



Partecipazione e Conflitto
* *The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies*
<http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco>
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version)
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version)
PACO, Issue 8(3) 2015: 736-760
DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v8i3p736

Published in November 15, 2015

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

THE CLASH OF COSMOPOLITANISMS

The European Union from Cosmopolitization to Neo-Liberalization

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ABSTRACT: It is clear that the European Union (EU) is currently in the worst crisis situation it has ever been in. The forms of social solidarity, inter-national cooperation, and trans-national structures and processes that many commentators have seen as the basis of 'cosmopolitan' Europe are under severe strain. Decades of apparent cosmopolitization – of political bodies, economic networks, social connections and the patterns of everyday life – seem to be rapidly going into reverse, being pulled apart or self-destructing. If the last several decades could be understood as involving the increasing appearance and strength (albeit unevenly and in contested ways) of cosmopolitan features both within the EU as an entity and 'inside' its external borders, then today the tearing fabric of 'European' life seems to point in the opposite direction. This paper poses the question: how 'cosmopolitan' really was the EU before the current set of crises, and how have the latter undermined what cosmopolitan features there were? The argument proposed is that the EU was from the very beginning ambivalently cosmopolitan, for it was structured around a liberal-economic, market-based cosmopolitanism, as well as a rights-based conception of citizenship and democracy, a kind of legal-political cosmopolitanism. Both forms of cosmopolitanism existed up until recently in a highly ambivalent relationship with each other. But as over time, and especially from the late 1970s, liberal-economic cosmopolitanism mutated into neo-liberal cosmopolitanism, then the tensions between the two cosmopolitanisms now stand out very starkly, and have reached breaking point. The nature and consequences of this situation are diagnosed.

KEYWORDS: Cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitanisms, Europe, European Union, EU, Kant, Marx, crisis.

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1.

It is clear for all to see that the European Union (EU) is currently in the worst crisis situation it has ever been in. The unprecedented refugee 'problem' stemming from mass migration from Syria and other locations has seriously undermined cooperation and solidarity between member-state governments, to the point that cross-border mobility in the Schengen area is being ever more restricted – a development mostly unthinkable just a few years ago. The barriers around 'Fortress Europe' become more impenetrable and daunting by the day, especially due to states' responses to Islamist terror attacks in the heart of Europe. Meanwhile, Eurozone governments of the North and East inflict punitive, so-called 'austerity' measures against the populations of the South, with dramatic consequences on social well-being, mental health and suicide rates. Unemployment, especially among youth, is at eye-watering levels, leading to the mass emigration of the most talented and mobile young people to other places where their prospects seem to be not quite so dire. The controversial putative entry of Turkey into the EU club becomes an ever more distant prospect, throwing into reverse several decades of negotiations between EU and Turkish elites that were meant to lead to the result that a Muslim majority country – supposedly cleansed of past human rights abuses by the state following the good example of the EU - could become officially recognised as part of 'Europe', and in so doing would dethrone ethnocentric definitions of the latter as supposedly characterised by a so-called 'Christian civilization'.

In sum, the forms of social solidarity, inter-national cooperation, and trans-national structures and processes that many commentators have seen as the basis of 'cosmopolitan Europe' are under severe strain currently, if they have not already partly collapsed already. Decades of apparent cosmopolitization – of political bodies, economic networks, social connections and the patterns of everyday life – seem to be rapidly going into reverse, being pulled apart or self-destructing. If the last several decades could be understood – as many analysts have - as involving the increasing appearance and strength (albeit unevenly and in contested ways) of cosmopolitan features both within the EU as a legal-political entity and 'inside' its external borders, then today the tearing fabric of 'European' life seems to point in the opposite direction – of rising ethno-nationalism, of neo-conservative foreign policy, and of punitive neo-liberal 'austerity' measures used by some members of the Eurozone against the others. It is therefore timely to pose the question: how 'cosmopolitan' really was the EU before the current set of crises, and how have the latter undermined what cosmopolitan features there were?

This seems to me a crucial question not just for citizens of an increasingly embattled and unhappy EU, but for people everywhere, because up until recently the EU was pre-

sented both by its own officialdom and their intellectual cheerleaders as a – if not *the* – major source and promoter of ‘really existing cosmopolitanism’ across the world. The EU could be regarded as “the first international model which begins to resemble the cosmopolitan model” adumbrated by Kant in the late 18th century and by later liberal political cosmopolitan thinkers (Archibugi, Held and Köhler 1998, 219). The EU, it was argued, was both a model for how erstwhile warring states could put their bellicose past behind them and create a union of peaceful equals - the peaceable League of States envisaged in Kant’s cosmopolitan theory - and also the promoter par excellence around the world of a vision of human life characterised by democracy, observation of human rights and the rule of law (Andrews 2012). In other words, the EU was claimed to have brought into being and embodied the Kantian liberal cosmopolitan dream. In the current period of crisis upon escalating crisis, and ever increasing suspicion and threats within and across borders, what remains of that dream?

My argument here is that the EU was always essentially a deeply ambivalent entity. This is unsurprising given its size, institutional and structural complexity, and chequered genesis and developmental history. More important is this point: the EU was from the very beginning *ambivalently cosmopolitan*, for it was structured around, first, a liberal-economic, market-based cosmopolitanism, as well as, second, a rights-based conception of citizenship and democracy, which when it is applied to trans-national conditions, becomes a kind of political cosmopolitanism (Parker 2012). Both forms of cosmopolitanism always-already existed in a highly ambivalent relationship with each other. But from the late 1970s, liberal-economic cosmopolitanism mutated into neo-liberal cosmopolitanism, then the tensions between the two cosmopolitanisms now stand out very starkly indeed, and have reached breaking point. The tension is so marked because, as I will argue below, neo-liberal cosmopolitanism is a ‘perverted’ or ‘fake’ cosmopolitanism, which eschews the sorts of cross-border sympathies and care for Others which characterises cosmopolitan ethics and political practice in the most profound senses of the word (Beck 2006). The EU was always a contradictory mixture of capitalist market and democratic politics, with equally contradictory imaginings of the role of the State and political bodies, be they national or trans-national: namely, as servants of capital and markets (the essence of neo-liberal thinking), or as mechanisms to tame and regulate markets (the essence of the Social Democratic envisioning of both political entities in general, and the EU in particular). The current crop of crises not only illustrate the whip-hand that the neo-liberal vision now enjoys over the Social Democratic one. They also have been effectively used by neo-liberal actors inside and outside the EU to foster the dominance of neo-liberal thought and economic-political practice, including within the institutions of the EU itself.

