.460***	0.509	0.384	1.758***	2.530***	1.150***	1.1442***
	(0.362)	(0.399)	(0.578)	(0.544)	(0.387)	(0.457)	(0.350)	(0.373)
25-34	1.419***	1.524***	0.498	-0.382	1.717***	1.987***	1.290***	1.282***
	(0.308)	(0.335)	(0.473)	(0.453)	(0.335)	(0.388)	(0.299)	(0.316)
35-49	0.743**	0.915***	0.728**	-0.035	1.411***	1.946	0.630**	0.770***
	(0.261)	(0.287)	(0.366)	(0.318)	(0.278)	(0.332)	(0.249)	(0.264)
50-64	0.247	0.209	0.255	-0.620**	0.536**	0.593**	0.123	-0.141
	(0.237)	(0.260)	(0.347)	(0.278)	(0.248)	(0.292)	(0.220)	(0.232)
EDUCATION								
Primary	0.288	0.061	-0.159	0.167	1.628***	0.716*	1.080***	0.609**
	(0.293)	(0.329)	(0.466)	(0.369)	(0.316)	(0.378)	(0.284)	(0.306)
Vocational	-0.182	-0.058	-0.133	0.048	1.277***	0.481	1.135**	0.715***
	(0.248)	(0.277)	(0.376)	(0343)	(0.278)	(0.329)	(0.246)	(0.262)
Secondary	-0.116	-0.318	-0.019	0.072	0.474*	-0.044	0.262	-0.053
	(0.229)	(0.256)	(0.327)	(0.302)	(0.275)	(0.323)	(0.240)	(0.253)
College (REF)								
INCOME								
N/A	0.251	0.062	-0.046	-0.538	0.211	-0.050	0.632**	0.463

	(0.351)	(0.387)	(0.522)	(0.408)	(0.398)	(0.451)	(0.318)	(0.335)
Q1	0.499	0.202	0.109	-0.999**	0.508	0.205	0.191	0.106
	(0.337)	(0.370	(0.504)	(0.461)	(0.374)	(0.433)	(0.325)	(0.342)
Q2	0.683**	0.347	0.220	-0.481	0.587*	0.484	-0.15	-0.120
	(0.297)	(0.327)	(0.435)	(0.376)	(0.338)	(0.393)	(0.297)	(0.312)
Q3	0.505	0.222	0.196	0.017	0.278	-0.154	-0.45	-0.187
	(0.302)	(0.332)	(0.434)	(0.364)	(0.354)	(0.414)	(0.304)	(0.319)
Q4	0.135	-0.152	0.451	-0.184	0.000	-0.398	-0.262	-0.422
	(0.274)	(0.304)	(0.360)	(0.307)	(0.337)	(0.393)	(0.279)	(0.293)
Q5 (REF)								
EMPLOYMENT								
Not working	-0.127	-0.203	-0.429	-0.886	0.431	-0.561	-0.447	-0.715**
	(0.323)	(0.362)	(0.481)	(0.433)	(0.436)	(0.500)	(0.327)	(0.343)
Self-Employed	0.000	0.512	0.291	1.026***	1.262***	1.141**	-0.023	-0.003
	(0.402)	(0.446)	(0.556)	(0.397)	(0.469)	(0.529)	(0.376)	(0.394)
Intermediary	0.198	0.197	0.067	-0.661	0.940**	0.520	-0.168	-0.409
	(0.275)	(0.306)	(0.367)	(0.350)	(0.397)	(0.452)	(0.286)	(0.299)
Routine non-manual	0.574*	0.670**	0.127	-0.192	1.188***	0.770*	0.271	0.084
	(0.293)	(0.325)	(0.406)	(0.359)	(0.407)	(0.464)	(0.294)	(0.305
Manual worker	0.172	0.034	0.292	-0.279	0.894**	0.567	0.046	-0.179
	(0.331)	(0.365)	(0.485)	(0.436)	(0.431)	(0.493)	(0.321)	(0.335)
Manager (REF)								
RELIGION								
Practicing Catholic	-1.149**	0.910	-0.343	1.779***	-0.218	-0.409	-0.219	-0.242
	(0.471)	(0.529)	(0.549)	(0.427)	(0.431)	(0.494)	(0.381)	(0.403)
Occasional	-1.037***	-0.584	-1.331**	1.235***	0.207	0.113	-0.141	-0.113
	(0.328)	(0.361)	(0.563)	(0.384)	(0.295)	(0.347)	(0.286)	(0.304)
No Practice	-0.665***	-0.302	-0.576**	0.712**	-0.039	-0.185	-0.225	-0.233
	(0.187)	(0.208)	(0.266)	(0.305)	(0.201)	(0.240)	(0.186)	(0.198)
Other Faith	0.235	0.494	-0.282	0.808	-0.943**	-0.820	0.515	0.609*
	(0.311)	(0.350)	(0.483)	(0.726)	(0.457)	(0.522)	(0.316)	(0.341)
No Religion (REF)								

