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RESEARCH NOTES

China's climate change policy post-Kyoto (2009-2015):
Applying the bureaucratic politics approach

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Abstract

China is regarded as the world's leading emitter of carbon dioxide. Having ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which binds countries to pursue emission reduction targets towards climate change mitigation, it faced international pressure to cut its carbon emissions. Accordingly, this aptly illustrates the country's evolving climate change policy that is mainly shaped by domestic considerations and its ascent to global supremacy. Using bureaucratic politics approach to examine a one-party state like China, this study finds that government ministries engaged in bargaining as the competition for power and influence intensified. In particular, the China Meteorological Administration and the Ministry of Environmental Protection asserted influence on climate change policy during the early years of international negotiations, while the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seized control of the policymaking process on climate change by mainstreaming economic development in the agenda. However, China's rise as an economic giant, along with the accompanying threats of climate change, prompted the leadership to adopt a low-carbon green growth strategy, which eventually became the country's ideal development path for the long-term.

Keywords: Bureaucratic Politics; China; Climate Change; Climate Policy; Sustainable Development

Introduction

China is the world's top energy consumer and carbon dioxide emitter, accounting for 30 percent of global emissions (Shan et al., 2018). In 2017, China's carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion reached 9.2 gigatons, which was roughly 27 percent of the world's total, exceeding the combined total emissions of the United States and the European Union (Sandalow, 2018). In 2006, China became the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs), overtaking the US, according to data from the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Falkner, 2016). With China's rapid economic growth starting in the 1980s, the country's carbon emissions associated with fossil fuel combustion, cement production, and manufacturing increased significantly.

As a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), China agreed to cooperate internationally to combat climate change. It has actively participated in negotiations under the UNFCCC and ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002,

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which set internationally binding emission reduction targets for developed countries (also known as Annex 1 countries). China, classified as a developing country under the Kyoto Protocol, was exempted from reduction targets. During the negotiations, China argued that as a developing country it must be allowed to continue to grow its economy without having to commit to legally binding emissions reduction. Moreover, Chinese negotiators pushed developed countries to provide funding and transfer of technology to the developing world. Since China had no commitments to deliver under the Kyoto Protocol, ratifying the international agreement entailed no actual economic costs (Heggelund et al., 2010). Apart from being the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, China is a key actor in the international climate change regime, given its status and influence in the Group of 77 (G-77), the largest intergovernmental organization of developing nations in the UN.

With China's increasing share in global emissions, international pressure also increased, urging China to take on concrete commitments as a member of the international climate change regime. At the 15th Conference of Parties (COP15) meeting in 2009 in Copenhagen, the US committed to reaching a strong international agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol, which was set to end in 2012. The COP, which meets every year, is the supreme decision-making body of the UNFCCC. It reviews the implementation of the UNFCCC and any other legal instruments. The vision of the US was for a deal that imposed obligations to all countries to act, especially emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil. However, China refused to agree to a mandatory target for emission cuts during the COP15 negotiations. News reports highlighted then-Premier Wen Jiabao's resolve to keep China's action plan regardless of the results of the Copenhagen talks.

From being a target of criticism for blocking negotiations in 2009, China emerged as an important actor in achieving a positive outcome during the Paris COP21 in 2015. Moreover, the partnership between the US and China leading up to the COP21 was a complete turnaround from the difficult episode in Copenhagen. Thus, China's policy shift on its negotiating stance at the global climate change talks requires deeper examination to determine how domestic policy actors behaved using the bureaucratic politics concept. The main objective of this study is to determine the bargaining process among domestic actors in formulating China's post-Kyoto climate change policy.

This paper is divided into three parts. The succeeding section deals with China's stance on climate change in international negotiations from 2009 to 2015, followed by a discussion of its domestic policymaking process on climate change. Lastly, the analysis is centered on how bureaucratic maneuvering among ministries has shaped China's policies on climate change both at the domestic and international levels.