I will not argue here, as some leftist analysts do, that the EU is in its very essence a neo-liberal project (Harvey 2009, 83). I will also not argue that the pan-European integration processes that were occurring until recently, and which were (and still in some ways are) the dream of significant wings of Eurocratic elites, were (or are) simply and 'really' *only* about the dismantling of national welfare states and the restructuring of labour markets in the direction of flexibilization and the diminishment of workers' rights and protections (Felski 2012). That certainly was part of the story of 'Europeanization', but it was (and maybe still is) not the whole story, even if the narrative has become ever more skewed towards involving the neo-liberalization of pan-European realities. The true question of the EU has always been one centred upon the relative preponderance of powers which accrue over time to the two sorts of cosmopolitanism indicated above, the market one and the (Social Democratic) political one. As Calhoun (2009, 638) phrased this point about the time of the 2008 financial crisis, will the structures of European "integration radically privilege capital or will inequality and accumulation be tempered by redistribution, high levels of public service, and strong rights for labour?"

The answer for today's conditions is clear – neo-liberal tendencies prevail, along with their apparent opposites but actual corollaries, namely neo-conservatism in foreign and domestic 'security' policies, and ethno-nationalist dispositions and rhetoric among wings of national political classes and general populations. But that answer was not, I think, inevitable. 'Europe' could have gone in other, more genuinely cosmopolitan directions. That it has gone in the direction of neo-liberalization – a kind of perverse cosmopolitanism – instead of a more genuinely cosmopolitical direction, was a matter of political contingency (especially involving manipulation of crises and the popular fears stoked by them) by self-interested elites, and was not somehow predetermined by the supposed 'nature' of the EU itself, because the latter has always been riven and ambivalent. Just as it matters very which elites, of right or of left, are in charge of particular national polities as regards the structure and functioning of the State, so too does the same point apply at EU level: the neo-liberalization of the EU is a contingent result of neo-liberal elites gaining many of the major levers of control of EU policy-making. And it is this factor, I argue, which has very strongly driven the EU not just in the direction of a perverse, neo-liberal cosmopolitanism but also into marked anti-cosmopolitan trajectories too. When neo-liberal cadres are in charge of decision-making, a cosmopolitan elite takes politics and society in eminently anti-cosmopolitan directions – and that is the central problem facing the EU and all its citizens at the present time.

2.

In the 1990s and early 2000s it was easy enough to make claims that the history of the EU had unfolded such that it had become an embodiment of ‘really existing cosmopolitanism’. As Eriksen (2008, 2) has put it, ‘Europe’ had created what seemed like a radically new form of political organisation: “It was in Europe that the modern system of states was invented and it is Europe that has come farthest in changing it”. Although the beginnings of the EU are explicitly economic in nature, nonetheless “from the beginning Europe has been more than simply a trading bloc and represents a new kind of transnational political community” (Stevenson 2005, 47).

The apparently profound changes that the EU has wrought to the political, economic, social and cultural landscapes of Europe seem impressive and wide-ranging when listed together. A “wide range of new policy fields have been subjected to integrated action and collective decision-making ... [including] trade, monetary and business regulation, fishing and agriculture ... foodstuff production, gene- and bio-technology, labour rights, environmental protection, culture, tourism, immigration, police and home affairs and ... [latterly] a common foreign and security policy. The EU has ... established a Single Market, a Monetary Union ... European citizenship and a Charter of Fundamental Rights”. Even if the EU’s powers in some areas like social policy and taxation are restricted, nonetheless “a significant amount of laws and amendments in the nation states stem from the binding EU decisions, directives and regulations” that they must observe (Eriksen 2008, 11).

The EU has been understood as a vast and sprawling policy regime but also as “a large-scale experiment searching for binding constitutional principles and institutional arrangements beyond the mode of rule entrenched in the nation state” (*ibidem*, 23). It could therefore plausibly be argued that the EU’s trans-national structures of politics, participation and citizenship had created a ‘post-Westphalian’ reality that had transcended, both empirically and normatively, the bellicose chaos of inter-state relations. Previous combatants, like Germany and France, were now wedded together forever into an intricate network of peaceable, transnational networks and mutual forms of dependence. Given its production and ongoing guarantee of the Kantian dream of ‘perpetual peace’, the EU acted not only as an instance of the permanent overcoming of previous nation-state rivalries and hostilities, but also as a model for promoting peace in other parts of the globe. It was these reasons that stood behind the Nobel Committee’s reasoning in awarding the Peace Prize to the EU, as a shining exemplar of post-nationalistic, post-Westphalian conflict resolution on a permanent basis.

For proponents of taking the EU in this sort of light, what made it special was not just its structural, post-national quality, but also its substantive commitments, the values for which it stood and which it was seen to promote globally. These encompassed orientations to and defences of “pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights” (Stevenson 2005, 47). The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 enshrined “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States”. Because the EU had defined itself with explicit reference to the upholding of human rights, participatory democracy and the rule of law across all member states, then the claims to participation and freedom associated with those principles themselves became transnational, and thus in a literal sense ‘cosmopolitan’ (Parker 2009). For Kant, for a polity to be cosmopolitan, it needs to submit its actions to a higher ranking set of legal and philosophical rules, and this set of rules the EU both adumbrated and required all member states to observe – it therefore passed another Kantian test as to sufficiency of cosmopolitan intent and practice (Eriksen 2006).

Analysts also drew attention to the fact that “observance of these principles is a key condition for a state’s membership [of the EU]. Membership ... entails the obligation to continue to respect these rights, with the European Commission retaining special enforcement procedures” (Stevenson 2005, 47). The EU thus insisted that new member states eschew such anti-cosmopolitan vices as anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial. All new members have to incorporate the *acquis communautaire* – the EU’s legal norms – into their constitutional and legal apparatuses. As membership was extended out from the original Western European core, first to the former dictatorships of the South, and the former Communist states of the East, the whole of Europe was moved in the direction of cosmopolitan political liberalism as well as cosmopolitan capitalism and free markets (albeit markets inflected by varying levels of state regulation among member nations). The EU thus could feasibly be understood as the main mechanism for democratising much of what counts as ‘Europe’, taking it out of its traumatic Fascistic and Communist past, as well as recognising to some degree minorities within national states and demanding that they be subject to the full protection of member states’ legal apparatuses.

