RESEARCH ARTICLE

So Far, Yet So Close: Italian Parties' Immigration Discourses During the Gentiloni and the First Conte Governments

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ABSTRACT

The article compares the immigration discourses of three Italian parties (League, Five Star Movement and Democratic Party) under the Gentiloni and first Conte governments (2016–2019). To this aim, it performs a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Facebook posts published by the parties and their leaders during seven periods of interest, with the goal of reconstructing the parties' ideal-typical basic discourses. The results prove that the centre-left Democratic Party's and the populist Five Star Movement's discourses elude xenophobic forms of Othering of migrants. However, the qualitative analysis shows how these actors' approaches actually 'spectralise' the migrants, thus legitimising stricter measures and lending credibility to the right-wing League's discourse. The three discourses may instead be correlated with different degrees of policy dramatisation. These results underline the importance of integrating discourse analysis in party-comparative studies and contribute to the formulation of new hypotheses to be tested in other cases.

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1. Introduction

After decades of growing salience, immigration has become one of the most important issues on the political agenda of many European states. The asylum crisis of the 1990s (Luedtke 2019) and the migration crisis starting in 2015 (Triandafyllidou 2018) especially have been turning points for the politicisation and even securitisation of the issue by a wide range of actors (see Buonfino 2004). While European institutions, after the Schengen agreements, have increasingly pressed for the strengthening of the external borders of the Union and the strict control of migrant flows (van Munster 2009), the issue has often become owned by radical right parties and movements across Europe at the national level, putting party systems under strain (Bale et al. 2010). In Italy, Matteo Salvini's League cemented its hold on the issue after the 2015 crisis, which saw Italy as a key country on Europe's Mediterranean border. The party further capitalised on it after the 2018 national elections, forming a government (the first Conte government) with the Five Star Movement (M5S) and becoming the most voted party in the European 2019 elections.

Existing literature on migration discourse generally focuses on the depictions of migrants as 'Others' and the discourses built around them in the media and political context at large, or on quantitative analyses and comparisons of the frames adopted by media and political actors on the phenomenon. As a result, we miss a comparative analysis of how different actors depict the migrant Other (i.e., the migrant who is constructed as different from us and in distinction from whom our identity is defined, secured and maintained) or introduce further Others in migration discourse. Mainstream parties, and in particular centre-left parties, are often absent in this strand of research. Thus, while most works agree that the immigration issue has been increasingly presented to the public through securitarian lenses (see for example Huysmans 2006), we know little about whether this is coupled with a homogeneous change in Othering practices by most actors, or if different images of Others are mobilised by different actors even when they share a common frame. Indeed, if different frames are deployed to increase consensus and legitimise policies (Entman 1993), also different ways of depicting Others produce different discourses and

imperatives to action (or inaction) (Hansen 2006).

Mapping the variations in the Othering practices of different actors in migration discourse can aid the comprehension of another facet of how actors create consensus and legitimise or delegitimise certain immigration policies. In perspective, we might find correlations with the characteristics of proposed policies, with electoral results and with the ways racism and xenophobia spread, and investigate the interactions between the findings on this level of analysis and others, such as communication frames. In particular, it is important to understand what images of the Other are produced by those actors who do not initially own the migration issue and are forced to confront themselves with it, and whether and how these images fuel into the securitarian and identitarian hard-line rhetoric of radical right parties.

This work intends to perform a hypothesis-generating descriptive analysis of a case-study (Lijphart 1971). The case under study will be the Italian one, as after the 2015 crisis the country saw governments led first by the centre-left mainstream Democratic Party (PD) and then by a populist alliance of the Five Star Movement and the radical right League. My research question is: what are the dominant Others and the discourses constructed around them in the migration-related communication of the main Italian political parties between 2017 and the end of the first Conte government, in 2019? To answer it, I will focus on the social media discourse on Facebook of the three parties and their leaders: the Democratic Party, the Five Star Movement and the League. While the PD's political positioning is clear, the M5S and the League require further clarification as they represent different forms of populism. The League was originally born as a regionalist party claiming to represent the interests of Northern Italy but has then steadily shifted towards nativism and radical right populism (Mudde 2007), with the main conflict in its narrative being a cultural one between an ethnically defined Italian people and immigrants and Muslims (Ivaldi et al. 2017). The M5S's populist stance at its birth was instead devoid of markedly radical right elements and notably fuzzy on the left-right spectrum, simply positing the party as representing the common people versus the Italian political elites (Ivaldi et al. 2017; Mosca & Tronconi 2019).

Italy has been chosen as the country under analysis due to it having been one of the European countries most affected by the new migratory flows of the recent years. While being one of the main entry points to Europe from the African continent, Italy was not the focus of attention at the height of the refugee crisis starting in 2015; nonetheless, successive Italian governments have suffered or exploited the pressure of a public opinion increasingly concerned with new arrivals.[1] The year 2015 actually marked a slight decrease in arrivals (153,842), down from 170,100 in 2014. After the closure of the Eastern Mediterranean route, the number of arrivals rose again in 2016, reaching 181,436 (UNHCR 2019).

Within this context, despite their ideological difference, both the centre-left Gentiloni government in 2017 and the first Conte government in 2018 and 2019 adopted controversial immigration policies, often criticised for their humanitarian outcomes (see Hermanin 2017; Strazzari & Grandi 2019). In particular, the Gentiloni government was criticised for its controversial agreements with Al-Sarraj's Lybian government to stem the flow of migrants, its restrictive 'immigration decree' and the attempt to impose a 'code of conduct' on NGO ships operating in the Mediterranean. The following Conte government saw Interior Minister Salvini, the League's leader, implement his 'shut ports' doctrine against migrant-rescuing at sea and produced two so-called 'security decrees', restrictive towards asylum seekers, the Italian reception system and NGOs. Choosing these two governments thus makes it possible to analyse the communication of parties that have all adopted at least partly restrictive immigration policies despite their opposing political stances; moreover, the similar context in which they act allows us to effectively compare the discourses between different parties and between the same party when in office or in opposition.

The paper is structured as follows: section 2 will first review the main literature related to migration discourse and to migration and party competition. Then section 3 will explain the methodological choices adopted for this study. Section 4

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[1] According to Standard Eurobarometer data, the share of people considering immigration one of the two most important problems in the country almost tripled in 2014 to 17% (up from 6%) and then doubled again in the following two years, before stabilising at 34% and then eventually decreasing to 22% in the first six months of 2019.

will review the results of the analysis and discuss the findings, identifying the dominant discourses of the main actors in specific contexts and discussing their interactions. Finally, section 5 will present some final remarks.