China at the international climate change negotiations

From its own point of view, China sees itself as a responsible member of the UNFCCC. It has ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and has actively participated in international climate negotiations. China has established national institutions, initiated mitigation programs, made progress in its GHG data reporting, and become a leading host of clean development mechanism projects (Schroder, 2016). In discussions under the UNFCCC, China has been an advocate of the "common but differentiated responsibilities" principle, which means that all parties to the Convention are responsible for contributing solutions to climate change, but the nature and extent of their responsibilities vary depending on their capacities. In the 1990s, China and other developing countries argued that it should not be subjected to binding emission cuts, unlike industrialized countries; thus, the Kyoto Protocol only imposed binding commitments on developed countries.

China's official position on climate change was shaped by the following justifications. First, other countries and international organizations should respect China's sovereignty regarding the full use of its own natural resources. Second, maintaining economic growth and stability were its top priorities. Hence, policymakers were seriously concerned that reducing carbon emissions would adversely affect economic growth. Third, Chinese officials strongly believed that industrialized countries should bear the responsibility for their historic emissions. Fourth, China assumed its role as the nominal leader of the developing world in the context of climate change negotiations (Harris & Yu, 2010).

Chinese negotiators stressed that China is still a developing country, and as such, it should be allowed to develop its economy without setting limits to its emissions. Moreover, negotiators argued that more ambitious targets from developing countries were contingent on additional funding and the transfer of technology from developed countries. The moral argument on equity was a core value in China's position on the international scene, which prompted Chinese negotiators to push for a climate change deal without taking on binding commitments (Heggelund et al., 2010).

After surpassing the US as the lead emitter of GHGs in 2006, China faced intense pressure from the international community to undertake absolute emissions reduction. At COP15, China and other leading emitters were criticized by the global media for failing to reach a more ambitious agreement. After two weeks of unsuccessful talks, China agreed to a system of voluntary pledges as the basis of a future climate change deal. President Obama met with a select group of heads of state to reach a compromise deal to sidestep problematic negotiations on legally binding emission targets. For the first time, major emitters from the developing world showed a willingness to contribute to the global mitigation effort without waiting for developed countries to fully implement their existing commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (Falkner, 2016).

In the succeeding COP meetings, China cooperated closely with other countries, particularly the US. In 2011, at COP17 in Durban, China's lead negotiator, Su Wei, told the media that China was willing to consider a legally binding instrument for the post-2020 climate agreement. At COP19 in Warsaw in 2013, parties were advised to submit intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) by 2015, thereby establishing a bottom-up approach that gave parties full discretion as to the scope, coverage, stringency, and conditions of their national contributions (Rajamani, 2016). In 2014, President Obama and President Xi issued a joint announcement on climate change, reaffirming the importance of bilateral cooperation and committing their countries to an ambitious 2015 agreement. The intention of the announcement was to inject momentum into the global climate negotiations and inspire other countries to submit equally ambitious actions by the first quarter of 2015.

Prior to the COP21 negotiations in Paris in 2015, China submitted its INDCs, which stated China's pledge to carbon emission reduction according to its national capabilities. As the world's largest emitter of GHGs and second-largest economy, China's INDCs had been much anticipated since it would determine the failure or success of the collective goal to keep global temperature rise in this century below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. China submitted its plan to reduce emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 60 to 65 percent by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. China earned praise from the media and senior UN officials for its pledges. President Obama and President Xi again issued a joint statement in September 2015 to stress their personal commitment to a successful Paris Agreement and reaffirm their goals of enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation on climate change. The Paris Agreement was hailed as a significant achievement, as it launched a new global cooperation framework on climate change to replace the Kyoto Protocol.

In the past, China used to be very skeptical of joining international regimes for fear that doing so would infringe on Chinese sovereignty. This mindset has changed gradually as China began promoting its image as a responsible power (Heggelund et al., 2010). Observers noted the shift in China's negotiating stance from opposing binding emission targets in Copenhagen to taking a leadership role in Paris. The COP15 in Copenhagen seemed to be a turning point in China's climate change policy at the international level. The international community noticed how quickly China could recalibrate its negotiating stance after the meeting in Copenhagen. Therefore, it is necessary to examine China's domestic policies and the policymaking process on climate change to understand its behavior on the international stage. The following section discusses the domestic factors and policy actors that have influenced China's foreign policy decisions on climate change.