The novel type of political community of the EU could be construed by both academic analysts and EU officialdom as having a profound ‘civilizing’ influence on other regions, especially its near neighbours. It could be plausibly claimed that the EU had positively affected human rights situations in non-member-states as diverse as Albania, Ukraine and Azerbaijan, and had effectively exported “the rule of law, democracy and human rights” throughout its near Eastern border territories (Eriksen 2006, 261). Such claims could of course be dismissed by more cynical analysts of a realist bent – for

them, the EU was basically a mechanism used by its most powerful member states to shape its 'near abroad' through a mixture of economic threats and bullying tactics (Hyde-Pierce 2006). Nonetheless, as La Rochefoucauld had already noted in the 17th century, hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue. Thus even if EU diplomacy had less than cosmopolitan intents, its effects - constraining national governments which wanted to enjoy the perceived benefits of commerce with a massive trading bloc, and encouraging observance of at least minimum human rights measures – could be understood as virtuous. As Parker and Rosamond (2013, 230) summarise, "it is the EU's own cosmopolitan features that render it a normative power in world politics and that make its own norms attractive from an external perspective". As such, the "ethics of the EU's normative power are located in the ability to normalize a more just, cosmopolitical world" (Manners 2008, 67).

For one of the leading proponents of this vision of the EU's abilities to do cosmopolitical 'good' in the world, Ian Manners (2008), there are at least nine normative principles which animate EU foreign policy: "sustainable peace", "social freedom", "consensual democracy", "associative human rights", "supranational rule of law", "inclusive equality", "social solidarity", "sustainable development" and "good governance". As Parker and Rosamond (2013, 233) put it, these can be understood "as liberal principles, rendered cosmopolitan to the extent that they increasingly trump any specific concerns of sovereign states that may conflict with them and are, in theory at least, increasingly advocated and upheld in transnational and European jurisdictional spaces". In this way the EU "has been peculiarly predisposed to shape conceptions of 'the normal' in international affairs in a non-coercive fashion as a consequence of its own status as post-Westphalian or post-sovereign peace project" – that is, as an eminently cosmopolitan entity which upholds and promotes cosmopolitan values.

Yet certain serious problems beset this vision of the EU as avatar of human rights-centred 'soft power'. As Fine (2003) warns, the imagining of the EU allegedly leaping out of a purely 'Westphalian' to an utterly 'post-Westphalian' condition imposes a far too sharp, and indeed mythical, historical break between 'then' and 'now'. It has also been pointed out that the paradox of the post-Westphalian EU is that it may in some ways have involved the transcendence of national borders *inside* itself, but that it imposes and polices very strict borders *around* itself. In this way, the EU turns into a new kind of sovereign state which bears uncanny resemblances to the European national-states it has supposedly transcended. For some critics, the ostensibly 'universal' legally-based cosmopolitan values that are promoted by the EU 'abroad' in fact originated in the very particular context of the Westphalian nation-state, which is "now simply reproduced beyond itself" at the EU level (Parker and Rosamond 2013, 231). In other

words, the putatively cosmopolitan post-national political entity has become just another power-wielding political body, flexing its muscles on the international scene. It does so through the paradoxical means of an imperialist imposition of its own supposedly universal and cosmopolitan norms. The EU is an entity that may claim to be ethically superior to the US, but in fact it is just another political entity with super-power ways of thinking and acting, cloaked in a veneer of cosmopolitan rhetoric – the epitome of a fake cosmopolitanism (Levy and Sznajder 2007).

For those who have wished to redeem the EU from such allegations, the value- and norm-driven (rather than the *realpolitik*- or market capitalism-oriented) nature of the EU has had to be emphasised. And in fact this has been done repeatedly by analysts who wish to present the EU as truly cosmopolitan in nature. Thus in the influential theorizing of Ulrich Beck (e.g. 2004), the ‘European project’ was born out of resistance to the perversion of genuine European values. A cosmopolitan Europe – of which the EU is the main expression - emerge out of the rejection of Fascist and Communist totalitarianism, and nation-states’ prior attempts attempt to define who is ‘truly human’ and who does not fit this model, and thus who should be excluded or destroyed altogether. A cosmopolitan Europe is also founded on cosmopolitan ideas about human dignity and attending to the suffering of all people, regardless of nationality or citizenship (or lack of it). Europe has thus overcome, at least partially, the history of nationalisms, colonialism and genocide, through the development of norms and legal systems which prevent these phenomena. There thus exists “a European antidote to Europe” (Beck 2009), a general logic that could be accepted by another major theorist of cosmopolitan Europe, Jürgen Habermas (2001), and is a notion already stated in the foundational source of liberal political cosmopolitanism, Kant (Inglis 2012). Once again, the EU seems to meet another key Kantian test of cosmopolitanism – it has utilised its own resources in the interests of self-critique, increasing self-restraint, and historical self-overcoming.

For Beck, such a situation means that the EU is a moral and post-Westphalian entity and enterprise in a radical sense:

... the EU must be conceived as the antithesis to the system of nation-states. The EU is not a large nation, a super-state that subsumes all of the other nation states into itself. The quite distinctive and still largely misunderstood, historically very specific, ‘power’ of the EU resides, for example, in the fact that it involves even those non-member-states that want to become members of the EU (Turkey, for example) in an internal reform process of self-Europeanization ... Europe is not a pre-given spatial container in which ‘Europeanization’ can unfold ... There is, however, a historical and moral starting point: the ethics of ‘never again’. We can no longer prevent the Final Solution in the past, but we will prevent the Final Solution in the future! Cosmopolitan Europe is a Europe that is

struggling for moral, political, economic, and historical reconciliation ... From the beginning, this reconciliation has been less a matter of idealistic preaching than of concrete realization: the 'happiness without limits' that Churchill imagined means, first of all, a market without limits, to be realized as a thoroughly profane creation of interdependencies in the policy fields of security, business, science, and culture. The adjective 'cosmopolitan' stands for this openness and accords with a critique of ethno-nationalism that fights for the recognition of cultural difference and diversity (Beck 2012, 646).