SCALES								
Precariousness	0.201*	0.050	0.048	-0.49	0.395***	0.175	0.598***	0.453***
	(0.104)	(0.114)	(0.157)	(0.146)	(0.106)	(0.124)	(0.098)	(0.104)
Left-Right position		-0.762***		1.298***		0.780***		0.046
		(0.117)		(0.157)		(0.127)		(0.110)
Ethnocentrism		0.220*		0.284**		0.972***		0.196*
		(0.117)		(0.135)		(0.130)		(0.104)
Economic conservatism		-0.755***		0.538***		-0.315***		-0.261***
		(0.104)		(0.126)		(0.116)		(0.094)
Cultural conservatism		-0.096		0.168		-0.315		0.032
		(0.118)		(0.127)		(0.116)		(0.102)
Anti-EU sentiment		0.628***		0.359**		1.171		0.823***
		(0.115)		(0.141)		(0.121)		(0.107)
Constant	-0.964**	-1.285***	-1.193***	-1.398**	-3.047***	-2.671***	-0.997***	-0.339
	(0.325)	(0.380)	(0.443)	(0.449)	(0.452)	(0.536)	(0.317)	(0.347)
Observations	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830

B coefficient, standard errors in brackets Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Reference category Macron
Model 1 Log likelihood 5937.730 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke: 0.336 X2 (df): 723.323(138)***
Model 2 Log Likelihood 5019.419 PseudoR2 Nagelkerke: 0.629 X2 (df):1738.873 (168)***

Table B3. Multinomial logistic regression on votes in the 2nd round

	Le Pen		No Vote	
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
GENDER				
	0.199	0.226	0.527***	0.570***
	(0.156)	(0.188)	(0.123)	(0.133)
Women				
Men (REF)				
AGE				
18-24	1.298***	2.043***	0.885***	1.112***

	(0.308)	(0. 371)	(0.243)	(0.263)
25-34	1.429***	1.780***	0.980***	1.006***
	(0.263)	(0.314)	(0.207)	(0.222)
35-49	1.164***	1.654***	0.676***	0.816***
	(0.231)	(0.281)	(0.178)	(0.192)
50-64	0.705***	0.873***	0.170	0.202
	(0.210)	(0.251)	(0.163)	(0.175)
+65 (REF)				
EDUCATION				
Primary	1.068***	0.70	0.478**	-0.013
	(0.258)	(0.316)	(0.200)	(0.219)
Vocational	0.849***	-0.011	0.336**	-0.105
	(0.223)	(0.269)	(0.171)	(0.185)
Secondary	0.392*	-0.134	0.147	-0.132
	(0.228)	(0.270)	(0.166)	(0.178)
College(REF)				
INCOME				
N/A	0.191	0.066	0.375	0.261
	(0.329)	(0.377)	(0.232)	(0.246)
Q1	0.333	0.229	-0.082	-0.102
	(0.302)	(0.357)	(0.230)	(0.244)
Q2	0.130	0.30	-0.169	-0.269
	(0.278)	(0.328)	(0.207)	(0.221)
Q3	0.073	-0.256	-0.303	-0.451**
	(0.289)	(0.345)	(0.215)	(0.230)
Q4	-0.017	-0.288	-0.314	-0.444**
	(0.276)	(0.327)	(0.195)	(0.208)
Q5 (REF)				
EMPLOYMENT				
Not working	0 .796**	0.393	0.059	-0.125
	(0.357)	(0.416)	(0.234)	(0.248)
Self-Employed	0.873**	0.732*	-0.089	-0.071
	(0.370)	(0.426)	(0.250)	(0.267)
Intermediary	0.842**	0.579	0.099	-0.060
	(0.329)	(0.379)	(0.202)	(0.214)