The domestic front

Years before the Copenhagen meeting, China has started formulating policies related to climate change mitigation. In 2005, the Renewable Energy Law was passed to address the worsening air pollution in many Chinese cities and develop the renewable energy industry, given its high growth potential globally. Climate change as a public policy issue also gained prominence in the government agenda under the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). In 2006, the government released its first National Assessment Report on Climate Change, citing that climate change posed a serious threat to the country. In 2007, the National Climate Change Coordinating Group was elevated to a higher level in the bureaucracy by transforming it into the National Climate Change, Energy Efficiency, and Emission Reduction Leading Small Group. A few months after COP15, top Chinese officials convened to discuss the prospects of low-carbon development. Therefore, China's stance against binding commitments at COP15 seemed to project a self-defeating behavior; since China's refusal to take on international commitments did not mean that it was not taking any action on climate change at the domestic level.

Aside from demanding equity in the implementation of the international climate regime, China's resistance to binding emission cuts was because sustaining economic growth remains a dominant national interest. Climate change in the domestic sphere was largely seen as an issue inextricably linked to energy and economy since cheap energy was an integral part of China's economic growth. Although there was a recognition among policymakers that China had to take action to mitigate the negative effects of climate change, the prevailing thought then was that cutting emissions could hurt the country's growth prospects. More specifically, Smith (2020) contends that China's political economy is fueled by three growth engines, namely, maximization of economic growth and national self-sufficiency, maximization of consumerism, and maximization of employment. On the last driver, he underscored that the persistence of 'zombie' state-owned enterprises in sectors such as steel, aluminum, coal, and construction is grounded in the Chinese Communist Party's mandate to represent the working class by keeping the workers employed.

Smith further elucidates on the environmental repercussions of China's aggressive actions:

> Builders and manufacturers have built shiny new cities and infrastructure at 'China speed', as *People's Daily* likes to brag. But in their haste to build and overbuild, they've wasted staggering quantities of natural resources and racked up the worst industrial health and safety record of any nation on earth, with more than 100,000 workplace deaths per year in recent decades. (Smith, 2020, p. vii)

It is thus imperative for the Chinese government to reconsider the current strategy of bolstering grand infrastructure projects while neglecting the adverse effects on its long-term environmental health.

Things started to change with the creation of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). While the 11th Five-Year Plan included a 20-percent reduction in energy intensity and other environmental goals as obligatory domestic goals, it was under the 12th Five-Year Plan that the government set a 17-percent decrease in carbon emissions per unit of GDP, along with energy intensity reduction targets. To achieve these targets, the State Council also launched the Working Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control. Other significant developments during this period include the selection of seven provinces for pilot carbon dioxide emissions trading projects in 2011, the promotion of low-carbon development at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the release of the first National Climate Change Adaptation Plan in 2013, and the publication of the National Plan on Climate Change (2014-2020) in 2014.

Reaching a political consensus to transition to a low carbon emissions development model was an important strategy in China's climate change mitigation. Although the paradigm shift might be perceived as primarily driven by international pressures at first, officials soon realized that the current growth path was no longer sustainable and that low-carbon green growth would serve the national interest in the long run. The 12th Five-Year Plan cited seven emerging strategic industries: environmental protection and energy efficiency, new energy, next-generation information technology, biotechnology, high-end manufacturing, clean energy vehicles, and high-tech materials. These industries were identified as the drivers of China's aspiration to become a world leader in green industries. In 2014, China invested some USD 83.3 billion in renewable energy, the largest investment made by any country in the world, which was more than double the amount the US invested in renewable energy that year. All these policy decisions allowed China to commit substantial amounts of emission cuts as part of its nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement.