For the moment we will simply note Beck's treatment of the relationship between 'concrete realization' and 'idealistic preaching' vis-à-vis the emergence of the EU. This is part of his broader analysis of the 'cosmopolitization' of reality, whereby cosmopolitan social conditions are seen to come about unintentionally, not through the enactment of utopian blueprints and grand plans, but through the mundane and often sordid self-interest of particular groups of actors. This is ultimately derived from Kant's account of what Hegel would call the 'cunning of History', and Adam Smith's and others' contemporaneous understanding of both the 'hidden hand' of the market and of private vices leading unbeknownst to public virtues (Inglis 2012). Beck's analysis holds that, among other processes, the creation of a capitalist single market (i.e. the enactment of liberal, then neo-liberal, market cosmopolitanism) within the EU has unintentionally rendered the conditions of possibility for other, primarily political but also social and cultural, forms of cosmopolitanism within the EU's territory. What this ignores, as we shall see below, are the tensions and ambivalences – and ultimately destructive relations – which pertain between these economic processes on the one side, and alternative, and I think more 'genuine', forms of cosmopolitanism on the other.

Beyond Beck's framing, the EU has also been understood as exhibiting cosmopolitan values and structures in other ways. The EU's motto is cultural 'unity in diversity', an emblematic representation of culturally cosmopolitan dispositions. EU institutions have attempted to create – arguably with some success – a pan-European cultural space, which respects national and regional cultural pluralism, while encompassing these within a sense of trans-national cultural orientations. The promotion of events and activities like the European city of culture programme, and the Erasmus and Socrates academic exchange networks, have endeavoured to foster a sense of 'European culture' and concomitant cosmopolitan sensibilities (Roche 2001).

Such activities are meant to be participated in by a new type of person, namely 'European citizens', who enjoy post-national citizen rights and whose identity is meant to encompass intertwining regional, national and European-level senses of belonging and affiliation. Successive Treaties signed by member states have arguably operated as a *de facto* European political constitution, establishing - at least in legal and theoretical

terms - a unitary European citizen body distinct from national citizenries. The Charter of Fundamental Rights, signed by member states in 2000 but only becoming binding in 2009, has a preamble which states that it “places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice”. Thus the Charter can be seen to express “the [liberal] cosmopolitan idea that individuals are the sole basis of political orders ... The individual is ... in the process of being liberated from the confines of the ... nation state in Europe as institutions above the nation-state are now in place with the competence to constrain ... the power exerted over its citizens ... The European nation states are reconfigured on the basis of a rights providing European level” (Eriksen 2008, 17).

Given that the EU institutions had brought into existence this new creature, the ‘European citizen’, it is no surprise that they should have been so keen to track the extent of her existence. The Eurobarometer surveys of attitudes within and across all member states at one level have operated as measures to capture the extent of feelings of ‘European-ness’ among different national populaces. Unsurprisingly, the pan-European academic industry which has sprung up to interpret the findings of the surveys has continuously found that younger and better educated groups, especially those in the professional classes, feel more ‘European’ than do older, less educated groups. Sometimes identification of oneself as a ‘European’ or ‘European citizen’ is taken by analysts as a proxy for being a cosmopolitan ‘citizen of the world’, with more Europe-affiliation by individuals taken to mean the presence of cosmopolitan attitudes and ideals among such persons (Pichler 2008).

At another level, the Eurobarometer surveys may be understood as deeply *performative* in nature – by attempting simply to report on something they define as ‘European public opinion’, they actually bring such an entity into existence (Law 2009). This points to a broader possibility – that allegedly cosmopolitan ‘European citizens’ exist only insofar as EU institutions define them and call them into being. After all, just as there cannot be national citizens without national political institutions making them possible and calling them into existence, so too the same must apply at the ‘European’ level too. EU institutions seek to will their own forms of cosmopolitan person into existence, while claiming merely to report on their alleged prior existence which occurs beyond any construction processes engaged in by EU institutions themselves. In other words, EU bodies manufacture not only the conceptual category of cosmopolitan European citizen, but also place certain individuals and groups into that category through performative mechanisms like the Eurobarometer surveys and the academic interpretation of them. Here we begin to see the outlines of the ‘fictitious’ nature of the cosmopolitanism of the EU when it comes to the interaction of institutions, legal apparatuses and statements, and concrete individuals and populations. It is not that ‘European

citizens' do not 'really' exist. It is rather that the EU can be seen as a massive mechanism for conjuring up cosmopolitan persons defined in its own image, and reported upon in seemingly endless official documents and analyses.

It is well documented that the officials of the 'Eurocracy' - those who run such bodies as the European Commission and service the European Parliament - are notably and necessarily 'cosmopolitan' in a certain sense (Hannerz 1989), namely that they speak multiple languages, have highly developed diplomatic skills, and are able to function cross-culturally in highly competent ways (Suvarierol, Busuioc and Groenleer 2013). The EU is often accused by its critics of being more an elite project than an exercise in genuine popular and demotic participation. Related to that issue is a specific problem for the assessment of cosmopolitanism. It may well be the case that when the EU institutions have gone on the look-out for evidence of the existence of cosmopolitan 'European citizens', they have cast that role in light of the characteristics and dispositions of a certain social group: namely the highly educated and relatively young cadres who are drawn from all over Europe to run those institutions themselves and to be the personnel of the pan-European academia which does their research and interpretation for them through the various funding Frameworks which have dangled the carrot of many millions of Euros of funding to cash-starved academics across the Union.

In essence, armies of academic and bureaucratic beneficiaries of the EU's largesse (especially prior to the financial crisis of 2008) have projected their own senses of cosmopolitanism onto the categories whereby cosmopolitans are searched for, sometimes seemingly fruitfully, and at other times in apparent vain. Such constructors of European cosmopolitanism have generally been deaf to the (obvious) charge that all identities are created against some sort of Other, and that the idea of the cosmopolitan European citizen is utterly paradoxical: while seemingly open to and caring for Others, it has been institutionally elaborated against, and at the expense of, multiple non-European Others - especially those who now wash up on the shores of Lampedusa island and the other vicinities where enforced migrants are likely to encounter the imposing and unwelcoming borders of Fortress Europe (Parker and Rosamond 2013, 236).

3.