2. Policy stances, frames, Others: A review of migration literature

Immigration is an extremely multi-faceted issue, spanning several policy fields. As such, it is first necessary to clarify what its facets are, in order to avoid conceptual stretching or ambiguity. In particular, in order to define immigration, we need to distinguish it from integration. According to Akkerman (2015), immigration refers to issues of labour immigration, access to citizenship, asylum, illegality and family reunification. Integration is instead related to social rights, the relationship with religious minorities (Muslims in particular) and assimilationist or pluralist trajectories of integration. If, however, according to Heckmann (2003, p. 46) integration is 'the inclusion of new populations into the existing social structures of the immigration country', then we should also include in it the sub-field of citizenship access, as the main gate to institutional inclusion. Immigration should instead aggregate those sub-fields that govern migrants as incoming subjects and – once arrived – distinct aliens and not as prospective full members of society: asylum, labour immigration, repatriation and reception policy, but also border control and externalisation, and all policies meant to tackle the so-called 'push factors'. Importantly, a policy pledge related to an immigration sub-field may well be justified through reference to another sub-field, or to integration considerations.

A sizeable literature has already developed on the theme of different parties' immigration stances (see Odmalm 2019 for a comprehensive review); the main objects of research are parties' positions and electoral strategies on the immigration issue. From a party competition view, the immigration issue becomes relevant in the 1980s, with the increasing salience of the issue within the electoral agendas of radical right parties. It is since the late 1980s and the 1990s that immigration has truly become one of their most important owned issues, however (Mudde 1999; Sonia & da Fonseca 2011). The salience of the issue has considerably grown since then,

prompting most actors and party systems to make choices and undergo transformations in reaction to it.

Most of these works focus on parties' positioning relative to each other according to their chosen policy approach to immigration. Immigration has often been seen as a valence issue, with a directional consensus in the electorate towards stricter policies and parties competing over their competence and ability to provide the desired outcome (Odmalm & Bale 2015). If parties treated immigration as a valence issue, we would expect differences and increases in salience in party manifestos not to be related to the parties' ideological positions. However, this does not seem to happen (Morales et al. 2015). Ideology has proven time and again to be an important factor in determining party positions, although in conjunction with factors such as competition from radical right parties (Mudde 2004; Sonia & da Fonseca 2011), public opinion shifts (Odmalm & Bale 2015), leaders' decisions (Bale & Partos 2014), other parties' behaviour (Bale et al. 2010) and incumbency (Castelli Gattinara 2016). Mainstream left parties, at least in Italy, seem to maintain more open and humanitarian positions than their opponents, shifting to pragmatic stances when in government (Urso 2018). The Italian mainstream right has instead usually adopted securitarian stances, also espoused by more radical parties such as the Northern League (Castelli Gattinara 2016).

Most of this literature performs quantitative analyses of party manifestos; as a result, we risk missing the ways parties justify their positions and frame the very issue of immigration accordingly. Authors such as Helbling (2014) and Castelli Gattinara (2016) have instead used frames specifically developed for the immigration issue to capture this dimension of party competition. Frames are, according to Entman (1993), schemes of interpretation that promote a particular problem definition or causal interpretation. Frames have more often been used for studies on media and immigration (Greussing & Boomgaarden 2017; Vollmer & Karakayali 2018) or on dominant political discourses, without a comparative approach between parties and party families (Triandafyllidou 2018; Guillem & Cvetkovic 2019). The framing approach is particularly useful when considering not party manifestos, but party

officials' declarations or other means of public communication. Through it, we can understand how parties compete not only by adopting different evaluative stances on the issue, but by changing the terms through which the issue is perceived as a problem, a moral duty or a resource.

Helbling (2014) uses seven framing categories: national, multicultural, moral-universal, economic prosperity, labour and social security, security (including both national security and terrorism on one side, and law and order on the other) and the neutral pragmatic. These categories are defined in more detail in the following section. The security frame might be further articulated into a proper security (or geopolitical, as Chouliaraki & Zaborowski (2017) term it) frame that refers to terrorism, national security and war, and a law and order frame which accentuates cases of domestic deviancy and criminality. In Italy, negative framings of immigration have historically focused on this theme of insecurity and 'urban safety', i.e. law and order (Marzorati 2013). Greussing and Boomgaarden, who adopt a statistical approach to identifying clusters of words which they then label as different frames (2017), also find economicisation (which is centred on the economic burden represented by immigrants) as a main frame in the Austrian press in 2015.

The use of these frames, however, does not capture the Othering discourses of party actors; indeed, the discursive images of the immigrant Other are studied in works that do not compare parties. In the literature we can traditionally find two main ideal-types of images of the immigrant Other (Anderson 2008): the villain, or evil-doer, and the victim. The first is a radical Other, characterised by an irreducible diversity that challenges the identity and the value system of the community that depicts it as a threat (Hansen 2006). Radical Otherness satisfies a community's desire to locate responsibility for the dangers and pain of life in an out-group that can be held accountable for them and nullifies the potential for questioning the very nature of one's identity that the Other retains by defining it as evil or irrational (Connolly 1991). The in-group is thus shielded from criticism or blame for any societal stress that is occurring. This radical diversity and opposition may be constructed on different grounds, however: the migrant may be enemified and associated with terrorists (Squire 2015)

or be considered culturally unassimilable and threatening to national unity (Marino 2015) and/or prone to turn to delinquency and commit serious crimes that disrupt the social order (Vollmer & Karakayali 2018). Delinquency itself can be explicitly traced back to the immigrant's cultural and racialised roots or be attributed to other socio-economic causes (van Munster 2009), or not be contextualised. These processes are common to most countries harbouring hostility towards migrants by parts of their society, including Italy: here, migrant Othering is mainly based on cultural difference and criminalisation (Benveniste et al. 2016). These cases are usually related to nativism, an ideology (in Mudde's (2007) definition) in which the in-group is identified with the culturally homogeneous native inhabitants of the nation-state.