More recently, the country welcomed its national emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 2017 to efficiently reduce carbon emissions by coal and gas-fired power plants (International Energy Agency, 2020). This was originally announced in 2011 and initially launched in 2013 across seven provinces and cities. It became fully operational in 2021 as firms deposited their emission permits with the government (Busch, 2022). Karplus (2021, p. 12) labels this scheme as a “transitional system that combines elements of enterprise-level targets, state control, and industrial policy with a market mechanism”. Further, she lists four primary drivers of China’s decision to adopt ETS, namely: (i) its cost-effectiveness as a mechanism in controlling CO2 emissions by electric power and industrial sectors; (ii) capacity-building exercise for the government in the monitoring, reporting, and verification of emissions; (iii) revitalization of the country’s CO2 offset market which relied on the European Union’s ETS; and (iv) promotion of accountability among firm managers for their respective CO2 and greenhouse gas emissions.

In 2021, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment launched mandatory data reporting requirements for six additional sectors, namely, iron and steel, aluminium, cement, chemicals, papermaking, and civil aviation (Busch, 2022). These are projected to be part of China’s ETS in 2025, along with the heavy industry and manufacturing industries. However, there have been doubts about the initiative’s economic benefits as well as opposition from the cited sectors, hence adversely impacting the planned expansion of the country’s ETS (Busch, 2022). Karplus et al. (2020) also posit that bigger, non-state firms tend to report non-compliance to China’s industrial energy efficiency policies.

In discussing China's shift to low-carbon green growth, it is essential to note that this move did not happen overnight. It was a product of a long bargaining process among key policy actors in the bureaucracy. Since China is governed by just one party, policymaking is mostly limited to relevant ministries and other government agencies. In the next section, the policymaking process on climate change is examined through the lens of the bureaucratic politics concept.

Bureaucratic politics in China's climate change policy

As the policymaking process in the Chinese government became less personalized and more institutionalized because of the reforms in the 1980s, some experts began to adopt the bureaucratic politics approach. Allison and Halperin's bureaucratic politics model offers a perspective that can explain the decision making of the Chinese government about foreign policy issues. Studies suggested that policymaking in China is not only under the control of top leaders, but it also characterized by competition among various agencies and organizations in the bureaucracy (Lai & Kang, 2014). Allison and Halperin (1972) stressed that government policy is not a product of the decision of one actor; rather, policy is made by a group of large organizations and political actors who have conflicting opinions on what the government should do. Therefore, these actors compete in attempting to influence both the decisions and actions of government. The authors argued that government decisions can be understood because of bargaining among players in government. Moreover, they wrote that organizational interests weigh heavily among other interests of senior players. These organizational interests are often dominated by the desire of actors to maintain the autonomy of the organizations they represent (Allison and Halperin, 1972). The success of players depends on their bargaining advantages, which stem from control of implementation, control over information, persuasiveness with other players, and their ability to affect the objectives of other players in other issues (Allison and Halperin, 1972).

Until 1998, the China Meteorological Administration (CMA) was responsible for coordinating climate change policy. This agency was originally intended to provide meteorological forecast service. It was later made into an administrative body under the State Council as one of the lead agencies in the scientific discussion on climate change. Scientists have been involved in climate change talks starting from the early 1990s. By delegating the policy coordination to the CMA, it made the CMA the only key player in climate policy. Back then, there were no other agencies involved. The CMA represented China in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN body tasked to assess the science related to climate change. Qin Dahe, the former director of CMA, became the co-chair of the IPCC Working Group I. Several Chinese experts had been selected to contribute to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (Heggelund et al., 2010). At the time, the political interest in the topic was virtually nonexistent; hence, there was no bureaucratic turf to fight over (Conrad, 2010).

Starting 1998, the function of coordinating climate change efforts was transferred to the State Development Planning Commission, which was later renamed as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in March 2003. The NDRC is the most influential government agency on matters of economy, energy, and climate change. The transfer of responsibility from CMA to NDRC signified that climate change was no longer seen solely as a scientific issue but more in terms of a political and economic issue (Heggelund et al., 2010). As a high-level inter-ministerial committee, the NDRC heads the National Leading Group on Climate Change (NLGCC). The four vice-chairs of the NLGCC are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), CMA, and Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). Two of these leading political institutions,

the NDRC and MOST, have been known to compete for influence at the national level, while the MFA tried to consolidate its position, and CMA representatives focused mainly on the scientific debates at the IPCC (Schroder, 2016).