As noted above, the EU was from its very inception contradictory, being founded on two different visions and types of cosmopolitanism. Wieviorka (2012, 687) summarises this point as follows:

The first [foundational element] was a profoundly humanist moral principle: in order to avert the return of war and atrocity, and to prevent nations from killing each other (as they had done twice during the past half century), the best course of action would be to unite the nations in the creation of a European community. In the words of Robert Schuman, one of its founding fathers, the EU would henceforth render war “not only unthinkable but also materially impossible” ... And whereas the long-range, utopian aims of the project conveyed that this community would be political, a sober, more realistic examination of the situation demanded that the project proceed step-by-step, beginning with economic integration. This was the founders’ second belief. The first act of European unification was the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was inaugurated in 1951 by six countries: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The idea was to create a common market for coal and steel, as well as a rational organization for the scale of production in each of the countries that signed the treaty. A European space thus began to take shape among states that had just survived two massive wars. The two resources historically tied to wartime industry were to be jointly managed by countries that had until recently been mortal enemies.

As we saw above, intellectual proponents of the EU either have stressed the normative values element and downplayed the economic aspects, or have, as in the case of Beck, positioned the former as the condition of possibility and unwitting agent of the development of the latter. These understandings omit to mention that the EU was also formed out of the US government’s anti-Soviet policies after 1945, which regarded pan-Western European unity and integration as a necessary bulwark against the expansion westwards of the Soviet Union – a case of Cold War *realpolitik* driving a certain form of (enforced) cosmopolitization (Muller 2009, 3).

What both types of account also miss, I argue, is a crucial point made by Michel Foucault (2008) in lectures in the 1970s. The EU ultimately was derived from two absolutely heterogeneous principles, a liberal, legal-political cosmopolitanism, which has been described above by various commentators, and a liberal, market, capitalist cosmopolitanism, which exist in a tense and ambiguous relationship with each other. Legal and economic liberalism are based in “two absolutely heterogeneous conceptions of freedom, one ... based on the rights of man, and the other starting from the independence of the governed”. They each create and promote very different persons, namely a “subject of right” and a “subject of interest” (Foucault 2008, 42). As Parker and Rosamond (2013, 241) summarise Foucault’s point, liberal democracy – including in its trans-national EU form – operates with “two distinct notions of freedom and associated subjectivities: freedom from government and a subject of interest, which animates market or capitalist social relations, and freedom guaranteed by government, and a subject of right, which may resist and temper those relations. These two subjects might

... converge at certain moments ... but, to the extent that they rest on fundamentally different and incommensurate ontologies, such convergence is always better visualised as an eclipse, whereby one conceals and excludes the other”.

As Foucault notes, liberal market cosmopolitanism is deeply ambiguous, as it unites people economically – including across national borders, its cosmopolitan element – while separating them into competing economic units:

[T]he bond of economic interest occupies an ambiguous position in relation to these bonds of disinterested interests [in civil society] which take the form of local units and different levels... Formally...civil society serves as the medium of the economic bond... [But], while it brings individuals together through the spontaneous convergence of interests, it is also a principle of dissociation... with regard to the active bonds of compassion, benevolence, love for one’s fellows, and a sense of community, inasmuch as it constantly tends to undo what the spontaneous bond of civil society has joined together by picking out the egoist interest of individuals, emphasising it (Foucault 2008, 302-303).

Consequently “while liberal democracy encodes, reflects, and legitimates capitalist social relations, it simultaneously resists, counters, and tempers them” (Brown 2003). The same applies to both principles once they have, as it were, become ‘cosmopolitan’ – i.e. when they involve cross-border and trans-national economic and political relations, as in the conditions of the EU.

Liberal market cosmopolitanism is thus one of the foundational principles underlying the development of the EU, captured in the notion that the purpose of the Union has been to build, operate and guarantee a trans-national ‘single market’. The European Commission’s first President, Walter Hallstein (1972), said as much when he proclaimed that the ‘basic law’ of the-then European Economic Community “is liberal. Its guiding principle is to establish undistorted competition in an undivided market” (Parker and Rosamond 2013, 237). Thus in contrast to the values-based understandings of the genesis and nature of the EU, which we have reviewed above, and which stress the EU’s political cosmopolitanism and underplay or ignore the market cosmopolitan element, it would be more accurate to see the EU as an *institutionalised ambiguity*: “the entanglement of cosmopolitan universal values and a ‘neoliberal culture’ is always already present in the EU’s ambiguous cosmopolitics” (*ibidem*, 238).

While political cosmopolitanism’s foundational figure is Kant, market liberal cosmopolitanism’s roots derive from both Kant and Adam Smith, and other 18th century advocates of the perceived peace-generating effects of free trade across national borders. Both Kant and Smith should therefore be recognised as the EU’s patron saints. The kind of cosmopolitan person the EU produces, or seeks to produce, is thus not only

a rights-carrying and enforcing legal subject, but also an entrepreneurial economic subject, free to trade across borders within the EU, but also compelled to be in competitive relations with all other such economic subjects. Adam Smith's cosmopolitanism of laissez-faire economics is based on and promotes the irrelevance of the national state in economic affairs, and celebrates the capitalist entrepreneur as a 'citizen of the world'. The EU is in part patterned after such ideas. Indeed, this version of liberal cosmopolitanism, which today takes a neo-liberal form which stresses the need radically to roll back the 'interference' of the state in markets to the bare minimum, can be argued to be the most significant aspect of the EU's post-national, post-Westphalian character, which in turn is taken by many commentators to be the quintessential feature of its cosmopolitanism. Yet the basis of that cosmopolitanism can be construed of as just another example, endemic across much of the world since the rise of neo-liberal dominance from the late 1970s, of nation-states handing over economic responsibilities to trans-national entities – including the WTO, World Bank and IMF – which impose neo-liberal rules on all players in economic and political life (Gowan 2001; Harvey 2009).