Routine non-manual	1.148***	0.910**	0.372*	0.228
	(0.328)	(0.382)	(0.206)	(0.218)
Manual worker	0.996***	0.855**	0.070	-0.063
	(0/346)	(0.405)	(0.230)	(0.244)
Manager(REF)				
RELIGION				
Practicing Catholic	-0.177	-0.511	-0.437*	-0.517*
	(0.341)	(0.403)	(0.262)	(0.282)
Occasional	0.338	0.098	-0.026	-0.071
	(0.250)	(0.301)	(0.205)	(0.223)
No Practice	0.423**	0.290	0.033	0.010
	(.166)	(0.201)	(0.133)	(0.145)
Other Faith	-0.980***	-0.827**	-0.215	-0.163
	(0.345)	(0.401)	(0.210)	(0.228)
No religion (REF)				
SCALES				
Precariousness	0.383***	0.213**	0.536***	0.434***
	(0.086)	(0.102)	(0.071)	(0.075)
Left-Right position		0.605***		-0.102
		(0.095)		(0.072)
Ethnocentrism		0.966***		0.330***
		(0.106)		(0.076)
Economic conservatism		0.180*		-0.166**
		(0.095)		(0.067)
Cultural conservatism		0.38		-0.032
		(0.093)		(0.073)
Anti-EU sentiment		1.104***		0.681***
		(0.095)		(0.074)
Constant	-3.495***	-3.198***	-1.066***	-0.503**
	(0.374)	(0.445)	(0.227)	(0.249)
Observations	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830

B, standard errors in brackets Sig:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Reference category Macron
Model 1 Log likelihood 3421.803 Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke : 0.185 X2 (df): 323.230 (46)***
Model 2 Log Likelihood 2941.798 PseudoR2 Nagelkerke : 0.428 X2 (df):857.740 (56)***

2. Marginal effects of predictors on votes for all candidates computed on the base of the above multinomial regressions

Marginal effects were computed on the basis of the above multinomial logistic regressions (Tables B2 and B3), predicting choices between Mélenchon, Hamon, Macron, Fillon, Le Pen, 'Other candidates' or 'No vote' in the 1st round (Table B2), and Le Pen, Macron or 'No vote' in the 2nd round (Table B3). The coefficients are the same whatever the reference category chosen in the regression. Model 1 includes socio demographic variables, model 2 adds political attitudes. For the 1st round we only present the results for the main candidates

Table B5a. Marginal effects of sociodemographic and attitudinal variables on votes in 1st round

	JLM		Macron		Fillon		MLP		No Vote	
VARIABLES	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**	**Model 1**	**Model 2**
GENDER										
Women									-0.0591***	-0.0826***
	-0.0327	-0.0318	0.0373*	0.0625**	0.00932	0.0197**	0.0113	0.0117		
	(0.0222)	(0.0214)	(0.0222)	(0.0261)	(0.0122)	(0.00914)	(0.0192)	(0.0161)	(0.0225)	(0.0292)
Men (REF)										
AGE										
18-24	0.0745*	0.0444	-0.165***	-0.223***	-0.0880***	-0.0428*	0.121***	0.131***	0.111**	0.149**
	(0.0430)	(0.0391)	(0.0391)	(0.0428)	(0.0269)	(0.0221)	(0.0393)	(0.0402)	(0.0481)	(0.0595)
25-34	0.0936**	0.0873**	-0.173***	-0.203***	-0.0948***	-0.0584***	0.0986***	0.0775***	0.101**	0.120**
	(0.0371)	(0.0361)	(0.0341)	(0.0409)	(0.0221)	(0.0166)	(0.0305)	(0.0250)	(0.0395)	(0.0493)
35-49	0.0301	0.0306	-0.121***	-0.160***	-0.0587***	-0.0399**	0.112***	0.114***	-0.00557	-0.00778
	(0.0300)	(0.0282)	(0.0331)	(0.0389)	(0.0221)	(0.0162)	(0.0264)	(0.0249)	(0.0306)	(0.0405)
50-64	0.0354	0.0260	-0.0107	-0.00379	-0.0682***	-0.0365**	0.0542***	0.0357**	-0.0395	-0.0518
	(0.0287)	(0.0261)	(0.0338)	(0.0406)	(0.0195)	(0.0151)	(0.0204)	(0.0146)	(0.0268)	(0.0353)
+65 (REF)										
EDUCATION										
Primary	-0.0786**	-0.0479	-0.134***	-0.0736*	-0.00177	-0.00749	0.144***	0.0392	0.0625*	0.0630
	(0.0366)	(0.0372)	(0.0351)	(0.0428)	(0.0193)	(0.0141)	(0.0336)	(0.0293)	(0.0344)	(0.0471)