Otherness, however, does not need to be radical. Hansen (2006) posits the existence of more degrees of Otherness, which are all instrumental in defining by opposition the Self of the in-group community, but which may do so in other ways than threat, and which may all be used to legitimise specific policies. On the opposite side of evil-doers, migrants may also become a victimised Other. Victims are passive subjects who have had to endure violence, poverty or other forms of pain in their origin country and/or during the perilous journey or even after their arrival in the immigration country. In this context, victimised migrants are not viewed as a threat, but they are still clearly considered different from the population of the reference community and are treated as passive actors without agency, towards whom we have a charity duty. This also turns them into dehumanised beings (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski 2017). In this case, the in-group does not necessarily coincide with the population of the host-state as a whole but may also be identified with smaller groups of benefactors, while also being opposed to variously depicted groups of abusers both in the migrants' home and host states. At the same time, however, these depictions strengthen long-standing images of underdevelopment and its opposition to the developed and 'civilised' world (Agustín 2003).

The overlaps between these images and the categories of refugee and economic migrant are instrumental to most discursive strategies: in particular, the economic migrant is often conflated with the criminal evil-doer through the use of the

lexicons 'illegal' and 'criminal', through which economic migrants and even refugee claimants are already depicted as breaking the law and associated with delinquency (Gilbert 2013). Thanks to this overlap all those who have not yet been granted asylum become illegal immigrants, and illegal immigrants become problematic or dangerous criminals.

All these images are mediated by the tropes of silencing, collectivisation and de-contextualisation (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski 2017): migrants are stripped of their voice, presented as parts of collective referents and never as individuals, and deprived of the background reasons for their journey, as though they have perpetually existed in the state of the migrant flow. This way, they can more easily be attributed the specific characteristics of one of the previous stereotypical images and better fit within an overarching narrative. Moreover, migrants are racialised and gendered: groups are associated with racial attributes and victims are generally associated with children and females, while males are more strongly associated with cases of violence (both general and gendered one) (see Johnson 2011; Wilmott 2017; Tyler 2018; Gray & Franck 2019). Victims and evil-doers are also different with respect to agency: while both are silenced, for victims this means that they are without agency, just a vulnerable body; evil-doers are instead ascribed agency, but also maliciousness, which restricts the immigrant's agency to their capacity to harm the host society (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski 2017).

By using the concept of the Other, we can avoid limiting ourselves to a quantitative comparison of the frequency of different frames or images of the Other, but we can instead construct each party's 'basic discourses' and compare them. Basic discourses, in Hansen's (2006) interpretation, are analytical constructs through which the construction and linking of identity and policy can be studied. They 'construct different Others with different degrees of radical difference; articulate radically diverging forms of spatial, temporal, and ethical identity; and construct competing links between identity and policy' (Hansen 2006, p. 46). Basic discourses are ideal-types of specific associations that compete or become hegemonic within a wider debate and are strongly linked with the concepts of identity and Other. Through them, we can

not only consider different frames, Othered subjects and policy sub-fields separately, but we may also analyse how they together build a coherent discourse that competes with others in the public arena. In the Italian case, such constructs would allow to confirm whether the League mainly combines a law and order frame with a criminalised Othering of migrants, to understand what depictions are combined with the PD's likely mixed humanitarian-pragmatic stance, and to map the M5S's approach to the issue. The M5S's case is particularly interesting, as Gianfreda (2018) has shown that the party has actually shied away from addressing migration and the very figure of the migrant in the parliamentary debates on the 2015 refugee crisis.

3. Methodology

The aim of this work is to identify the Othered images present in political discourses of various Italian actors over the immigration issue during the Gentiloni and the first Conte government. From these images and through their comparison with the frames employed by the parties, a series of ideal-typical basic discourses (Hansen 2006) attributed to each actor in a certain context may be constructed, and their relationships investigated. The selected period is still characterised by limited research due to its proximity in time. Moreover, it is a unique chance to study and compare the characteristics and evolution of actors' discourses in a period of shift between a mainstream centre-left government and a populist-radical right one, where an actor with a seemingly mostly pragmatic discourse (if we assimilate it to the previous record of the centre-left Renzi government in 2015 (Colombo 2018)) has been replaced in office by a government characterised by a much harsher rhetoric. At the same time, both governments have been accused by several critics of implementing illiberal measures against migrants; therefore, we might hypothesise that the discourses of such different actors may be more similar or interact with each other in ways that we do not capture only by coding and analysing their manifestos.

The selected actors are the PD, League and M5S. They have been chosen as they were all a major ruling party during one of the two governments under study; moreover, they have been the three most voted parties both in the 2018 national

elections and in the 2019 European Parliament elections. Their choice allows for a comparison of a mainstream left, a radical right and a populist actor in the same time frame.

The data for the analysis have been scraped from the Facebook communication of these actors and of their leaders. The choice of a social media such as Facebook for this kind of work needs justification, as most other studies focus instead on media outlets, party manifestos or parliamentary debates (see Guillem & Cvetkovic 2019; Odmalm 2019). The choice to focus on media rather than manifestoes is demanded by the object of the analysis, as it allows to gather more data on the communicative approaches parties adopt not only to propose policies, but also to constantly describe and interpret the varying actors and events of the Italian migration issue before the wider public. Moreover, the political communication of parties is nowadays increasingly influenced by their social media strategies, as social media allow political actors to bypass the media in setting the agenda and refine and spread their own framing of specific issues (Ross & Bürger 2017). This means that by focusing on social instead of traditional media we can find a version of actors' discourses closer to what they actually intend to spread. Furthermore, networking and transcoding allow the social communication of one actor to reproduce messages of other actors or distributed on other media (Schulz 2014), which means that we still have access to a plethora of communication forms, from simple posts and self-interviews to interventions in TV debates and press articles. Therefore, the results should not be excessively biased by media-specific contents and tropes; instead, using social media may make it possible to focus on a 'purer' version of the actors' intended discourse.

Amid the main social networks, Facebook was preferred over the others for the analysis. Facebook's role in Italian political communication has been highlighted in particular with reference to League's leader Matteo Salvini, who had built at the time an online community of more than 3,800,000 'friends' on the platform (see Bobba 2019). Facebook remains the most common social media in Italy, having been used by 90.4% of online users in 2018 (Coppola 2019). While fine-grained statistics

are not yet available for Italy, Facebook use does not seem to be particularly influenced by age, census or membership of a specific ethnic group in those countries where similar studies were carried out (Pew Research Center 2019). Nonetheless, it must be remembered that a series of biases are potentially present: only 48% of the adult Italian population were social media users in 2017 (Pew Research Center 2018). Furthermore, language on social media is more emotional and more prone to putting blame on opponents (Hameleers et al. 2017). Therefore, the results of this study will have to be balanced with those obtained through other more traditional media.