It is, I think, highly significant that in the recent enforcement of 'austerity' (more accurately, neo-liberal restructuring) in Greece most spectacularly, and in Spain and Portugal too, that the EU acted in tandem with the world's main neo-liberal enforcers, all of them unelected bodies which care little for democratic niceties and popular will as expressed through the ballot box or other means. Both the EU – at its most markedly neo-liberal – and the IMF have seemed wholly unconcerned about the principles of legal-political and democratic cosmopolitanism, but have been zealous in their desire to impose technocratic regulatory politics upon the member states of the European South. Technocrats implanted into national governments to ensure 'responsibility' – code for massive retrenchment of national governmental powers and welfare spending, and radical flexibilization of labour markets – is consistent with market cosmopolitanism, in the sense that the operation of the free market is meant to trump all other considerations, but it is certainly not consistent with legal-political cosmopolitanism's stress on human rights (including social and worker rights), and the expression of the democratic will of the people at both national and trans-national levels (Parker and Rosamond 2013, 239).

Neo-liberal cosmopolitanism is compatible with 'human rights' as long as these are strictly defined on its own terms: as freedom *from* government, as civil and political rights which ensure the individual's autonomy from government in economic life, and as the rule of law as the protection of market freedoms – the very forms of the 'open society' that the Soros Foundation promoted in post-Communist Eastern Europe. But other sorts of rights – democratic and social – which are the hallmarks of legal-political

cosmopolitanism, especially in its Social Democratic form, are not only ignored by neo-liberal cosmopolitanism and its proponents, but are actively now connived against. In effect, especially since the financial crisis of 2008, there has been a massive tilt away from the ambiguous mixture of cosmopolitanisms in the EU's formal structures, towards the preponderance of neo-liberal cosmopolitanism in policy and its often brutal enactment against populations in the European South.

Already in the early 2000s, the fear that the one cosmopolitanism might trump the other in the EU's policies and functioning seems to have animated Habermas's (2001) attempts to shore up a Social Democratic version of legal-political cosmopolitanism within the EU's formal structures. As he put it:

The neoliberal conception of freedom is linked with a normatively diminished conception of the person. The concept of the person as a 'rational decider' is not only independent of the idea of the moral person who determines her will through an insight into what is in the interests of all those affected; it is also independent of the concept of a citizen of a republic, who participates in the public practice of self-legislation under equal rights ... [Thus] neoliberalism is ... unreceptive to the republican idea of self-legislation (Habermas 2001, 94).

This now seems like a very accurate prediction of what occurred when a democratically elected Greek government held and won elections on a programme of anti-austerity measures. The neo-liberal personnel of the EU and IMF wholly ignored popular will and successfully insisted on the implementation of neo-liberal restructuring, in direct contravention of the will of the national populace. Meanwhile, members of the European Parliament – putatively the most explicitly 'democratic' element of all the EU's structures – either were impotent to change the terms of the neo-liberal enforcement or cheered it on, despite its forcefully anti-democratic nature.

The sorts of claims made about the EU's virtuous cosmopolitan nature that we reviewed above are cast into serious doubt by the flagrantly anti-democratic nature of the EU's now explicit and one-sided neo-liberal policy orientation. This is not a sudden turn to neo-liberal orthodoxy that has come out of the blue – it is rather a working out of the market cosmopolitanism which has been at the heart of the EU since its very earliest beginnings. The 'capitalist' orientations and inflections of cosmopolitanism have been there all along, yet the intellectual cheerleaders of the EU have radically underplayed these in their over-emphasis on the EU's legal-political cosmopolitanism. But the latter has for a long time indicated the presence of market and neo-liberal elements within itself. For example, historically the European Commission has emphasised political and civil rights, but not labour and workers' rights, in its exhortations to

prospective new members and the EU's near neighbours to sort out their human rights records (Parker 2009). Damro (2012) has shown how market cosmopolitan concerns have profoundly impacted on EU foreign policy more broadly, including the imposition of neo-liberal demands on the EU's near neighbours – a rather less rosy picture than the one which sees the EU as simply a shining exemplar of human rights good practices.

4.

One of the major paradoxes of the European single market is that it has indeed created a certain kind of post-Westphalian situation across the EU. Market cosmopolitanism has made possible the cosmopolitan features of the Union. Yet as in liberal social orders more generally, the rule of (cosmopolitan) law sanctions great social inequalities and iniquities (Bohman 2009), while neo-liberal practices and policy-making assume and demand that these not only be maintained but in fact become ever greater and more stark over time. Workers' rights and the forms of social solidarity which are made possible by them, are dissolved by the "individualized disembedded autonomy ... [enforced upon all persons] by the market-focused cosmopolitan post-nationalism advanced by the EU" (Zhang and Lillie 2015, 94). The EU may be in some ways 'post-national' in the legal and political senses, but its economic cosmopolitanism offers no guarantee of post-national workers' rights. Trades unions have remarkably little power and influence at EU level, and the pan-European union movement remains weak – unsurprising and inevitable given the tilt towards neo-liberal cosmopolitanism.

The political economy of pan-European cosmopolitan free movement undermines the relationship that had hitherto existed between the West European national state, its territory, the citizens within it, and welfare state regimes based around conceptions of industrial citizenship, labour protection and welfare safety nets for those in need (Esping-Anderson 1990). Migrant EU workers today – the creatures and subjects of the Union's market cosmopolitanism – strongly tend to see their options as involving exiting from a country that no longer provides work for them and moving to another within the single market, rather than remaining within that country and developing a strong political voice within it (Zhang and Lillie 2015, 102). 'Cosmopolitan Europe' has afforded worker *mobility*, but it has not afforded worker *stability*, the essence of a one-sided and perverted cosmopolitanism, as Zygmunt Bauman (1998) might phrase the issue. Moreover, increasingly vast socio-economic inequalities underpin the recurrence of xenophobia and racism among national populations across Europe – the anti-cosmopolitan consequences of neo-liberal cosmopolitization (Lentin 2004).

More broadly, we should consider the possibility that it is not just the case that the EU has always involved an ambiguous intertwining of two different cosmopolitanisms, but also that it is constituted out of a more genuine cosmopolitanism and a perverted or even ‘fake’ one. Marx and Engels (1998 [1848], 54) were indeed correct to identify the cosmopolitan nature of capitalism:

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country ... it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries ... [using] raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction ... The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible ... It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

It does not require too much imagination to see how the EU’s market cosmopolitanism has fostered a similar scenario across the parts of Europe it exists within and in turn transforms, leading to a situation where “the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency” of national economies and cultures has given way, at least in part, to “intercourse in every direction”, and to the banal cosmopolitanism of everyday life in places such as London, Brussels and Milano, where the native population has been radically intermingled through processes of EU citizenship and mobility with nationals from all across the European space and beyond (Johansen 2015).