Vocational	-0.0768**	-0.0596*	-0.117***	-0.0679*	-0.0145	-0.0110	0.0949***	0.0165	0.113***	0.118***
	(0.0313)	(0.0305)	(0.0329)	(0.0382)	(0.0166)	(0.0128)	(0.0251)	(0.0227)	(0.0308)	(0.0409)
Secondary	-0.0548*	-0.0449	-0.0352	0.0143	0.0201	0.00636	0.0363	0.000938	0.0296	0.0180
	(0.0310)	(0.0299)	(0.0344)	(0.0390)	(0.0188)	(0.0137)	(0.0227)	(0.0219)	(0.0278)	(0.0379)
College (REF)										
INCOME										
N/A	0.00625	-0.00871	-0.0354	-0.0179	-0.0520**	-0.0278*	0.00155	-0.0105	-0.0152	-0.0406
	(0.0376)	(0.0368)	(0.0402)	(0.0450)	(0.0262)	(0.0163)	(0.0362)	(0.0296)	(0.0471)	(0.0582)
Q1	0.0702*	0.0338	-0.0212	0.00712	-0.0739***	-0.0382**	0.0583	0.0232	0.00360	0.0183
	(0.0391)	(0.0385)	(0.0424)	(0.0479)	(0.0258)	(0.0165)	(0.0371)	(0.0315)	(0.0453)	(0.0580)
Q2	0.102***	0.0543	-0.0302	0.000895	-0.0618**	-0.0233	0.0645*	0.0528*	-0.0410	-0.0453
	(0.0361)	(0.0359)	(0.0366)	(0.0413)	(0.0244)	(0.0165)	(0.0341)	(0.0315)	(0.0409)	(0.0527)
Q3	0.0794**	0.0482	-0.0151	0.0195	-0.0389	0.00699	0.0272	-0.00552	-0.0116	-0.00975
	(0.0369)	(0.0369)	(0.0378)	(0.0431)	(0.0258)	(0.0201)	(0.0346)	(0.0282)	(0.0435)	(0.0554)
Q4	0.0306	0.0117	0.0122	0.0555	-0.0125	0.00324	0.00679	-0.0129	-0.0303	-0.0349
	(0.0317)	(0.0318)	(0.0343)	(0.0397)	(0.0244)	(0.0168)	(0.0324)	(0.0268)	(0.0408)	(0.0522)
Q5 (REF)										
EMPLOYMENT										
Not working	0.00463	0.0205	0.0373	0.0937*	-0.0356	-0.0169	0.0614*	0.0125	-0.0535	-0.0933
	(0.0409)	(0.0370)	(0.0471)	(0.0552)	(0.0294)	(0.0185)	(0.0339)	(0.0284)	(0.0469)	(0.0609)
Self-Employed	-0.0619	0.0209	-0.0764*	-0.0701	0.111***	0.0529*	0.106**	0.0740*	-0.0739	-0.0938
	(0.0410)	(0.0465)	(0.0432)	(0.0479)	(0.0409)	(0.0274)	(0.0423)	(0.0392)	(0.0484)	(0.0654)
Intermediary	0.0221	0.0417	-0.0185	0.0196	-0.0586***	-0.0252*	0.105***	0.0525*	-0.0631	-0.107*
	(0.0372)	(0.0341)	(0.0364)	(0.0420)	(0.0220)	(0.0148)	(0.0346)	(0.0304)	(0.0432)	(0.0557)
Routine non-manual	0.0386	0.0642*	-0.0735**	-0.0535	-0.0505**	-0.0213	0.0957***	0.0414	-0.0347	-0.0647
	(0.0382)	(0.0354)	(0.0367)	(0.0409)	(0.0235)	(0.0156)	(0.0321)	(0.0286)	(0.0441)	(0.0569)
Manual worker	0.00516	0.00462	-0.0306	0.000639	-0.0559**	-0.0138	0.0868**	0.0490	-0.0259	-0.0600
	(0.0409)	(0.0352)	(0.0436)	(0.0493)	(0.0260)	(0.0189)	(0.0343)	(0.0316)	(0.0467)	(0.0603)
Manager (REF)										
RELIGION										
Practicing Catholic	-0.185***	-0.102***	0.00316	0.0213	0.262***	0.129***	-0.0266	-0.0290	-0.0566	-0.0675
	(0.0378)	(0.0385)	(0.0435)	(0.0566)	(0.0493)	(0.0385)	(0.0382)	(0.0318)	(0.0415)	(0.0601)
Occasional	-0.163***	-0.0728**	0.0240	0.0145	0.120***	0.0624***	0.0579	0.0221	0.00939	0.00292