Posts were collected from the Facebook pages of PD, League and M5S and of their leaders (Matteo Renzi, Maurizio Martina and Nicola Zingaretti during their respective mandates as party secretaries for PD, Matteo Salvini for League and Luigi Di Maio for M5S). To these was also added the page of Council President Paolo Gentiloni (who, as PD member, has been included in the PD cluster), while Giuseppe Conte, not being formally a member of any party, has been excluded from the collection. Posts were not collected over the entirety of the three-year period, in order to obtain a sample of manageable dimensions; instead, a series of periods coinciding with critical events or processes related to immigration in Italy were identified, and all immigration-related posts from these periods were collected.

The periods were selected in correspondence both with sudden and/or unanticipated events and with the presentation, discussion and implementation of policies or programmatic points put forward by some of the actors and opposed by others. As a result, I will refer to them using the more generic term 'contexts'. The contexts selected were:

- the signing of the Italo-Lybian memorandum in February 2017;
- the legislative conversion process of the Orlando-Minniti decree on immigration between February and April 2017;
- the defamation campaign against NGOs in March-May 2017 (during which NGO ships in the Mediterranean were accused of conducting a shady 'immigration business', being paid by the traffickers);
- the presentation of the code of conduct for NGOs in July 2017;

- the Macerata attack (when on the 3rd February 2018 an Italian individual shot and tried to kill several migrants hosted in the town);

- the sudden block imposed in August on the Diciotti vessel (one of the first of Salvini's campaign against rescue ships, with an importance amplified by it being not an NGO ship, but an Italian military ship);

- the legislative conversion processes of the two Security decrees in October-December 2018 and June-August 2019 (whose latter period also includes the Sea Watch 3 case, another extremely mediatised case of an NGO vessel being denied permission to land).

The collection periods were selected differently according to the context, but always included at least one week before and one after the event, policy, or act, or the two weeks after it. For legislative acts, the periods ranged from the week prior to the act's formal presentation in Parliament, as the legislative proposal had usually already been made public, to the week after its approval. For the Lybia memorandum and the code of conduct there was no clear-cut end to the debate: in the former case, the collection period included the two weeks after its announcement, as this represented the first moment the agreement was clearly presented to the public. In the case of the code of conduct, the period started when the code was first anticipated on 2nd July 2017 and ended one week after its coming into effect, on 1st August 2017. For the other unanticipated events, the period started from the day of the event until two weeks later. The case of the NGO defamation campaign did not fit well into these categories due to its continuous and sustained nature: therefore, the period selected ranged from the first news on a judicial inquiry by attorney Zuccaro on NGOs, on 17 February, to two weeks after a televised interview of the same attorney on 27 April. The final periods are thus: from 02/02/17 to 11/05/17; from 02/07/17 to 08/08/17; from 03/02/18 to 17/02/18; from 16/08/18 to 30/08/18; from 27/09/18 to 01/12/18; and from 08/06/19 to 12/08/19, for a total of more than 41 weeks of collection. The longer periods have allowed for the collection also of several posts related to episodes of criminality, European politics and negotiations,

relationships with foreign states (France in particular), electoral speeches and other more generic interventions on the immigration issue.

Posts were collected on the basis of a keyword search on each page,[2] integrated through the collection of posts directly from the page feed. Such complementary collection was manual, as Facebook's current API limitations do not allow to automatically scrape all posts from a page through dedicated software, but only a pre-selected sample of them (Facebook 2020). This double collection made it possible to include both posts hidden from the main feed (through the search) and photos and videos whose lack of text would have excluded them from a keyword-based search. The only exception to this collection method was in the League and Salvini's case: their Facebook posts published before the 2018 elections were not accessible through the feed, as the website proved unable to retrieve them as the feed was scrolled down to earlier dates. As this technical issue could not be solved and repeated itself across multiple instances and devices, in this case only the posts from the keyword search were collected. The analysis section will also deal with the consistency of these posts with the others scraped from the two pages, including the potential biases arising from them. In the case of other media being attached to the posts, they were coded as well if their content was produced by a party member or inasmuch it was clearly endorsed and referred to by the post; in the case of contents whose link was not available anymore, the posts were coded whenever their text and the attached title were enough to provide material for the coding.

Only contexts related to immigration proper have been selected: given the higher salience of immigration policy compared to integration policy in Italy, the analysis adopts the former as its focal point. While the border between the two is

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[2] The keywords used for the search were: 'migrante/i' (migrant/s), 'immigrato/a/i/e' (immigrant/s), 'clandestino/a/i/e' (illegal migrant/s), 'irregolare/i' (irregular/s), 'richiedente/i asilo' (asylum seeker/s), 'rifugiato/a/i/e' (refugee/s), 'africano/a/i/e' (african/s), 'arabo/a/i/e' (arab/s), 'musulmano/a/i/e' (Muslim/s), 'ONG' (NGO), 'migrazione/i' (migration/s), 'immigrazione' (immigration), 'Macerata', 'Diciotti', 'Sea Watch', Carola, Rackete, 'decreto sicurezza' (security decree), 'decreto Minniti' (Minniti decree). These keywords attempt to cover most of the approaches to the issue: several refer to the individuals involved or often associated with immigration, while the others refer to the phenomenon as a whole or are associated with one of the aforementioned contexts, either being the name of a relevant actor, of a setting or of a piece of legislation.

indeed permeable, integration issues present in posts have been included in the analysis whenever they are referred to in order to support a specific stance on immigration. For the same reason, in parallel, only posts referring to migrants or migrant subcategories have been included, while posts related exclusively to Roma or Muslim individuals already established in Italy have been excluded. It must be underlined that the sample used for the analysis is *not* meant to be a representative sample in a statistical sense; it is designed to attempt to represent most party positions with reference to a broad and exhaustive series of contexts of the immigration debate, while satisfying the need for a small enough sample to be analysed qualitatively.

The posts collected and analysed amount to 112 for the PD, 106 for the M5S and 314 for the League (see Table 1 below). In the League's case, however, only a third of them (32%) belong to the party's opposition period, due to the above-mentioned collection difficulty.

Table 1 – Number of posts collected by party and period and proportion (%) of posts by party for each period.