But in Marx’s day, the cosmopolitization of reality through capitalist means went together with a state which operated as “the executive committee of the whole bourgeoisie” – that is, as guarantor of the free movement of capital through space, and the civil liberties of the exploiting classes, rather than as the guarantor of workers’ rights and enabler of social solidarities beyond the market. The contemporary neo-liberal vision is to have states that are as minimal as those in Marx’s time, coupled with extensive governance regimes, enforced by, but irreducible to, state apparatuses alone, centred on the disciplining of people into the forms of thought and action associated with

productive neo-liberal subjects (van Gerven and Ossewarde 2012). Enforced neo-liberalization and flexibilization involve massive regimes of governance and an expansion of government's surveillance mechanisms, together with a radically shrunken state as regards its market-taming and solidarity-building capacities. It is Marx's vision of the capitalist state as a vassal of capital, conjoined with extensive forms of disciplining of populations. Market cosmopolitanism thus requires and promotes both a shrunken state and a massive extension of governance. From that viewpoint, the EU's neo-liberal cosmopolitanism can be viewed as demanding, and acting as a mechanism for the promotion of, a radical restructuring of the state and politics more broadly (Mouffe 2012). It is therefore deeply antithetical to the legal-political cosmopolitanism that was from the start of the EU the other side of the Union's cosmopolitical coin. What was once an entanglement of cosmopolitanisms in an uneasy alliance has today become the war of the one upon the other – a war being waged very successfully, most obviously in Greece, but in more subtle and occluded forms elsewhere.

Marx could unequivocally define the globalizing capitalism of his day as cosmopolitan in nature, and for good reasons. But when neo-liberal cosmopolitanism can be shown to have all sorts of negative consequences for social solidarity, and to be in a pitched battle with the democratic and market regulating orientations of legal-political cosmopolitanism, then one's identification of it as a 'real' or 'true' cosmopolitanism has to be tempered and rethought. The Cypriot philosopher Mariana Papastephanou, reflecting on the EU's enforced neo-liberal restructuring of her country, poses a thought experiment:

Imagine a slave trader of the previous centuries. He travels; he is rootless perhaps in terms of mobility or attachment to a specific land/community, and he encounters alterity in many forms. He may even listen to and (if musical enough) enjoy the sad songs the slaves sing on board, on the seaway to the new 'life' he has in store for them. Perhaps he 'hybridizes' himself a lot by this encounter. Maybe he is attracted by African art, and he is perceptive enough of the prospect for further profit this art presents if cleverly promoted in European 'global' cities. And he surely speaks foreign languages; otherwise, he would not be able to carry out his transactions. Most probably, this slave trader also genuinely holds his actions to be consistent with an ethico-political ideal of a kind; we may imagine this to comprise a global vision of merry owners feeling protected and secure, prospering in a global context where everything falls into place - that is, where the superiors are served and revered by the inferiors in a master-slave relation free of any improbable dialectics. I do not doubt that it is possible for such a slave trader to describe himself as an avatar of cosmopolitanism on grounds of his mobility, his knowledgeability of otherness and the global element of his 'ethico-political' 'vision'. (Perhaps I should not even doubt that some pragmatic decisionmakers and global players may not be able to see the difference between the slave trader and rival, indeed, opposite, cosmopolitan

exemplarities, and thus feel that we should grant the cosmopolitan adjective to the slave trader, too) (in Peters and Papastephanou 2013, np).

What then if, like the slave trader, neo-liberalism is, in nature and by its consequences, involves a 'fake' cosmopolitanism? After all, it explicitly lacks the 'sympathy' for others – especially those 'unlike' oneself – to be found in most definitions of cosmopolitanism, and which in fact underpinned Adam Smith's understanding of human relations (Barbalet 2014). 'Sympathy' for the suffering of other people seems not to trouble the neo-liberal apparatchiks of the IMF or the EU's upper echelons – the administrative wing of the class of "business lounge Europeans ... striding briskly through the terminals of Schiphol on their way to yet another meeting in Bergen or Barcelona, permanently wired via Bluetooth and laptop" (Felski 2012: viii).

As Miliband (2009) pointed out for the national state, which groups enter the state apparatus and come to control the levers of power, does not just affect which sorts of policies are enacted, but also the restructuring of the state and the general philosophy by and through which it operates. A striking feature of the current state of play within the higher levels of the EU is the elective affinities which pertain between neo-liberal cadres working in ostensibly different institutions and drawn from diverse national political systems. The head of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, an arch neo-liberal drawn from French politics, could just as easily be running a major wing of the EU, so closely does her habitus and way of thinking match those of the high level Eurocracy. This is not to downplay national differences in the types of neo-liberalism at work. Angela Merkel's neo-liberalism not quite the same as Lagarde's, not least because Merkel can and must play the game of watered-down Social Democracy at home in Germany, and orthodox neo-liberalism abroad, especially in the European South (Beck 2012). But an increasing neo-liberalization of the personnel occupying high level and influential roles within the EU institutions has been noticeable over the last two decades, as has been well documented by Anderson (2011). Characters such as Olli Rehn, EU commissioner and a political nominee of the neo-liberal right from the crumbling social-democratic polity of Finland, have played a substantial if stealthy role in changing the common-sense of substantial wings of the EU institutions away from social democratic legal-political cosmopolitanism towards neo-liberal dogmas. Finland exemplifies broader trends across the Union – thus the arch neo-liberal Alexander Stubb, trained in the US, was one of the most extreme and vocal opponents of the Syriza government in Greece during the bailout discussions, illustrating the fact that increasingly neo-liberalized Conservative parties across Western Europe send their ideologues into EU spaces and ne-

gotiations, changing the tenor of discussions in an ever more orthodox and inflexible neo-liberal manner.

To echo Marx's terms, the '(un)holy alliance' that now haunts Europe is an array of neo-liberal cosmopolitan politicians and administrators, whose ideas are all oriented around the transnational movement of markets and capital, the consequences of which are the strikingly anti-cosmopolitan conditions suffered by populations in the member nations of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. The new neo-liberals of Western Europe have many dispositions in common with their Thatcherite colleagues in the UK – the only substantive dispute being whether it will be 'more Europe' or UK independence that might foster the onrush of market principles most efficiently and rapidly. This is in fact the real question surrounding the UK's referendum about EU membership, which is only apparently about issues of national sovereignty.