	(0.0324)	(0.0338)	(0.0359)	(0.0432)	(0.0281)	(0.0205)	(0.0354)	(0.0302)	(0.0373)	(0.0495)
No Practice	-0.104***	-0.0280	0.0361	0.0293	0.0637***	0.0308***	0.0226	-0.00564	-0.00242	-0.0174
	(0.0249)	(0.0237)	(0.0236)	(0.0288)	(0.0128)	(0.00971)	(0.0206)	(0.0184)	(0.0228)	(0.0306)
Other Faith	0.0146	0.0293	-0.0306	-0.0614	0.0412*	0.0136	-0.0975***	-0.0746***	0.0830*	0.0843
	(0.0434)	(0.0414)	(0.0362)	(0.0409)	(0.0239)	(0.0157)	(0.0222)	(0.0207)	(0.0424)	(0.0540)
No Religion (REF)										
SCALES										
Precariousness	-0.0116	-0.0211*	-0.0536***	-0.0421***	-0.0275***	-0.0108*	0.0200*	-0.00177	0.0783***	0.0882***
	(0.0126)	(0.0120)	(0.0133)	(0.0157)	(0.00777)	(0.00575)	(0.0103)	(0.00866)	(0.0118)	(0.0155)
Left-Right position		-0.122***		-0.00292		0.0580***		0.0755***		0.0137
		(0.0118)		(0.0166)		(0.00811)		(0.0101)		(0.0163)
Ethnocentrism		-0.0610***		-0.0356**		0.00568		0.0797***		-0.00845
		(0.0124)		(0.0155)		(0.00533)		(0.00969)		(0.0161)
Economic conservatism		-0.0793***		0.0569***		0.0359***		-0.00577		-0.00777
		(0.0115)		(0.0136)		(0.00603)		(0.00852)		(0.0153)
Cultural conservatism		-0.0164		-0.00219		0.00706		0.0118		0.0113
		(0.0124)		(0.0156)		(0.00480)		(0.00774)		(0.0150)
Anti-EU sentiment		0.00649		-0.131***		-0.0102**		0.0577***		0.0588***
		(0.0110)		(0.0155)		(0.00516)		(0.00835)		(0.0148)
Observations	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830

Standard errors in parentheses. Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All scales are standardized (Mean=0, SD=

Table B5b. Marginal effects of socio demographic and attitudinal variables on votes in 2nd round