	PD		M5S		League		Total	
Period		*%*		*%*		*%*		*%*
02/02/17 to 11/05/17	14	14	34	35	49	51	97	100
02/07/17 to 08/08/17	13	31	17	40	12	29	42	100
03/02/18 to 17/02/18	19	31	5	8	38	61	62	100
2018 elections								
16/08/18 to 30/08/18	15	25	16	27	29	48	60	100
27/09/18 to 01/12/18	27	20	10	8	96	72	133	100
08/06/19 to 12/08/19	24	17	24	17	90	65	138	100
Total	112	21	106	20	314	59	532	100

Source: own elaboration

Collected posts have undergone both a qualitative discourse analysis and an extensive coding based on several criteria. Firstly, as for the coding, each post has been coded for every Othered subject (not only migrants) present and the way they

are constructed. The villain-victim dichotomy is expanded into five categories: en-emified, criminalised, victimised, reified and a fifth category for all the other images depicted as despicable but not included within the previous ones (see Table 1). The Others identified were collective subjects who were differentially defined from the Self to which the actor referred, and towards whom the actor acted or wanted to act according to reasons deriving at least partially from that very difference. The (actually absent) instances which provided positive images that did not fit within this scheme were to be coded separately, in order to avoid a potential bias towards negative and/or passive images.

A second set of codes has been applied to the frame or frames present: I have here mainly drawn from Helbling's (2014) evaluative frames (see section 2), but with two additions: 1) a law and order frame (separated from security) and an exploitation frame (needed in particular for categorising the M5S's peculiar communication) (see Table 2); 2) Greussing and Boomgaarden's (2017) economicisation frame has been conflated with the economic and social burden frame. In all cases, the coding unit was the post, to which one or more codes have been assigned according to the frames present.

Table 2 – Nature of each Othering category.

Enemification	*Criminalisation*	*Reification*	*General Negative Othering*
Construction as enemy Use of war-related language	Construction as criminal Reference to illegal status	Construction as a non-human object Representation through numbers	Construction of the Other as despicable for some reason (generally moral) that does not coincide with the other categories

Victimisation
Construction as victim

Source: own elaboration

These codes allow for a better justification of the results of the discourse analysis. The frame-based coding is present to provide suggestions as to how images of Others and the traditional evaluative frames may interact in producing specific meanings. With this amount of data it is possible not only to identify what images of Others are present or dominant, but we may also construct for each actor the models of the basic discourses in which these Others have been embedded in different periods.

Table 3 – Nature of each framing category.

Economic and Social Burden	*Economic Prosperity*	*Exploitation*	*Humanitarian*
Economic disadvantages of immigration Labour and welfare competition Reception as a waste of resources	Economic advantages of immigration	Other actors' economic or political advantages in producing and exploiting the immigration problem	Solidarity towards the weaker Protection of human rights Prevention of deaths
Law and Order	*Multicultural*	*Nationalistic*	*Pragmatic*
Increased criminality and illegality Infiltrations or strengthening of criminal organisations Need for the respect of law Unacceptability of immigrants with illegal status	Favourable opinion towards cultural and religious diversity and tolerance	Defence of national identity and traditions Defence of national borders	Technical statements Statements which do not provide a justification for the advocated policy
Security			
Terrorist infiltrations Grave destabilisation			

Source: Own elaboration

4. Analysis and Discussion

4.1. *The Quantitative Results*

The results return varied insights on a relevant portion of the Italian political discourse on the immigration issue: all three actors under study frame the issue and depict migrants in different ways (Tables 4 and 5). The results have been aggregated according to the actors' incumbency or opposition role. It is important to note that the League's posts from the opposition periods are consistent with the party's communicative choices while in government, suggesting that there has been no major change in its rhetoric. Their results are somewhat more radical, with even less victimisation and humanitarian frames and more security ones; this might be due to a bias in the keyword collection, returning more written posts and short videos, accounting for a direct and less nuanced rhetoric, against longer videos and interviews.

Table 4 – Proportion (%) of Facebook posts coded for the presence of each frame.

Frame	PD			M5S			League		
	Gov.	*Opp.*	*All*	*Gov.*	*Opp.*	*All*	*Gov.*	*Opp.*	*All*
Economic and Social Burden	0	0	0	0	4	2	21	15	19
Economic Prosperity	2	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Exploitation	0	0	0	41	71	57	18	19	19
Humanitarian	41	50	46	24	9	16	9	3	7
Law and Order	17	13	15	18	0	8	61	51	58
Multiculturalism	20	21	20	0	2	1	0	0	0
Nationalistic	0	4	3	0	0	0	10	10	10
Pragmatic	63	31	44	37	7	21	12	7	10
Security	7	7	7	0	25	13	8	24	14

*Each post could be assigned more than one code; column totals in all tables thus do not equal 100
Source: own elaboration

The PD's two main frames are the humanitarian and pragmatic ones, with the multiculturalism and law and order ones in third and fourth place. When considering images of the migrant Other, victimisations and reifications of migrants are the

most common, followed by criminal images. Furthermore, at a closer look, the frequency of the law and order frame and criminal images are misleading: in the PD's opposition period, all the criminal images and 67% of the law and order frames are used in the context of the first Security decree in order to criticise the government's policies, which will produce people more likely to turn to delinquency due to the lack of integration. In the party's period in office, all of the criminal images and 90% of the law and order frames come from Matteo Renzi's Facebook page: in both cases it is specific individuals who are negatively framed, but without suggesting that they should be less deserving of assistance or be repatriated.

Table 5 – Proportion (%) of Facebook posts coded for the presence of each migrant image.

	PD			M5S			League		
Frame	*Gov.*	*Opp.*	*All*	*Gov.*	*Opp.*	*All*	*Gov.*	*Opp.*	*All*
Enemified	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	6	5
Criminalised	15	9	11	6	13	9	41	45	42
General Negative	0	1	1	0	0	0	7	6	7
Reified	37	13	23	6	2	4	7	9	8
Victimised	22	43	34	14	2	7	11	4	9

Source: own elaboration

The M5S is especially focused on the immigration 'business', with a seemingly mono-thematic obsession on exploitation when in opposition and a more moderate stance when in government, tempered by pragmatic and humanitarian frames. Also the presence of security frames drops to 0% when occupying office. However, part of the exploitation frames were simply replaced by law and order frames after the promulgation of the two Security decrees, which enshrined many of the NGOs' actions in the Mediterranean as legal infractions. The Movement's most peculiar attribute is evident when considering migrant images: only a small portion of the Movement's Facebook immigration-related production refers to migrants, and when it

does, it swings between criminal, victim and reified images. Moreover, criminal images of migrants mainly focus on their irregular and thus illegal status (90% of the criminal images), but do not suggest further associations with delinquency and crime. Therefore, they are not only much less numerous, but also less intense and radical than those of the League.