The NDRC sets the macroeconomic agenda and is a decisive actor on domestic issues. It studies and formulates five-year plans for economic and social development, and it guides the overall performance of the economy. Likewise, it coordinates policies on energy conservation and emission reduction. Since it is responsible for both economic and energy policies, the NDRC defines and sets the direction of climate policy. In June 2007, the NDRC issued the National Climate Change Program, which indicated that the Chinese government acknowledges the importance of addressing climate change by establishing institutions and mechanisms and adopting measures on GHG mitigation, adaptation, climate change science and technology, and public awareness (Tsang & Kolk, 2010). Despite the existence of the NDRC, policymaking involving climate change and energy policies remains highly fragmented, for no single institution has absolute authority to mediate the interests of relevant agencies. Consequently, policy articulation sometimes appears uncoordinated, such as the negotiating stance of the Chinese delegation at COP15 in Copenhagen (Ong, 2012).

As the most influential institutional player in foreign affairs at the ministerial level, the MFA has the primary role in the international political process on climate change. Its function is to implement foreign policies that have been approved by the Politburo Standing Committee by translating broad foreign policy goals into practical plans for implementation (Lai & Kang, 2014). It is a hardliner in its position that Chinese economic considerations and sovereignty should be upheld, and developed countries must be responsible for leading climate change initiatives and providing financial assistance and technology transfers to developing countries. Often, the position of the MFA is in line with that of the NDRC in terms of climate change for it prioritizes China's economic development, which is a core national interest (Heggelund et al., 2010).

When the climate change negotiations were formalized with the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, the implications of climate change were framed as a potential threat to China's economy if emission reductions would be implemented. Thus, the strategy at the time was to prevent binding commitments at all costs. The MFA took on this difficult task of protecting the country's economic interests while actively participating in the climate talks. Fearing international isolation anew after the Tiananmen incident of 1989, China's leadership wanted to present itself as a responsible member of the international community (Conrad, 2010). Given China's expanding role in the international arena and its increasing involvement in several complex global issues, MFA had to rely on the expertise of other agencies. In doing so, it had to compete with other bureaucratic actors to influence the policymaking process (Lai & Kang, 2014).

The MOST is the ministry with extensive technical expertise on clean development mechanisms and issues of technology transfer, having established a research program on climate change in the 1990s. Its officials have traditionally been sympathetic to environmental concerns (Heggelund et al., 2010). It also sends representatives to the COP meetings. The MOST, together with the MEP, which was previously the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), made efforts to gain more influence in climate change policy with contrasting results. The MEP was only granted full ministerial status in 2008 with few staff and a small operational budget. Its goal of championing environmental causes is often seen as less significant when pitted against the goals of the NDRC and MFA. Although the emergence of environmental agenda in domestic politics can be considered as a policy window that the MEP can maximize to push its organizational interests on climate change, it still lacks leverage vis-à-vis other key ministries.

Compared to MEP, the MOST has gained some latitude in its bid for influence. Since policymaking on climate change is hugely dependent on scientific data and the use of technology, the MOST was able to assert its relevance given its predominance on the scientific aspect of the issue. Many departments within the MOST have close links with research institutions involved in climate change policymaking. Its Office of Global Environmental Affairs coordinates various bilateral and multilateral research initiatives on climate change. The engagement of MOST in international research cooperation was an effective strategy in expanding its bureaucratic turf, as it gained control of important information that allowed it to challenge the NDRC in certain policy decisions (Conrad, 2010). MOST also provides policy inputs and advice to international climate change negotiations as another way to exert its influence in decision-making. Therefore, MOST has been successful in exerting its influence by using its expertise, information, and other resources to frame the climate change issue within the realm of science and technology. In the process, it was able to shift the political priorities of the Chinese leadership and increased its significance as a policy actor (Conrad, 2010).