	Macron		Le Pen		No Vote	
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
GENDER						
Women	0.106***	0.123***	0.00593	0.00561	-0.112***	-0.129***
	(0.0277)	(0.0310)	(0.0195)	(0.0161)	(0.0265)	(0.0293)
Men (REF)						
AGE						
18-24	-0.243***	-0.306***	0.110***	0.135***	0.133**	0.171***
	(0.0522)	(0.0555)	(0.0381)	(0.0377)	(0.0519)	(0.0561)
25-34	-0.267***	-0.275***	0.123***	0.108***	0.144***	0.168***
	(0.0437)	(0.0488)	(0.0321)	(0.0269)	(0.0439)	(0.0479)
35-49	-0.200***	-0.236***	0.107***	0.106***	0.0932**	0.130***
	(0.0393)	(0.0437)	(0.0264)	(0.0229)	(0.0378)	(0.0422)
50-64	-0.0798**	-0.0768*	0.0723***	0.0533***	0.00755	0.0234
	(0.0364)	(0.0410)	(0.0218)	(0.0159)	(0.0336)	(0.0383)
+65 (REF)						
EDUCATION						
Primary	-0.161***	-0.000823	0.115***	0.00751	0.0452	-0.00669
	(0.0442)	(0.0519)	(0.0329)	(0.0281)	(0.0432)	(0.0493)
Vocational	-0.120***	0.0214	0.0904***	0.00396	0.0298	-0.0254
	(0.0387)	(0.0440)	(0.0260)	(0.0237)	(0.0369)	(0.0418)
Secondary	-0.0527	0.0328	0.0373	-0.00637	0.0154	-0.0264
	(0.0382)	(0.0424)	(0.0242)	(0.0232)	(0.0362)	(0.0405)
College(REF)						
INCOME						
N/A	-0.0794	-0.0543	-0.000958	-0.00743	0.0803	0.0617
	(0.0516)	(0.0558)	(0.0376)	(0.0305)	(0.0535)	(0.0561)
Q1	-0.0102	0.00879	0.0517	0.0290	-0.0415	-0.0378
	(0.0521)	(0.0570)	(0.0381)	(0.0324)	(0.0510)	(0.0553)
Q2	0.0207	0.0518	0.0274	0.0164	-0.0481	-0.0682
	(0.0468)	(0.0516)	(0.0336)	(0.0289)	(0.0465)	(0.0504)
Q3	0.0479	0.103*	0.0274	-0.00322	-0.0752	-0.0995*
	(0.0486)	(0.0540)	(0.0356)	(0.0288)	(0.0479)	(0.0521)
Q4	0.0571	0.103**	0.0158	-0.00635	-0.0728*	-0.0966**
	(0.0442)	(0.0488)	(0.0336)	(0.0274)	(0.0442)	(0.0478)
Q5 (REF)						
EMPLOYMENT						
Not working	-0.0597	0.0115	0.0829**	0.0327	-0.0232	-0.0442
	(0.0544)	(0.0599)	(0.0342)	(0.0269)	(0.0519)	(0.0572)
Self-Employed	-0.0420	-0.0169	0.103***	0.0635*	-0.0614	-0.0466
	(0.0571)	(0.0636)	(0.0400)	(0.0333)	(0.0541)	(0.0609)
Intermediary	-0.0702	-0.0106	0.0869***	0.0471*	-0.0167	-0.0365
	(0.0467)	(0.0514)	(0.0320)	(0.0260)	(0.0460)	(0.0500)
Routine non-manual	-0.139***	-0.0832	0.113***	0.0664**	0.0258	0.0168

	(0.0471)	(0.0517)	(0.0312)	(0.0265)	(0.0469)	(0.0509)
Manual worker	-0.0782	-0.0259	0.112***	0.0774**	-0.0339	-0.0515
	(0.0529)	(0.0583)	(0.0343)	(0.0305)	(0.0505)	(0.0556)
Manager(REF)						
RELIGION						
Practicing Catholic	0.0898	0.128**	0.000287	-0.0233	-0.0901*	-0.105*
	(0.0583)	(0.0654)	(0.0407)	(0.0287)	(0.0539)	(0.0613)
Occasional	-0.0212	0.00934	0.0493	0.0129	-0.0281	-0.0223
	(0.0460)	(0.0525)	(0.0343)	(0.0268)	(0.0441)	(0.0498)
No Practice	-0.0379	-0.0167	0.0586***	0.0294	-0.0207	-0.0126
	(0.0302)	(0.0344)	(0.0212)	(0.0180)	(0.0287)	(0.0322)
Other Faith	0.0924*	0.0639	-0.0804***	-0.0513**	-0.0121	-0.0126
	(0.0497)	(0.0557)	(0.0237)	(0.0215)	(0.0473)	(0.0532)
No religion (REF)						
SCALES						
Precariousness	-0.121***	-0.0966***	0.0191*	-0.000148	0.102***	0.0967***
	(0.0162)	(0.0179)	(0.0105)	(0.00871)	(0.0149)	(0.0167)
Left-Right position		-0.0498***		0.0537***		-0.00395
		(0.0172)		(0.00843)		(0.0160)
Ethnocentrism		-0.113***		0.0777***		0.0350**
		(0.0179)		(0.00911)		(0.0170)
Economic conservatism		0.0417***		-0.00943		-0.0323**
		(0.0159)		(0.00839)		(0.0151)
Cultural conservatism		0.00446		0.00515		-0.00962
		(0.0173)		(0.00780)		(0.0161)
Anti-EU sentiment		-0.189***		0.0743***		0.115***
		(0.0175)		(0.00828)		(0.0162)
Observations	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830	1,830

Standard errors in parentheses. Sig *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All scales are standardized (Mean=0, SD=1).