Finally, Salvini's League focuses especially on a law and order framing of the issue, with a series of ancillary frames supporting it: in particular the exploitation and economic and social burden frames (this latter one is significantly adopted only by the League, amid the parties under study), and, more rarely, the nationalistic and security frames. As for migrant images, the dominant one is the criminal image, followed by a group of more generic negative depictions: these identify immigrants either as culturally incompatible or as lazy 'failed citizens'. There are also some associations with terrorists and, more generally, people who 'don't flee war, but bring it here'. At the same time, however, there is a proportion of humanitarian frames and victim images: these are associated either with the need to stop the sea crossing in order to avoid more deaths, or with elders, women and children who really flee from war (versus young males who do not). A common element to all actors is the absence of any reference to positive migrant agency.

The results also allow us to study the images of further Othered subjects in the posts, so that we may better understand the articulations of the actors' discourse. These results have been summarised in Table 6, aggregating enemy, criminal and negative images for each relevant subject. While enemy images will be also treated separately later in the text, in many cases the distinction between criminalisation and a more general negative depiction was blurred and influenced by how much legislative power the party could wield, thus making a certain subject's actions unlawful or not. The PD focuses on two subjects: the human traffickers in the Mediterranean, demonised as the new slavers, and its right-wing and populist opponents, who fuel hatred and racism in the Italian society and lean towards authoritarian positions. The dominance of each subject is inverted with the passage from government to opposition, with traffickers reduced to nothingness and the frequency of political opponents

more than tripling. The M5S constantly refers to a fuzzy group of elites as its main target: i.e., right-wing and mostly left-wing politicians, the cooperatives working in the immigration sector, journalists and experts, and other prominent public figures. NGOs are associated to these individuals and groups in a general ensemble of people illegally or at least despicably profiting from immigration or defending those who do. Traffickers and the EU are other recurring subjects: the former for the same reasons as the PD, and the latter due to its inability to help Italy or even its willingness to trick Italians into carrying the burden of immigration alone. The frequency of these subjects changes as well, with the traffickers' and NGOs' proportions shrinking after the elections while the presence of the EU becomes more prominent. A common element between PD and M5S is the disappearance of traffickers from their discourses after the 2018 elections.

Table 6 – Proportion (%) of Facebook posts coded for the presence of an Othered subject that is not a migrant.

Frame	PD			M5S			League		
	Gov.	*Opp.*	*All*	*Gov.*	*Opp.*	*All*	*Gov.*	*Opp.*	*All*
Eastern Europe	4	4	4	2	0	1	0	0	0
EU	7	4	5	31	13	21	11	3	9
France	0	0	0	6	4	5	6	0	4
Human Traffickers	33	0	13	2	27	15	7	9	8
NGOs	2	0	1	27	71	50	34	18	29
Political Opponents	2	66	48	-	-	-	-	-	-
Elites	-	-	-	61	77	69	-	-	-
Do-Gooders	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	42	36

Source: own elaboration

Lastly, the League places blame in particular on NGOs and 'do-gooders' (in Italian *buonisti*, with a strong negative connotation). 'Do-gooders' is a label used by populist radical right parties to refer to a varied group composed of leftist politicians,

journalists, experts, cooperatives and transnational elites (at times led by billionaire George Soros himself), who, at best, are putting Italy in danger with irrational immigration policies from which they profit, and at worst are willingly planning to ethnically replace Italians and destroy the country's sovereignty. The label is also used against common people opposing radical anti-immigration policies.

A final element to consider is the frequency with which the actors have produced enemy images of these subjects in their Facebook communication. Indeed, all of them have, but in different ways. The PD has enemified only human traffickers, doing so in 20% of the cases in which it cited them while in government. The best example is Graziano Delrio's interview with newspaper *La Repubblica*: 'We are at war with the traffickers. A true war, not in TV debates' (Delrio 2017). The M5S has also enemified NGOs (4% of NGO posts), elites (3% of elites posts) and traffickers (19% of trafficker posts). The League has done the same with do-gooders (3% of all do-gooder posts) and NGOs (11% of all NGO posts).

4.2. The Basic Discourses

By integrating the previous results with a detailed qualitative analysis of the sample, we can now describe the basic discourses produced by each actor. Basic discourses are ideal-types which identify particular sections of the wider public discourse: they associate Selves and Others on the basis of specific spatial, temporal and ethical identities and construct links between identity and policy (Hansen 2006).

4.2.1. League

As we have seen, the League's posts are predominantly against immigrants, but with a significant proportion adopting humanitarian frames and victim images. Indeed, Salvini and his party articulate a clear rhetoric of deservingness (Boltanski 1999; Holzberg et al. 2018; Rheindorf & Wodak 2018; Vollmer & Karakayali 2018), where 'real' refugees fleeing from war are opposed to economic illegal immigrants. The former are exclusively identified with elders, women and children, so that young males are associated with clandestine migrants. A clear example of this distinction

comes from Salvini's interview on TV program *Pomeriggio 5*:

> Those who flee from war, women, children, my home is their home. The problem is that among the hundreds of immigrants who have arrived, some – let us think of San Lorenzo, in Rome [where three migrants had been charged with killing a young girl] – have brought war in our home. And I do not need these people in Italy (Salvini 2018).

Salvini and the League succeed in making the border between refugee and illegal immigrant overlap with that between grateful migrant and terrorist, criminal or simply disrespectful. Illegal migrants are despicable predominantly because they commit crimes, but also because they are disrespectful towards Italian culture, religion and traditions and because they represent a burden which prevents millions of Italians in poverty from being helped:

> With 4 million and a half Italians who survive below the poverty line, I believe that we need first to care about these people, before letting a single immigrant land or regularise them (Salvini 2017b).