In addition, some of the most outspoken and demanding neo-liberal cadres in the EU, including at the meetings about the Greek bailout, hail from the former Eastern Bloc. Their increased influence both on concrete policy-decisions and the philosophical ambience in which these are formulated, puts a different spin on claims that one of the EU's great cosmopolitical achievements was the peaceable accession of the former Communist countries into the European fold. The standard narrative is offered by commentators such as Wieviorka (2012, 694):

In freeing itself from the Soviet straitjacket, Eastern Europe breathed new life into a unification project that was still in the process of developing, reinforcing the values of peace, freedom, citizenship, and democracy central to its formation. From an economic standpoint, the period that saw the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union also witnessed the triumph of liberalism and neoliberalism, whose optimism enabled the formation of a pro-European political philosophy eager to emancipate itself from all forms of nationalism. Europe could now provide a frame of reference for various emancipatory projects, as well as for social justice, democracy, and modernization. It could also avoid subjecting itself to the dictates of the marketplace.

These remarks seem both over-optimistic and mistaken. With the end of Soviet-imposed Communism, the political vacuum was filled in the Eastern countries by both ethno-nationalists and early neo-liberals. Subsequently a new, younger class of neo-liberal cadres was taught in the US, the UK and other locations of the virtues of Thatcherism and neo-liberal projects more generally. It is this group that now hold key positions in politics and political administration, both within national systems and within the EU. It is they who make the most strident demands for neo-liberal orthodoxy within Europe, and especially in the supposedly lazy and profligate South. The Eastern European political class initially felt marginalised in discussions about the future philo-

sophical and practical orientations of Europe, as they did in the early 2000s when their countries had only just joined the Union. The attempt by Habermas and his French counterpart Jacques Derrida to mount a popular movement for the introduction of a European Constitution was looked on by many of them with distaste. The social democratic elements which would have enshrined the taming of the market by the state apparatuses – that is, the regulation of market cosmopolitanism by the legal-political variety – seemed unacceptably redolent of the allegedly crippling socialism from which they had only recently escaped (Levy and Sznajder 2007).

But today, Eastern European neo-liberals have been instrumental in recasting the tenor of EU decision-making in manners much more to their taste. It comes as no surprise that their enthusiasm for the cosmopolitanism of the single market should go along with the apparently contradictory disposition to keep migrants from Syria and other places forcibly out of their countries. For as is widely acknowledged, neo-liberal cosmopolitanism is all about taking down boundaries when it suits the interests of capital, and erecting other ones when needed, especially as regards regulating migration flows to suit the needs of the flexibilized labour market (Bauman 1998; Sparke 2006).

5.

Just as Zhou Enlai allegedly remarked of the consequences of the revolution of 1789, so too may we make the same judgement on the eventual outcomes of the revolutions of 1989: it is still too early to tell. But one consequence is already clear – the end of Communism has meant an inflow of a new and very robust group of neo-liberals into the fabric of the main bodies of the EU, with a concomitant ending of the uneasy balance between market and legal-political cosmopolitanism that had characterised the EU from its beginnings. The balance has now shifted definitively in the direction of the former, which itself should be understood as a fake or at least deformed cosmopolitanism, because of the damage it creates for populations subjected, without any adequate democratic legitimation, to it.

At the current time, if the responses to the Euro crisis involve further moves towards the economic and political integration of the Eurozone, then more European integration will certainly lead to the further grip of capital on the European body politic, with the corollary of even more ethnocentric and xenophobic responses among affected populations who do not fully grasp that it is neo-liberal policy-making that drives their misery, not the shadowy figure of the ‘migrant’ who is scapegoated for all of society’s ills (Calhoun 2009; Anderson 2011).

More and more, the political-legal cosmopolitan vision of the EU as a bastion and exemplar of peace, justice and emancipation recedes into the bleaker view of it as an exclusionary and discriminatory fortress (Ponzanesi and Blaagaard 2011). The EU is becoming a space where new arrivals fleeing war and persecution (often stimulated in part by Western governments neo-conservative foreign policy), who are the very people who were led to believe in the ideal of the EU as a cosmopolitan haven from strife, are either held in detention centres and possibly later expelled, or are subjected to routine discrimination and relegated to second class status in a regime that Balibar (2004) described some time ago as being 'quasi-apartheid' in nature. Such a situation is administered by the new neo-liberal hegemony within the EU. While they may struggle to contain the influx of people battering at Europe's increasingly unyielding doors, who ultimately are demanding to be treated to basic cosmopolitan norms of hospitality, they undoubtedly will use the crisis to foster further neo-liberalization of the European polity. As Chantal Mouffe (2012, 637-638) recently indicated, today:

... the need for a democratic confrontation about the nature of the EU is absolutely vital. Indeed many people on the left are beginning to doubt the possibility of an alternative to the neo-liberal model which has been the driving force in the [I would add, recent re-]construction of the EU. The EU is increasingly perceived as being an intrinsically neo-liberal project that cannot be reformed. Because it appears futile to try to transform its institutions, the only solution that remains is to exit. Such a pessimistic view is, no doubt, the result of the way in which all attempts to challenge the prevalent neo-liberal rules are presented as anti-European attacks on the very existence of the Union. Without the possibility of making legitimate criticisms of the current neo-liberal hegemony, it is not surprising that a growing number of people are turning to Euroscepticism, fearing that more European integration can only mean a reinforcement of a neo-liberal Europe. Such a position could lead to the collapse of the European project, and it is urgent, therefore, to think about how to create the conditions for democratic contestation within the EU.

In essence, then, it is not an exaggeration to say that the struggle over Europe's 'soul' at the present time involves the need to reassert a genuine cosmopolitanism over a perverted one, and to restore the balance of cosmopolitanisms that have been at the heart of the EU since its inception. It would be a tragedy indeed if the only way truly to be a cosmopolitan European would be to become a Eurosceptic and to connive at the break-up of what has been not only a massive neo-liberal project and anti-cosmopolitan fortress, but also a space where internally war was consigned to the past and a hopeful sense of transnational cooperation was achieved, albeit in partial and incomplete ways. Such a vision of Europe still exists among at least some of its citizens, even if it does not among the neo-liberal elites that currently hold sway over them.

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