As the competition for power and influence among ministries intensified, bargaining among them became essential. While CMA and MEP wielded influence on climate change policy in the earlier years of international negotiations, the NDRC and MOFA were able to seize control of the policymaking process by promoting a more conservative perspective that placed economic development above all other interests. This explained the hardline stance of China against binding commitments during initial negotiations of the post-Kyoto climate deal. This position, however, became untenable as China became the second-largest economy in the world and the highest producer of GHG. Mounting international pressure on China to act more responsibly by reducing its emissions proved to be difficult to ignore. Likewise, Chinese leadership had to re-evaluate its position as more research studies singled out China as a country most vulnerable to catastrophic climate events.

Thus, the Chinese leadership sought ways to mitigate carbon emissions while ensuring sustained economic growth. The shift to a low-carbon green growth strategy turned out to be a more feasible policy alternative as scientific data on climate change became available, pointing to the negative impacts of a business-as-usual scenario. Moreover, the aspiration of being a world leader in green industries was a strong impetus for the transition. The NDRC identified emerging strategic industries, all related to green technologies, given their high value-added potential, which could increase the competitiveness of the Chinese economy (Zhang, 2015). Soon enough the low-carbon development model gained traction as an ideal development path for China in the long term. From being a buzzword, low-carbon green growth came to be a formal strategy reflected in several official documents.

In the 18th Congress Report of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the term "ecological civilization" was added to the national development strategy together with economic, political, cultural, and social development. A guide was also issued to operationalize the concept. Moreover, green growth has been the central theme of other major documents: the 12th Five-Year Plan, the Working Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control in the 12th Five-Year Plan, China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change, the National Plan in Response to Climate Change 2013-2020, and the CCP Central Committee Resolution Concerning Some Major Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform (Zhang, 2015). These domestic policies enabled China to pledge more ambitious emission reduction targets as its nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement.

Concluding thoughts

The number of bureaucracies involved in climate change demonstrates that this issue is cross-cutting, and, as such, it entails a complex coordinating process. Given that climate change is closely linked to economic and energy policies, the NDRC has the primary role in policymaking. This topic is also a foreign policy issue; thus, the MFA is heavily involved in international climate change negotiations. The MOST and MEP, whose main interests include safeguarding environmental concerns, take a secondary role in the policymaking process. While this arrangement may be true in the early years of the post-Kyoto climate negotiations, the MOST, MEP, and the larger scientific community gained some influence in pursuing a more proactive climate policy domestically and internationally.

In the 1990s, climate change was perceived as an issue that affected China's sovereignty in domestic affairs, and mitigation programs were understood as a threat to China's economic growth. However, a paradigm shift started in the early 2000s as more scientific data became available pointing to the adverse impacts of climate change in the form of extreme weather events, which could weaken the economy and the stability of Chinese society at large. Furthermore, studies pointed out that delaying mitigation could be costlier. Thus, a political consensus was reached on pursuing a low-carbon development path. For Shu (2023), China's climate policies have undergone three main phases, specifically: (i) as a defender of development rights from 1988-2006; (ii) an active follower of global climate policy-related developments over the period 2007-2005; and (iii) a global leader from 2016 and beyond. The Chinese leadership was convinced that the existing industrialization model would be unsustainable.

Moreover, state planners decided to focus on green technologies to ensure the long-term viability of economic growth. Policies were soon drafted to lay the foundation of the low carbon green growth strategy. These policies placed China in an advantageous position to make more large-scale commitments in international climate change negotiations. Regarding policy effectiveness, Shu (2023) finds that the country's climate policies have positively impacted various issue areas such as carbon reduction, energy efficiency, technology innovation and economic development. Nevertheless, the Chinese government may still consider key policy options involving the implementation of a national climate law, enforcement of more market-based and voluntary instruments, incorporation of local targets into local climate plans, and greater citizen participation in the policy process (Shu, 2023).

In essence, this case illustrates that although China is ruled by one party, bargaining among relevant ministries and agencies remains a common practice in arriving at important policy decisions. Therefore, the saying that "where you stand depends on where you sit," which aptly encapsulates the main assumption of the bureaucratic politics model, also applies to Chinese policymaking and not just in most democratic states.

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