Illegal immigrants are associated with other negative subjects: human traffickers, NGOs and the wider group of the 'do-gooders'. Traffickers are criminals who break the law and profit from the lives of migrants (although this is often not enough to empathise with those they exploit, when they are not poor and do not flee from war (Salvini 2019a)). NGOs are associated with traffickers and sometimes even considered outright enemies, as in the Sea Watch case (Salvini 2019b); in another example, Salvini's Facebook page shares on 28 March 2017 a conspiracy theory which claims that European elites are plotting to replace white Europeans with Africans, according to the century-old so-called 'Kalergi plan' (Salvini 2017a). The resulting discourse (see Figure 1) is in its entirety a clear example of securitisation and moralisation of borders (Rheindorf & Wodak 2018).

Figure 1 – Graphical representation of the League's basic discourse.

Source: own elaboration

The main Other is the illegal migrant, associated with other nefarious subjects and clearly split from its opposite, the victimised deserving refugee. Against illegal immigrants, who seem to make up almost the entirety of the immigrant population, the League and its leader depict themselves as the defenders of an ethnic Italian Self which they represent. It is this Self that is in danger and must be rescued, through the closure of borders and the repatriation of all those not worthy of remaining in Italian territory.

4.2.2. M5S

The key distinguishing element of the M5S's discourse is the relative absence of migrants. Migrants are present in few posts and with conflicting depictions: sometimes as illegal irregulars, sometimes as victims (although the relative dominance of these two is inverted after taking office). The lion's share of Othered subjects belongs to a heterogeneous group of elites, followed by NGOs, the European Union and traffickers. Apart from the European Union, these subjects are generally depicted as

criminals or despised for supporting those who criminally profit from the 'business'. They may also be enemified: at the height of the NGO scandal in April 2017, the Movement's leader Di Maio's official page shares an interview by attorney Carmelo Zuccaro on TV channel *Rai3*, in which Zuccaro declares:

> In my opinion NGOs might be financed – some NGOs, I repeat – by the traffickers. I know there are contacts. It is a business that now rewards as much as drug smuggling […]. It might also be possible – the matter might be even more disquieting – that some of these NGOs pursue different goals, to destabilise the Italian economy for example. Those who would profit from a weak Italian economy, weakness which is doubtlessly incremented by an uncontrolled influx of migrants, might see such situation as advantageous (Di Maio 2017).

Similarly, also politicians are sometimes defined as 'traitors' of the Italian people: both the PD (M5S 2017) and Berlusconi (M5S 2018) undergo this radical Othering process.

While the M5S somewhat moderates its stance when in government, the articulation of its discourse does not change (see Figure 2). It is an atypical discourse, which does not correspond to any of the types already identified in literature; only Gianfreda (2018), analysing Italian parliamentary debates, already notices its peculiarity. The Movement's focus is related to its 'pure' populist origins: instead of articulating a conflict between an ethnic Italian Self and a migrant Other, it draws a line between the Italian people and the elites that the populists oppose. The immigration issue is only another field in the fight against the caste of the privileged, and the role of migrants is overlooked; we might term this a case of 'absconded Other'. This is likely to be intentional, in order not to lean towards any of the extremes of the political spectrum while effectively criticising the PD first and supporting the League later. As other parties make instead explicit in the wider debate the presence of migrants, however, it is fair to assume that this discourse alone is not capable of justifying why migrants should simply suffer the collateral damage of policies that are presented as theoretically not targeting them.

Figure 2 – Graphical representation of the M5S's basic discourse.

Source: own elaboration

4.2.3. PD

The PD's discourse presents some structural changes which make it useful to distinguish between the period in office and that in opposition. Its distinctive attribute is the duality between the victimised migrant and the reified migrant. When leading the government, the PD uses predominantly reified images of the migrant Other: migrants are de-individualised and either turned into a de-humanised collective form ('flows'; 'the migratory phenomenon') or expressed as numbers. A typical expression is 'governing the flows', expressing a technical and de-humanised approach to the issue. Gentiloni announces the Libyan memorandum with these words:

> We talk in this deal about the organisation of the camps in Libya and the cooperation in this with the international organisations, the repatriations from Libya to the origin countries, we talk about border police, coast guard, it is the description of a possible path to reduce and govern the migratory flows (Gentiloni 2017).

Victim images are present in the collection periods only with reference to the crossing of the Mediterranean, and not to the condition of the Lybian camps. The victimised migrants are opposed to the politicians who campaign on the immigration issue, eliciting xenophobia, but most importantly to the human traffickers,

with whom the PD constructs a radical and even war-like opposition. Their inhumane nature is often highlighted, for example in this passage by Renzi:

> This happened after we saw the images – when the shipwreck sank and there were the children locked in the hold, they had locked them up because they were noisy, during that journey of death (Renzi 2018).

Here lies a specific and under-investigated articulation of Self and Others (see Figure 3), often considered an instance of pragmatic rationalisation (Triandafyllidou 2018). The reified migrant Other is dehumanised and turns immigration into a technical issue of management, where 'governing the flows' does not elicit problematic associations with the humanity and individual biographies of migrants. Victim images can still be used when it may mark a difference from more radical parties, appeasing a section of the party's electorate. Despite referring to the same migrants, these images are not associated to each other, nor are they put in opposition; their relation is simply left in ambiguity. Moreover, while migrants are an explicit target of the government's policies, the main opposition is not with them, but between the State Self and the trafficker Other.

Figure 3 – Graphical representation of the PD's basic discourse while in office.

Source: own elaboration

When in opposition, victim images become predominant over reified ones (see Figure 4); besides the sea crossings, they also become related to immigrants already in Italy's reception system. Moreover, traffickers disappear, while the main opposition is constructed against the Conte government and Salvini in particular, who is increasingly viewed as a dangerous and inhumane minister (PD 2018). The imperative becomes, therefore, to oppose the government's policies; thus, also here the main Self-Other opposition does not relate to migrants directly, but is inscribed in the wider critique of the racist and authoritarian posture of the government.

Figure 4 – Graphical representation of the PD's basic discourse while in opposition.

Source: own elaboration

4.3. Discussing the Results. New Hypotheses for Party Competition Models

The basic discourses presented above allow us to understand in more depth each party's stance. While the League's discourse reproduces most of the anti-immigration discursive practices already analysed in the literature, both the M5S's and PD's discourses are interesting in different ways. The M5S's is an atypical one for a party opposing immigration, although actually traceable to the party's populist background. The PD's discourse might seem dominated by a pragmatic and rational framing when in office, but if we investigate the images employed, we understand how this actually produces a considerable de-humanising potential. The party's discourse while in opposition becomes again more typically humanitarian.

These discourses do not exist as monads but interact with each other and the wider media environment. When considering their interaction, the logical

structure of each discourse becomes an important factor. The League's discourse (and the PD's opposition one) are complete in their structure: they identify a problem and associate it with an opposing Other who is delegitimised and whose nature and characteristics justify their action. The M5S tries to do the same, but by bundling the immigration issue with another one which they own, i.e. the fight against the elites. Therefore, migrants are hidden, but should their presence be made clear no justification is present as to why they should just endure the collateral damage of a policy action not aimed at them. The discourse rests on overwriting the migrant Other with another one more suitable to the party's programme, but it becomes weaker if the migrant Other is made explicit. The governing PD also tries to shift the blame to the trafficker Other, but without enough strength; at the same time, it focuses on its technical policy-making ability to solve the immigration issue. Migrants are reified as a technicality and the issue is pragmatised, but there is very little justification why the issue should be a problem at all.

I thus argue that both discourses, while they try not to explicitly take stances that might displease parts of their electorate, have to rely on external sources to maintain their consistency. This source is the more radical right-wing discourse, which delegitimises migrants as a radical Other and constructs immigration as an urgent problem. Therefore, while trying to defuse or bundle the issue, both parties are actually legitimising the most radical discourse and its main elements. The result of this process is a *spectralisation* of the migrant Other in the political discourse. Besides the radical right's criminalised immigrant, migrants for the other main parties become a spectre, an open secret avoided by official communication but which produces and justifies a diffuse sense of societal unease. This unease, in turn, fuels into the most radical representations of the migrant Other. We might hypothesise that this interaction is at work also in other national party systems.

We might also wonder whether some policy choices are correlated with certain discursive constructions. In order to provide an answer, I would like to introduce a new concept: while actually most of the discourses have seemed to justify restrictive policies, either through radical Othering or through other forms of de-humanisation,

it seems possible that radical Othering is correlated with the *dramatisation* of those policies. We might define a policy as dramatised when it is planned, implemented and communicated in order for it to be clearly visible and to exalt the role of its proposers over those who are damaged by it. Policy dramatisation occurs together with the discursive production of a radical Other whose different nature is perceived as threatening. Rather than imagining policy dramatisation to be caused by radical Othering or vice versa, we should conceive of them as organic to one another: indeed, they both rest on aggressive communication aimed at exalting the difference between two subjects. However, we can assume that dramatised policies do not only differ in the way they are communicatively presented, but also in some of their attributes, which would thus be correlated also with the parties' basic discourses. In the immigration field an actor who avoids radical Othering and dramatisation will likely focus first on border externalisation and, if necessary, stopping boats on the high seas, rather than preventing disembarking when already in the harbour, as in the *Diciotti* case, where it is more likely to draw attention. Moreover, being able to dramatise one's policies means multiplying the chances for an actor to employ radical Othering discourse.

Policy dramatisation, together with issue ownership, provides a useful means of interpretation of parties' behaviour in the Italian case, which may be generalisable to other cases. During the PD government, the pressure posed by a radical right party owning the immigration issue (the League) pushed the other two office-seeking parties with lower issue ownership to try not to lose electorally to this trend while adopting a blame-shifting strategy. The PD's blame-shifting approach targeted human traffickers while being supported by a pragmatised discourse, while the M5S tried to overwrite the migrant Other with the Italian elites. Policy dramatisation might be the key to explaining the PD's sudden discursive shift when in opposition: once the League began to govern and was able to implement more dramatised immigration policies the previous uneasy balance of the PD's discourse, based on hiding the controversial migrant subject, became impossible to sustain without making explicit its contradictions. The PD thus began to target the governing parties themselves and the League in particular. These hypotheses might allow us to reconsider the effects of

discursive practices and interactions on party competition over immigration. For instance, they may provide us with a different interpretation of mainstream left parties' tendency to adopt more pragmatic stances when in government. While the traditional interpretation is that mainstream left parties shift to pragmatic stances when, and due to, being in government, we might actually hypothesise that their more open and humanitarian stances do not simply represent a 'default' approach that changes when being incumbent, but constitute a response to being in the opposition of parties who employ radical Othering and policy dramatisation. Parties such as the League, when in government, combine their radical discourse with the chance of dramatising immigration policies. The result is that the pragmatic mainstream left discourse, which hides the migrant subject becomes unsustainable due to the extreme mediatisation of the issue which leads to a more opposing humanitarian stance.

5. Final Remarks

The results of the present work are useful from more than one perspective. A variety of Others have been identified in the discourse of three relevant Italian party actors, compared with dominant frames and used as a foundation for the characterisation of each party's basic discourses. In a European context stably characterised by tough stances on immigration, the results show in detail how broadly different discourses may similarly justify stricter policies, reinforcing each other and sustaining a wider spectralisation of the migrant in the public debate. From a theoretical point of view, they provide bases for a better interaction between different strands of research in the migration field. The work indeed suggests some further categories for coding in quantitative analyses which might better capture the discursive nuances employed by certain actors, avoiding simple 'humanitarian' or 'pragmatic' classifications through an increased focus on images of Others. Finally, the last hypotheses might expand our understanding of the interactions between actors' discursive shifts, contextual political competition and policy choices. Their suggestions should be verified in other countries in order to accept their validity.

A few limits are present within this work. On a theoretical level, the

categorisation of Other images has been quite arbitrary, in a literature which has not yet consistently articulated the idea of different Other types according to different radicality or other characteristics (see Croft 2012 for a review of different Other types, which however does not focus exactly on degrees of radicality). Moreover, focusing only on Facebook communication has allowed for a 'purer' analysis of parties' discourse, but has at the same time excluded further media outlets which might have challenged the actors' attempts at setting the agenda on their own terms and prompted them to develop different discursive articulations. Besides developing the above-mentioned hypotheses on party competition, further country-comparative research might help us understand whether the basic discourses found in Italy are common ideal-types in other European states; at the same time, other party families should be included in the analyses. Most importantly, further research should also study the interplay between parties and the other actors who produce discourse in the public sphere; while this study has assumed, based on previous research, that public discourse was generally favourable to tougher stances and migrant radical Othering in Italy during this period, different contexts might influence the production of different basic discourses and the modalities and outcomes of their interaction.

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